'Bogged down in Housing': Politics and Planning in Residential Leeds, 1954-1979 by Philliskirk, Ben
1 
 
“Bogged down in housing”: Politics and Planning in 
Residential Leeds, 1954-1979   
 
Ben Philliskirk 
 
Submitted in accordance with the requirements for the degree of Doctor of 
Philosophy 
 
The University of Leeds 
 
School of History 
 
December 2016 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
The candidate confirms that the work submitted is his own and that appropriate 
credit has been given where reference has been made to the work of others. 
 
This copy has been supplied on the understanding that it is copyright material and 
that no quotation from the thesis may be published without proper 
acknowledgement. 
 
© 2016 The University of Leeds and Ben Philliskirk 
 
 
 
  
3 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
One of the advantages of studying a long-term part-time thesis has been that I 
have benefitted from the input of three different supervisors. First I would like to 
thank Richard Whiting, who has been there for the whole process and extended 
his supervisory role into his retirement. In addition, Moritz Foellmer and Mark 
Smith both provided valuable insights before their departure from Leeds to 
pastures anew. Moritz and Mark’s organisation of several urban history 
workshops at Leeds also provided a significant source of intellectual stimulation. 
 
For her constant encouragement and interest in my work I would also like to give 
many thanks to Linda.    
 
 
  
4 
 
Abstract 
This thesis addresses several themes relating to politics and planning processes 
and their effect on residential areas of post-war Leeds. As such, it examines the 
extent to which Leeds’ political leadership and council bureaucracy were 
pursuing a ‘modernisation project’ in the post-war period, asks if policy changed 
from an ambitious attempt to reshape Leeds’ residential environment to the aim 
of managing selected ‘problem’ areas, and questions whether popular 
organisations were concerned mainly with defending ‘traditional’ communities 
and ways of life, or if they had a more positive aim of achieving greater control 
over the built environment. In relation to this, it considers how much the council 
bureaucrats, local politicians and community groups were constrained by 
political, economic, organisational and technical issues. Ultimately, one of the 
central features of this thesis is how housing issues in Leeds went from a 
relatively consensual political approach with extensive technocratic guidance and 
little popular involvement, to a situation by the end of the 1970s where numerous 
grass-roots organisations were demanding a say in housing policy, party-political 
divisions were an increased feature and the council had become more 
exasperated  at the resources, guidance and management it was receiving from 
central government. This is linked to concepts of ‘collective consumption’ and 
the relationships between citizens and the state, producing conclusions that 
suggest that an inability to achieve broader political influence over changes to the 
residential environment effectively encouraged a retreat to the pursuit of more 
individual solutions and the frustration of collective aims.  
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“Bogged down in housing”: Politics and Planning in Residential 
Leeds, 1954-1979. 
Introduction 
 
Cambridge Road, Woodhouse, 1970s. (Leeds Library and Information Service, www.leodis.net) 
In 1965, when discussing planning policy at a Development Plan meeting, one 
Leeds councillor declared that “(we) must not let every subject get bogged down 
in housing.”1 This was a rather telling statement. For all local authorities, and 
especially a leading one like Leeds, housing was undoubtedly the greatest 
priority. In the immediate period following World War Two, amid the shortages, 
rationing and state direction of policy that ensued, councils were given the major 
role in the provision of housing. They were operating under conditions laid down 
by central government and the various financial and policy constraints that 
stemmed from this, but nevertheless, it was councils that organised the building 
of masses of houses and the development and redevelopment of residential areas. 
The role of councils was to change in the mid-1950s when many of the 
restrictions on private builders and landlords were lifted, but the job local 
authorities were given of clearing the slums and providing modern housing was a 
massive one, and one which was to cause some controversy later in the period.
                                                          
1 Leeds, WYAS. Sub-Town Planning and Improvements Development Review Committee 1965-
69. LLD1/2/834518 (Meeting of 29/10/1965) 
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When examining the politics and planning of Leeds’ housing in the post-war era 
there are a number of themes and questions that need to be investigated and 
which seem of the greatest importance. The first is that of civic pride and local 
identity. In his 2004 book on the Victorian city, Building Jerusalem, Tristram 
Hunt asked rhetorically ‘After seventy years of near total decline, after decades of 
sustained depopulation, suburbanisation, industrial depression, cultural collapse, 
and political castration, could it really be that British cities are starting to revive 
their long-lost Victorian ethic?’2 Another impression of long periods of the post-
war era would be utterly at odds with that of Hunt, who may be indulging in a 
degree of romanticisation and focusing on rather narrow aspects of urban 
governance and legislative fiat. Urban economic, social and cultural elites may be 
less in evidence and local responsibility for gas, electric and water was lost, but 
cities gained the tasks of spending vast resources on housing and education, 
providing modern dwellings and schools, and the significant obligation to plan 
for the development of the entire urban area.   
 
A quote from Anthony Clavane’s Promised Land, a clever and entertaining 
intertwining of the fortunes of the city of Leeds, Leeds United football club and 
Leeds’ Jews, suggests an alternative point of view. ‘The city’s changing skyline 
reflected its new civic pride. The back-to-backs and factories were flattened to 
make way for the M1, an inner ring road and brutalist buildings like the Yorkshire 
Post complex and John Poulsen’s International Pool.’3 He adds that the past was 
seen as something to escape from, as ‘From the opening of City Square in the 
1890s to the great slum clearances of the early sixties, civic visionaries tried -and 
mostly failed- to reverse the image of a grimy, industrial mill town, the eternal 
Victorian city.’4 Clavane acknowledges later in the book that the promise of the 
sixties was to be disappointed, and images of 1970s Leeds have subsequently 
been dominated by the dismal atmosphere of Jimmy Savile, the Yorkshire Ripper 
and David Peace’s Red Riding saga of novels, but this should not obscure the 
hopes and achievements of the city’s attempts at transformation in the post-war 
                                                          
2 Tristram Hunt, Building Jerusalem-The Rise and Fall of the Victorian City (London, Phoenix, 
2004) 
3 Anthony Clavane, Promised Land: A Northern Love Story (London, Yellow Jersey, 2011) p.48  
4 Ibid, p.35 
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period. Residential Leeds was an integral part of this process, and the demolition 
and construction of thousands of dwellings sat side-by-side with the building of 
motorways, schools, offices, shopping centres, university and hospitals. This 
could almost attain an atmosphere of religious revival, and Conservative 
candidates at the 1972 municipal elections were proud to hail ‘slum property 
being demolished at an almost unbelievable rate, and new housing rising on the 
barren soil.’5 
  
The flowering of civic pride was firmly connected to the modernisation drive of 
post-war Britain and, as the above quotes from Clavane suggest, transformation 
of the built environment was a central part of this process. ‘Modernisation’ as a 
concept was thus closely connected to ‘modernism’ in architecture and planning. 
John Gold has said that ‘The social consensus heavily backed the principle of 
progress through technology and supported the idea that architecture could 
contribute decisively to solving pervasive urban problems. The traditional built 
environment could not stand in the way, because its present sorry state 
represented the embodiment of past failures and short-sightedness: its intractable 
problems positively demanded radical solutions.’6 Despite the growing breadth 
and depth of social and infrastructural provision in post-1945 Britain, there were 
fears of decline both locally and nationally. Governments were concerned about 
Britain’s economic performance compared to its major rivals, and were also 
acutely aware of the country’s diminishing position internationally when up 
against the Cold War ‘superpowers’. At a local level, cities such as Leeds felt that 
they needed to reinvigorate themselves economically in order to compete more 
effectively with regional rivals and to narrow the ‘North-South divide’ that had 
been widening since the 1930s. Just as Victorian industries needed to be replaced 
or reinvigorated, the infrastructure of Victorian cities was ripe for the same 
treatment. These two undertakings went hand-in-hand; as late as 1977 Leeds was 
delighted to say that ‘Dilapidated out-of-date dwellings and decaying industrial 
                                                          
5 Leeds Central Library, Leeds Local and General Election Leaflets etc. 1966-1972. Conservative 
Party leaflet, Headingley, 1972 
6 John R. Gold, The Practice of Modernism: Modern Architects and Urban Transformation, 1954-
1972 (London, Routledge, 2007) p.12 
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premises have fallen before the bulldozer and made way for up-to-date well-
equipped housing projects and modern factories.’7 
 
Like many other British cities, Leeds experienced a great intensive and extensive 
transformation in its residential environment in the post-war era. New housing 
areas often represented radical departures in terms of style, materials and living 
experience. This thesis will explore how much this process of change was 
promoted by the conscious introduction of a modernisation project, or if much 
more piecemeal and less coherent forces were at work, in terms of a set of 
responses to political, social and economic pressures outside the control of actors 
within Leeds. Concepts of modernisation were used in different ways in this 
period, and often with a very ideological purpose. Kefford has argued that ‘the 
political and cultural authority which was attached to ‘the modern’ in the post-
war period meant that both state and non-state actors were keen to present their 
objectives in modernising terms.’8 Saumarez Smith also describes the desire to 
translate ‘images of modernity’ into reality as ‘tantamount to orthodoxy’ in the 
early 1960s.9 Thus, while piecemeal efforts to improve older housing could have 
been described as a form of modernisation, in actual discourse modernisation 
represented a much sharper break with the past. For most of the advocates of 
modernisation in Leeds, a planned transformation of ‘obsolete’ features of the 
city into an organised, harmonious social environment was essential in order to 
change perceptions of the city and adapt to many new socio-economic and 
cultural trends.   
 
The issue is complicated further when the concept of ‘modernism’ is considered. 
In many cases modernism and modernisation overlapped, as both involved a 
critique of the past and a vision of a more rational future, but for the purposes of 
this thesis ‘modernism’ is treated as a style and ‘modernisation’ as a deliberate 
process of change. In Leeds the two were not always coupled, and the pursuit of 
the goals of modernisation did not always require the techniques and rhetoric that 
                                                          
7 LCC, Leeds: The Capital of the Centre of Britain (1977) p.11 
8 Alistair Kefford, ‘Constructing the Affluent Citizen: State, Space and the Individual in Post-War 
Britain, 1945-79’ (Unpublished PhD Thesis, University of Manchester, 2015) p.26 
9 Otto Saumarez Smith, ‘Central Government and Town Centre Redevelopment in Britain, 1959-
66’ in Historical Journal 58:1 (2015) p.218 
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accompanied modernist architecture. Saumarez Smith has suggested that 
modernism covers ‘both planning concepts—especially decentralization, 
automobile-centred transport, planning blight, and slum clearance—but also 
architectural ones such as radical or high-rise forms, disregard for much of the 
existing historic fabric, a cannon of stylistic tropes, and industrialized building 
systems.’10  He also adds, tellingly, that most post-war building in Britain was not 
particularly radical, even at the high point of industrialised systems in the 
1960s.11 Possibly as a result of this complex relationship between ideology and 
practice, in his article on the early visions of Milton Keynes Ortolano deliberately 
avoided using the term ‘modernism’, arguing that ‘the term’s very adaptability 
compromises its explanatory power’.12 For this thesis, however, engaging with 
modernism is essential, as the association of the term with the introduction of 
innovative styles and techniques was a major aspect of the arguments of those 
who were both in favour of and opposed to modernisation and change in the built 
environment in this period. The physical form of the urban environment was 
often to assume a much greater significance than its superficial appearance would 
have suggested, and attitudes to modernism played a big part in this.      
 
The achievement of the aims of modernisation and modernism was heavily 
dependent on the application of expertise to the development and execution of 
urban policy. The post-war production of development plans took as its starting 
point a survey of the city and its environment, a technique that was central to the 
thought of pioneering urban planners such as Patrick Geddes.13 Planning was 
judged to be a largely technical activity, and relied on the assumption that 
professional experts would be able to identify and predict trends in socio-
economic life and recommend appropriate actions to accommodate them. From 
the point of view of politics and popular legitimacy planning was made easier in 
the immediate post-1945 period by the existence of a relative consensus on the 
need for state intervention to regulate society and the economy, and the 
                                                          
10 Otto Saumarez Smith, ‘The Inner City Crisis and the End of Urban Modernism in 1970s 
Britain’ in Twentieth Century British History (2016) 27 (4) pp.578-579 
11 Ibid. 
12 Guy Ortolano, ‘Planning the Urban Future in 1960s Britain’ in Historical Journal 54:2 (2011) 
p.506 
13 Peter Hall, Cities of Tomorrow: an intellectual history of urban planning and design in the 
twentieth century (Oxford, Blackwell, 2002) 
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presumption that experts were the best people to judge how to achieve this. 
Nevertheless, urban planners found it difficult or impossible to forecast changes 
in such things as population growth, family formation or cultural expectations, 
and they always lacked control over the wider socio-economic context. Harrison 
sums this up quite well when he points out that ‘The planners were not solely to 
blame: they had not sufficiently allowed for unsympathetic governments and 
local authorities, national pressures for tax cuts, contractors’ unsanctioned cost-
cutting, poor maintenance and shared welfare facilities planned but not 
provided.’14 Despite low levels of public interest in plans themselves, there was 
increasing controversy when it came to their consequences. As one of the major 
fields that were affected by the decisions made by professional technocrats and 
bureaucrats, housing came to arouse a greater deal of political activity as the post 
war years unravelled.   
 
Council house construction had really begun in earnest after the end of World 
War One, while private rent control dated from the same era. Large-scale slum 
clearance first took place in the 1930s, but after World War Two housing was 
placed firmly within the public domain. The majority of dwellings provided were 
public housing, while the extension of planning regulations over the whole 
country meant that the construction and location of private housing estates was 
subject to a high degree of public control. Even owner-occupation was influenced 
and subsidised through Mortgage Tax Relief and via local authority mortgage 
schemes that made housing finance available to the less well-off. Housing as an 
issue was highly political in nature, accentuated by the different ways that central 
and local government impacted upon different tenures and types of house. As 
Carter has argued, ‘Government action could be defended in ethical terms as 
creating public benefit; but many of these ‘benefits’ conflicted with one another. 
There were thus extensive opportunities for those who could shape the agenda to 
define the public good in ways that suited them best.’15 The increased input of 
government and the public sector, in this uneven nature, had created a situation 
                                                          
14 Brian Harrison, Seeking a Role: The United Kingdom, 1951-1970 (Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 2009) p.153 
15 Harold Carter, ‘From slums to slums in three generations; Housing policy and the political 
economy of the welfare state, 1945-2005’, University of Oxford Discussion Papers in Economic 
and Social History, No.98, May 2012 
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where forms of collectivism both complemented and came into conflict with 
private interests and individual aspiration. The politics and planning of housing 
and residential areas took place in this context.  
 
The tensions in the social and political context of housing between the private 
and the collective was not only the case in terms of housing tenure, but also with 
regard to the wider living environment. There was a significant increase in the 
public housing stock, accompanied by a dramatic depletion in private rented 
accommodation, which was eroded by slum clearance and by sales of houses to 
sitting tenants. This brought many more people within the scope of ‘collective 
consumption’, the rents and management of their homes coming under the aegis 
of local authorities. This could bring great advantages when it came to the 
standard of the domestic and social living environment and the security of tenure, 
but also led to a high degree of dependence on the council. The potential for 
increased political control over rents, maintenance and surroundings could have 
been a benefit of social housing, but there were also problems when it came to 
making political influence tell. The structure of many local councils was very 
hierarchical, with leading officials and councillors doing the vast majority of 
decision-making. At first this seemed to be an accepted part of the process, but as 
many tenants and residents felt increasingly that the council was not responsive to 
their concerns and interests, the legitimacy of local government and democracy 
came under question. The issue of how conflicts of interest and outlook came to 
be articulated and resolved at a grassroots level was a central part of local politics 
for a period in the late 1960s and 1970s, but one which was never really tackled 
but rather taken outside the scope of local politics itself. As local authorities 
themselves lost financial and political power, the influence of local people and 
their organisations was diminished as well. 
 
Discord between private and collective aims was not only in evidence within the 
relationship between the state and the individual. The increased role that Leeds 
City Council had acquired in the realm of planning housing provision and land 
use put it in a regulatory position regarding conflicts between private interests 
and between different groups and individuals within public housing. Many of 
these disputes were difficult to reconcile, as the council was often dependent on 
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private businesses and finance to achieve its aims, or unwilling to offend or 
antagonise people. These difficulties were inherent in the council’s position, 
caught as it was between a role as an arena that reflected local politics, or as an 
institution that was there to stand above politics and achieve harmony. Both these 
roles relied on the fiction of a neutrality that was unattainable in the political, 
social and economic context of the time. In the area of land use and the Green 
Belt, Leeds often had to decide between the ambitions of builders and private 
developers on the one hand, and the interests and desires of owner-occupiers on 
the other, while the positions of different types and levels of property-owner were 
also evident when it came to planning and providing wider facilities in residential 
areas such as shopping centres or industry. Within the sector of public housing 
there were often issues relating to the social environment, and disputes got 
surprisingly heated on subjects such as the use and siting of play areas and 
whether areas adjoining council houses should be communal or enclosed 
privately. Later in the period financial restrictions meant that it was difficult to 
resolve problems by throwing extra money at them.       
  
As far as literature on housing and planning is concerned, many of those can be 
categorised as either general social and technical histories of housing in the post-
war period, works of geographical or sociological theory and case-studies, or 
more specific books in a social policy vein that concentrate often on subjects such 
as housing allocation and management. Regarding the first, both Burnett’s A 
Social History of Housing 1815-198516 and Short’s Housing in Britain: The Post-
war Experience17 have provided useful information regarding legislation relating 
to housing, and details of the general framework of housing policy since the war. 
With a non-political approach, Murie, Niner and Watson18 concentrate mainly on 
the powers and duties of local authorities and national government. English, 
Madigan and Norman19 focus on the processes of slum clearance and particularly 
the allocation and rehousing systems of various councils. Stephen V. Ward20 and 
                                                          
16 John Burnett, A Social History of Housing, 1815-1985 (London, Methuen, 1986) 
17 John R. Short, Housing in Britain: The Post-war Experience (London, Methuen, 1982) 
18 Alan Murie, Pat Niner and Christopher Watson, Housing Policy and the Housing System 
(London, Allen and Unwin, 1976) 
19 John English, Ruth Madigan and Peter Norman, Slum Clearance (London, Croom Helm, 1976) 
20 Stephen V.Ward, Planning and Urban Change (London, Paul Chapman, 1994) 
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Helen Meller21 give overviews of the evolution of town planning in Britain. 
Meller’s argument tends to overplay the ideological side of planning and its ‘fall 
from grace’ as planners overreached themselves in terms of scope and ambition22, 
but she does show some awareness of the political context and the inability of 
planning to ‘resolve conflicts between private and public interests, as priorities 
about encouraging new economic activity changed.’23  The place of urban policy 
features sporadically within general political histories of the era. Harrison’s 
encyclopaedic volumes from the ‘New Oxford History of Britain’ series give at 
least some degree of attention to planning issues as an integral trend in post-war 
Britain, and show some awareness that the fortunes of urban planning were 
related to wider attitudes that concerned politics and the state.24 Housing and 
planning is also noticeably neglected in many of the autobiographies and 
biographies of political figures, a particularly disappointing feature in the case of 
leading Leeds MPs like Hugh Gaitskell, Keith Joseph and Denis Healey. Richard 
Crossman’s diaries at least provide a bit more information.25 A valuable popular 
history of post-war British urban environments is found in John Grindrod’s 
Concretopia, where he defies much of the popular legend relating to modernism 
by adopting a sympathetic approach to the social and cultural history of the 
transformation of urban Britain.26 
 
Given that consideration of urban policy and housing issues is relatively sparse in 
most political histories of the period, this has made primary sources more 
illuminating but also sometimes more difficult to locate. The information held in 
Leeds Central Library concerning reports of council meetings and committee 
work has been important, and some of the wider sources of council 
documentation have provided revealing information. The West Yorkshire 
                                                          
21 Helen Meller, Towns, plans and society in modern Britain (Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 1997) 
22 Ibid, pp.85-95 
23 Ibid, p.5  
24 Brian Harrison, Seeking a Role: The United Kingdom, 1951-1970 (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 
2009) and Finding a Role?: The United Kingdom, 1970-1990 (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
2010) 
25 Richard Crossman, The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister: Volume One. Minister of Housing 1964-
66 (London, Hamilton, 1975) 
26 John Grindrod, Concretopia: a journey around the rebuilding of postwar Britain (Brecon, Old 
Street, 2013)  
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Archive Service has also been a useful source of material relating to housing 
matters, albeit more fragmentary in nature. For the purposes of this thesis such 
evidence as reports of public local inquiries into Compulsory Purchase Orders, 
files of officers’ meetings, and planning proposals for redevelopment have been 
valuable. Council records are not available to a uniform breadth or standard 
across the whole period. Some valuable sources, such as Leeds City Council’s 
annual committee reports, finish abruptly at a certain point, while others, such as 
the Department of Housing Quarterly Reports, only started in the mid-1970s. 
Documentation on such features as public local inquiries can be very sporadic. 
Nevertheless, there has been enough detailed information available to form a 
strong impression of the working of the council during this period. Most affairs 
relating to housing involved the local authority to some extent, whether it is 
planning permission, public health or economic development. This helps to 
explain the heavy focus on records stemming from the local authority. As one of 
the major aims of this work is to assess the motivations and inspirations of, and 
constraints on, local politicians and planners, it inevitably concentrates on 
documentation created by or through the council. This also covers sources that 
help to demonstrate the interaction between the politicians and officials of the 
council, on the one hand, and other actors on the other, including central 
government, business, local associations and groups, and private individuals.      
 
Fortunately, there is also a good deal of information in Leeds Central Library 
and, partly, the West Yorkshire Archive Service that has been produced by, or 
involves, non-council actors. This enables another viewpoint and gives an insight 
into the broader context of housing and planning policy. Records that were 
created by campaign groups or local associations tend to be less thorough in 
nature than those that were bureaucratically produced, but the different types of 
language used, and the style of the documentation, can be very revealing about 
the particular groups in question and whether they were orientated in an 
intransigent position or more willing to compromise with the council and its 
policies. One additional advantage of extending my study to 1979 has been that it 
offers increased scope for using some sources that are more ‘oppositional’ in 
nature, for example the radical Leeds Other Paper and the publications of Leeds 
Civic Trust. The Yorkshire Post and Yorkshire Evening Post remained my main 
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sources of information for local housing issues in the mass media, and were 
important sources for information on local feeling before the ‘explosion’ of 
campaign group literature in the late 1960s and early 1970s.    
 
On the subject of photography, Mathew Thomson has said that ‘in the interwar 
period and in the context of plans for a welfare state, the image came to the fore 
as a symbol of what was wrong about an old world and what was possible 
through social reform.’27 He goes on describe how photographs of children 
playing in the street that were used as evidence of deprived social environments 
later became regarded by some people as examples of how these older areas 
provided more freedom for children and local people. Similarly, photographs 
taken as part of the slum clearance procedure that were intended to document the 
inadequacy of older housing often came to be seen later as proof of ‘close-knit 
communities’ and a lost world of doorstep chats and corner-shop encounters. 
Many of the images used in this thesis have the same kind of multi-faceted 
impact. All of the images came from Leeds Central Library’s Leodis database, a 
collection of photographs from various sources. There are a great deal of 
photographs that were taken by council departments for housing and planning 
reasons, with the intention of documenting aged and obsolete sites and buildings, 
while others come from newspapers or private collections. Some are used in this 
thesis for merely illustrative reasons, as with the photographs of Louis Street in 
Chapeltown or the interior of Seacroft Civic Centre. The pictures of Quarry Hill, 
Ebor Gardens, back-to-backs in Harehills and the aerial shot of Seacroft Town 
Centre help to show the sheer scale and scope of these particular environments. 
The photographs that are more ambiguous are those which juxtapose the old and 
new, often featuring the rubble left by recent demolition. The viewer is able to 
project their own impressions on to the image, whether those of nostalgia for the 
passing world or the feeling of inevitable and/or desirable change. In photographs 
such as those of Woodhouse and of the construction of the Inner Ring Road there 
is a pervasive sense of flux which does a lot to illustrate the fortunes of the urban 
environment in this era.      
                                                          
27 Mathew Thomson, Lost Freedom: The Landscape of the Child and the British Post-war 
Settlement (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2013) p.45 
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Most literature that engages critically with issues of post-war housing and 
planning tends to take one of two broad approaches. The first is what could be 
called the ‘state versus society’ or ‘bureaucracy versus the people’ argument. 
This has been common to both contemporary and more recent work, and focuses 
on the idea that post-war planning and state intervention followed a top-down 
approach that gave the state apparatus, leading politicians and technical experts 
too much power vis-à-vis ordinary people. This critique has been found across the 
political spectrum, and found an obvious resonance with campaigning groups in 
the 1970s. Approaches of this kind have adopted positions that suggest that the 
state follows its own interests as a bureaucracy or apparatus, or works on behalf 
of privileged outside interests, either business and finance, or certain groups in 
the population that function as political clienteles, such as council tenants. 
Alternatively, there are those who regard the hierarchical nature of housing and 
planning policy as providing an opportunity for the dreams and schemes of 
technocratic thinkers, who could indulge their ‘utopian’ ideas with the social 
environment as a blank canvas for experimentation. In the case of Alice 
Coleman’s controversial 1980s work Utopia on Trial, the argument turned the 
architectural determinism of many modernist architects and designers on its head 
and produced what almost amounted to a polemic denouncing modern 
architecture for creating all kinds of social problems.28 Often these strands were 
combined to provide an indictment of the post-war planning system, as in the 
progenitor of this approach, Jane Jacobs’ 1961 work The Death and Life of Great 
American Cities.29 Jacobs’ argument went against the whole idea of technocratic 
planning in her emphasis on ‘common sense’ rather than theory, and in the 
advocacy of local approaches to local problems rather than the idea that there 
were common urban policies to deal with generic issues. 
 
Leeds had its own exponent of this thesis in Alison Ravetz, who has written a 
series of books on post-war housing and who was particularly active in the 1970s 
writing articles about issues both nationally and in relation to Leeds, while also 
                                                          
28 Alice Coleman, Utopia on Trial: vision and reality in planned housing (London, Shipman, 
1990) 
29 Jane Jacobs, The Death and Life of Great American Cities (London, Pimlico, 2000) 
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giving support and advice to local tenants’ groups that were opposed to council 
policy. Focusing on the public sector, Ravetz’s Council Housing and Culture30 is 
quite thorough on all aspects relating to council housing, but particularly with 
reference to life on estates, tenant organisation, local authority administration and 
estate design. She emphasizes the differences between different types of council 
tenant, and also council housing’s ‘emphasis on homes rather than the shared 
environment, and its constant obsession with economy.’31  Ravetz’s pamphlet The 
Housing Poor32 is also interesting, describing as it does the plight of the less 
privileged members of the housing system. Her argument focuses around groups 
of people whom she claims are left out of the system and not provided for under 
the forms of tenure at the time. She states that all housing policies have focused 
on the concept of an ‘ideal dwelling’ that the ‘housing poor’ find unsuitable, 
unattainable or out of their financial reach. This approach was also taken by 
Norman Dennis and Jon Gower Davies in their respective studies of planning in 
Sunderland and Newcastle. They claim that the planning process operated in a 
way that discriminated against the poorer sections of the population who were 
forced to accept the decisions made by councils whether they liked them or not. 
Their criticisms of the inefficiency of the planning bureaucracy and the ‘planning 
blight’ it created are the strongest part of their arguments, but their emphasis on 
the ‘sovereignty’ of the local householder and tenant and the defence of their 
individual preferences, however irrational, would effectively make any planning 
process impossible.33 A very critical appraisal of post-war council housing is 
provided in Anne Power’s Property before People.34 This focuses on the 
management of public sector housing, especially at an estate level, but also has 
serious reservations about many of the premises behind council house building in 
the post-war period, including the design and construction of many estates that 
she holds made them harder to administer and maintain, and more dysfunctional 
as living environments.  
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One of the most recent of the expositions on a ‘state versus society’ theme is in 
Peter Shapely’s The Politics of Housing. Shapely’s argument, which focuses on 
the experience of Manchester, is based on the idea that the ‘traditional’ top-down 
pattern of urban governance and housing provision was challenged by ‘a 
consumer revolt against the politics and mismanagement of the council’ which 
meant that ‘a degree of power eventually shifted away from the centre and 
towards the tenants as the end user of the product.’35 It is undoubtedly the case 
that there was a significant increase in grassroots activity and protest about 
housing issues in the late 1960s and early 1970s, but Shapely’s line seems 
somewhat exaggerated. In particular, his emphasis on ‘consumerism’ seems 
highly problematic. The underlying ideology of consumerism could best be taken 
to be focused on purchasing power, choice, and passive, individual, decision-
making, factors that were limited by tenants’ lack of resources and opportunity, 
and rooted more in their position in society and the economy than in the 
behaviour of local authorities. As Cooper and Hawtin have claimed, in 
‘consumerist’ ideology ‘involvement is based on the process of consumption by 
individuals rather than on collective choice, a basis which depoliticises 
community participation.’36  If anything, tenant activism was based on renewed 
ideas of citizenship and heightened political awareness, and the increased power 
of ‘consumerist’ ideology actually disarmed collective organisation by the late 
1970s. Shapely’s distrust of local government stretches to a dismissal of attempts 
to encourage citizen participation, regarding this as a means of integrating 
dissenting voices into the planning process and ‘controlling and, therefore, of 
actually diminishing the power of protestors.’37 Again, there is much truth in this, 
but he neglects to mention the effect that participation initiatives frequently had 
in stimulating residents’ organisation and creating protest where there was little 
evidence of it before.  
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The problems identified by these types of analysis undoubtedly existed, but not in 
such a one-sided or narrow sense as you would gauge from their arguments. 
There is little reflection on the actual role of the state in the post-war era or the 
wider political aspects that affected public policy on housing. Some of these 
authors identify as left-wing in their emphasis on the undemocratic or counter-
productive effects of state policy and planning on the lives of ordinary people, but 
in practice many of their arguments seem quite conservative in their denial of the 
ability to achieve benefits through urban change. There is a tendency to suggest 
that working-class people exercised control over their living environments prior 
to the interference of slum clearance and urban redevelopment, an assertion that 
seems somewhat dubious. The difficulty these views face is in their relative 
disregard for the effects of social and economic change on these communities 
relative to their emphasis on changes initiated by local authorities and planners, 
and the unwillingness to ask why public institutions and government at all levels 
were influenced to act as they did. Effectively they share too limited a conception 
of urban politics. As Paris and Blackaby state in their examination of urban 
renewal in Birmingham, analyses focusing on the inadequacies of local 
government ‘run the risk of ignoring wider determinants of the local situation, in 
particular the impact of central government policies and the operations of the 
market.’38            
 
Other commentaries on post-war urban policy demonstrate a greater focus on the 
place of housing within the political and socio-economic context. These usually 
emphasise the limits on local authorities as agents of change, and often offer 
explanations in line with broader attitudes towards the role of the state and its 
relationship with powerful interests. In the 1970s this was frequently, but not 
exclusively, influenced by varieties of Marxism. A radical approach with less 
emphasis on bureaucratic and technocratic ‘excesses’ than the ‘state against 
society’ school is adopted by Merrett39 and by Gibson and Langstaff.40 They aim 
to demonstrate the links between policy on housing and the economic and social 
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circumstances faced by the government, which then impacted on local authorities. 
Both point out that the switch from slum clearance to housing improvement by 
central and local government took place against a backdrop of more straitened 
public finances and increased costs in the construction industry and in land 
acquisition. At the same time they argue that party policy was becoming more 
consensual, with owner occupation coming to be regarded by the Labour Party as 
the normal and desirable form of tenure, and council housing assuming a 
‘residual’ role. A more political approach is adopted by Patrick Dunleavy in The 
Politics of Mass Housing in Britain, 1945-1975.41 He is critical of the influence 
wielded on housing policy by building contractors and architects, and details the 
links they had with local councils and the ‘technology-led’ determinants of 
housing provision, but he does also admit that political pressures were 
instrumental in the eagerness of local authorities to grasp a ‘technological short-
cut’ solution to their problems.42 Glendinning and Muthesius’ Tower Block, an 
encyclopaedic look at local authority modernist housing projects, is more 
sympathetic towards the high-rise boom of the 1950s and 1960s.43 They argue 
that the political ambitions of local councils and their attempts to surmount the 
constraints they faced were the most important factors. Many local authorities 
were under pressure to demolish slum housing and to replace it rapidly with large 
numbers of modern units. Faced also with the problem of potentially losing many 
residents through ‘overspill’ into neighbouring areas, councils decided to take the 
high density approach. Tower Block's more favourable approach to the 
construction of modern housing is coupled with greater scepticism about the ‘new 
consensus’ that emerged in the late 1960s and 1970s. Glendinning and Muthesius 
argue that ‘the theory of “user flexibility” and tenant “participation” does not 
seem to have originated primarily with any specific group of users or tenants, but 
was first propagated by groups of “providers”, notably designers and 
journalists.’44 Thus the ideology that surrounded housing policy in the 1970s was 
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as much shaped by fashion and elitist thinking as that of the modernist period of 
the era before.      
 
Some of the most helpful literature on urban policy has taken it as part of wider 
political analyses relating to the state and the economy. On this subject Manuel 
Castells was one of the most influential thinkers of the 1970s, specifically from a 
Marxist viewpoint.45 He developed the concept of ‘collective consumption’ 
which he classed as involving ‘…in housing, socio-cultural facilities, public 
transport and so on, ie. the whole sector which the economists call ‘collective 
goods’ and which are characterised (in terms of liberal economics) by the fact 
that they do not meet the price of the market, that they are not governed directly 
by supply and demand.’46 He argued that this sector covered functions that were 
necessary for the functioning of socio-economic activity and the harmony of 
society, but not profitable enough to be fully provided by private enterprise, and 
that these services had become much more important in the post-war era. As 
such, they had become a potential source of conflict between different social 
strata and between service users and the state, taking place through what Castells 
described as ‘urban social movements’. Against the kind of arguments advocated 
by people such as Ravetz and Shapely, Castells stressed that ‘we must conceive 
of opposition to decisions relating to urban planning as something more than 
“consumer-reaction”’47, and linked them to a wider political ‘crisis’. ‘State 
intervention in the maintenance of essential but unprofitable public services has 
effectively been carried out at the cost of an inflationary and growing public debt, 
for the finance of these growing and indispensable public expenses could not be 
achieved through an imposition on capital (which refused to yield part of its 
profits) or, completely, through increased taxation- the eventual social struggles 
and political oppositions spelled out the limits of such a strengthening of state 
power at the expense of wage earners.’48 Castells’ view was possibly somewhat 
exaggerated in its stress on the potential radicalism of oppositional groups, and 
perhaps slightly too deterministic in his view on the state. There was some room 
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for political differences within the scope of ‘collective consumption’, such as 
conflict over the provision of services and the extent to which different groups 
benefitted from urban politics. Nevertheless, his thesis provides an important 
background to the rise of mass public housing and state planning, and to the 
subsequent stresses of the 1970s.       
 
Another approach that used the concept of ‘collective consumption’, but rejected 
the neo-Marxist ‘structural’ explanations of Castells, was taken by Patrick 
Dunleavy in Urban Political Analysis.49 Focusing more specifically on urban 
politics within the UK, he claimed that the importance of ideology had been 
exaggerated, which had ‘the effect of shifting the conception of policy-making 
into a framework emphasising ideas, debates, strategies and techniques as 
determinants of policy, and underplaying the impact of organised interests and 
economic or political power.’50 He argued that central government influence was 
relatively limited and was ‘much more effective in reducing the scale of local 
authority activity, in producing financial retrenchment or in eliminating initiatives 
or practices via the operation of the ‘ultra vires’ rule, than it is in effecting 
redistributive goals or securing positive policy advance.’51 Importantly, he 
asserted that a focus on the politics of collective consumption would ‘certainly 
reflect the economic, ideological and political structures which encourage or 
constrain state intervention, the forces determining the balance between public 
and private consumption modes, and the broader balance of class and sectoral 
forces in society as a whole.’52   
 
Further material on urban politics relating directly to housing has been provided 
by Harold Carter. His paper on housing policy and the political economy of the 
welfare state53 assessed which groups in society had benefitted or lost out from 
state intervention in housing policy, and examined the consequences of post-war 
trends such as the containment of urban areas, urban renewal, subsidies to home 
owners and needs-based housing allocation. He concluded that ‘pursuit of the 
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median voter and the preservation of vested interests created at earlier stages of 
reform have been the two great forces driving forward state involvement in the 
political economy of housing’.54 In his previous work on Labour political control 
and housing in Sheffield and Southwark55, Carter used a similar kind of analysis 
to look at how the declining fortunes of the local Labour Parties in the two areas 
were linked to changes in the nature of public services and social structure. He 
observed that several factors came together to favour Labour domination in these 
places: working-class society in the immediate post-war period was very 
cohesive, the benefits of social intervention were seen to go to established 
community members, and there was a relatively continuous flow of financial 
resources.56 When these factors disappeared as a consequence of slum clearance 
and population dispersal, increased needs-based housing allocation that favoured 
groups such as immigrants and the socially excluded poor, and financial cuts that 
had uneven effects, the solid support for the Labour hierarchy was also lost. 
Politically, and to some extent socially, Leeds was different to Sheffield or 
Southwark, possessing a stronger middle-class presence and a higher degree of 
party alternation in office, so the consequences coincided less, but both of 
Carter’s works show the value of an analysis that takes into account many of the 
more dynamic and unintended results of urban political intervention.  
 
A recent approach that argues that urban renewal was not a utopian, naïve 
reconstruction project or an attempt at self-aggrandisement by a collection of 
bureaucrats is provided by Tim Verlaan in an article on the Netherlands.57 He 
suggests that much of the urban redevelopment that was planned and executed in 
the post-war period was provoked by a feeling of necessity and an anxiousness to 
act in order to deal with issues that threatened to prove highly problematic in the 
future. Consequently, he asserts that ‘…governance practices disclose 
interrogations of modernity between a range of actors who frequently displayed 
feelings of doubt, hesitance and ambivalence about the future, leading to 
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particular political and spatial outcomes.’58 It is significant that he sees planners 
as part of a wider urban renewal ‘coalition’ with politicians, civil servants, other 
professionals and businessmen, though there appears to be less evidence in Leeds 
of his belief that politicians were the group most prone to uncertainties about the 
type of projects and plans that were planned and built. During the period when 
Leeds’ Liberals were organising campaigns aiming to resist the tide of urban 
redevelopment, the Conservative group that ran the council were highly 
enthusiastic about rejuvenating Leeds’ urban environment and showed a great 
deal of faith in the council ‘technocracy’. On the other hand, by the mid-1970s 
many of the planners were insisting on the limits to their ability to effect certain 
changes, and starting to manage expectations at a lower level. Much is due to 
context. Nonetheless, Verlaan’s article is an important reminder of the diversity 
of aim and opinion within local policy-makers, and shows that many decisions 
and plans were made due to a fear of being ‘left behind’ by wider processes of 
urban social, economic, cultural and technological change.             
 
Outside of the general books relating to housing issues, the secondary sources 
most relevant to housing matters in Leeds are the PhD thesis on ‘Conservative 
Governments and the Housing Question, 1951-59’ by A.G.V. Simmonds59, Owen 
Hartley’s essay in Derek Fraser’s A History of Modern Leeds60, and a chapter 
focussing on Leeds in Langstaff and Gibson’s An Introduction to Urban 
Renewal.61 Simmonds uses Leeds as a case study, and offers a good overview of 
Leeds’ housing policy during the 1950s, comparing and contrasting it to 
encouragement and legislation from central government. The house-building 
programme is described in some detail, but it is less comprehensive on the issues 
of slum clearance, private renting and housing’s place in planning. Social change 
within Leeds is touched on in his conclusions, but only superficially. He gives the 
opinion that there was generally a consensus within Leeds council on housing 
matters, touches on tenants’ and residents’ points of view in the conclusion, but 
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not in depth and primarily in a way that concentrates on their relationship to 
Conservative political ideology of the time. In Hartley’s work housing occupies a 
small section in an essay which is a short part of a general history of Leeds, but it 
nonetheless provides some useful information on housing policy, including the 
rivalry between different sections of the council bureaucracy. Gibson and 
Langstaff provide a brief but interesting narrative on Leeds’ post-war planning 
efforts, concentrating mainly on housing. Michael Langstaff himself worked 
within Leeds’ Housing Department in the 1970s. Their argument is that Leeds did 
employ a distinctive approach in its outlook to urban renewal, but had constantly 
to battle against constraints that were political and economic in nature, and which 
also had their roots in the very environment that Leeds’ planners and politicians 
were faced with. They describe Leeds’ attempts at housing improvement as one 
example of local policy development, contending that it was a successful short-
term response to massive housing obsolescence problems, but not one that could 
provide a lasting solution to poor housing and environmental conditions. 
Unfortunately, Leeds was also faced by the early 1970s with a situation where 
clearance and redevelopment were becoming politically and economically 
unfeasible, and where economic decline was affecting a lot of communities. They 
comment that Leeds had succeeded in providing basic amenities for its thousands 
of elderly homes, but that ‘many of the others improved since the mid-1950s are 
now (1982) in need of substantial investment in reimprovement or clearance: they 
are often set in drab environments.’62   
 
Two recent theses have featured Leeds as case studies for quite different 
approaches to urban policy. David Ellis focuses on community politics in Leeds 
from 1960 to 1990, with a concentration on what he describes as the ‘long 
1970s’, and addresses the impact of activist groups and whether they qualified as 
a ‘movement’ akin to the feminist, anti-racist, peace and gay rights movements  
of the same era.63 Grass-roots organisations connected to issues around urban 
renewal play a major part. He argues that community action was a response to the 
refusal of the council to allow citizens to participate in the establishment and 
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execution of urban policy as much as it was a response to material problems, 
significant as they often were.64 Their campaigns, he stresses, had some success 
in reorienting local policy in fields like slum clearance and road-building, and 
had formed the outline of ‘an alternative approach to housing renewal’ by the late 
1970s.65 Ultimately, they reached their limits and failed to become a movement 
due to a lack of links between different groups of activists both within Leeds and 
nationally; the absence of a shared identity and ideology; campaigns which pulled 
in different directions; and an increasingly unfavourable national policy by the 
1980s.66 He is candid about many of the limitations of community groups despite 
his sympathy with their aims and, while his assessment of their impact on Leeds’ 
housing policy may be slightly exaggerated, he provides a valuable reminder of 
the significance of local protest movements as well as the reasons for their 
emergence.  
 
Alistair Kefford's work concentrates on the nature of the local state and uses 
Leeds and Manchester as examples.67 He argues that local authorities acted to 
remodel the spaces of the city in a way that favoured economic growth and, in 
particular, create in material form the ideal arena for private consumption habits. 
It aims to act as a corrective to post-war histories that stress a rupture between 
pre-1979 welfare collectivism and Thatcherite entrepreneurial urbanism, and 
suggests that both collective and individual behaviour was heavily influenced by 
a highly interventionist yet pro-capitalist state. He states that ‘the physical fabric 
of cities was remodelled around the needs of a re-imagined post-war subject—the 
affluent, mobile, consuming citizen—and public officials endorsed and facilitated 
a pre-eminent role for the commercial domain, and organised capital, in 
determining the form and function of the urban landscape.’68 These factors did 
play a major role in the modernisation plans of Leeds’ politicians and 
bureaucrats, but Kefford’s focus on the state’s promotion of private sector 
activity possibly leads him to underestimate the significance of collective 
consumption during this period. While there were notable continuities in local 
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authority approaches to economic growth and private-sector consumption 
throughout the post-war period and after 1979, the major shifts in the policies and 
attitudes of the state came in the field of public provision, where the state had 
started to take a less interventionist approach in the 1970s that aimed to 
depoliticise issues relating to collective consumption and release the pressure of 
public expectation.      
 
At a slight tangent, but closely related to my approach to post-war Leeds, a book 
by Rosemary Wakeman on the post-1945 modernization of Toulouse69 has been 
illuminating with regard to many of the similarities in approach to urban 
redevelopment across different cities and countries. It focuses on perceptions of 
change and the goals and images associated with the processes of ‘modernisation’ 
and is insightful in the descriptions of how modernisation encompassed different 
points of view, for example social reform and improvement, technical advance, 
capitalist economic change, and provincial identity and pride. She approaches the 
issue in more of a historical fashion rather than the social policy or geographical 
outlooks of many of the other sources. Wakeman’s definition of ‘modernization’ 
is ‘the widespread conviction that economic innovation and progress, that 
ordered, wholesome living environments, and that the judicious organization of 
the various social classes were the solutions to the conflicts that had plagued 
France for two centuries.’70 She describes modernism as the ‘aesthetic arm of the 
rationalist, progressive outlook that infused French public policy and the 
technocratic agenda.’71  
 
There are, obviously, notable differences between Toulouse and Leeds. The 
French and British states and local authorities operated in different ways, there 
were other political groups and currents and, significantly, Toulouse was dealing 
with growth whereas Leeds, in many ways, was managing decline. Nevertheless, 
both were important provincial cities in Western countries, and Wakeman’s 
method and analysis is also relevant to Leeds’ experiences. She states that ‘the 
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modernist landscape was clearly a social order and a strategy for political power 
imposed upon the city. The modernization of Toulouse became a subterranean 
celebration of bureaucratic power and rationality, both in terms of aesthetic 
design and material production. It was a mechanism for forging a new French 
identity around modern middle-class elites, their tastes, and their values.’72 It has 
been very useful to bear these thoughts in mind when contemplating Leeds’ post-
war history.73   
 
Closer to home, another significant commentary on modernisation and 
modernism in the post-war city is provided by Simon Gunn’s article on 
Bradford.74 He points out that recent literature on urban Britain has tended to 
neglect the post-war history of the major industrial and port cities and that, as a 
result of this, ‘it has become difficult to envisage the ‘industrial city’ in Britain as 
a twentieth-century phenomenon, so overdetermined does it seem to be by its 
nineteenth-century origins.’75 His analysis of how modernism was applied in 
Bradford shows close similarities to Wakeman’s, the emphasis being on the 
intended rationality and efficiency of the modern social environment and the 
hierarchical and technical nature of planning. As far as the demise of 
modernisation in Bradford is concerned, Gunn locates this in economic and 
industrial decline rather than popular opposition or ‘planning from below’, 
though he does add, interestingly, that the spontaneous rejuvenation of older 
areas of the city that took place as an effect of immigration helped to undermine 
many of the assumptions made in the rigid development planning of the era.76 His 
ultimate conclusion was that the speed and scope of urban change provoked its 
own backlash, and that ‘the collapse of urban modernism in cities like Bradford 
was not only—as so often assumed—an aesthetic reaction, powerful as this was 
among certain social groups. It was also the result of other, deeper lying 
processes, notably the settlement of new migrant communities and the effects of 
rapid deindustrialisation, which undermined the particular combination of 
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universalism, meliorism, and technocracy that lay at the heart of urban 
modernism.’77 While Bradford was not identical to Leeds in stature or industrial 
profile, and immigration made more of an impact on Bradford’s urban fabric, I 
find Gunn’s approach very convincing. Bradford was a close neighbour of Leeds 
with a largely Victorian heritage, and both cities were anxious to transform their 
images along with their environment. Gunn looks broadly at the socio-economic 
context that planning operated in, and is not too harsh on the judgements of the 
post-war era, while acknowledging their limitations. Where his article differs 
more starkly from my research is that it focuses more on the city centre and on 
industry, with housing taking a back seat. An examination of residential Leeds 
could produce equally significant insights.   
 
Historical approaches to post-war urban change on the lines of Wakeman and 
Gunn are relatively rare. As has been mentioned previously, much of the 
secondary sources come from the stances of sociology, social policy, geography 
and political science. This thesis is unambiguously one that takes the form of 
urban political history. The issue of ‘community’, for example, is an important 
one in urban history at this time, but this thesis tends not to get too bogged down 
in the sociological aspects of it, focusing instead on the effect that concepts of 
community had on political positions and disputes. The emphasis is on the 
institutions and figures that made decisions relating to the built environment of 
Leeds, the actions of other organisations such as political parties, tenant groups 
and the like, and the political, social, ideological and economic context that actors 
faced and had to operate within. This often involves an emphasis on the more 
bureaucratic and hierarchical features of political life in Leeds, but this does not 
reflect a personal tendency to favour a ‘top-down’ style of history, merely the 
desire to focus on the motives and actions of those in positions of responsibility.  
Indeed, one of the themes running through this thesis is that these people and 
organisations were heavily influenced and constrained by the wider environment 
they faced.  
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This politically orientated approach enables the issue of agency to come more to 
the fore. Often individual bureaucrats, politicians and even community activists 
are taken to be typical of their particular roles, without enough attention being 
paid to their idiosyncrasies. The same goes for political parties and pressure 
groups, which exhibited widely differing behaviours according to their particular 
backgrounds and the people that they represented. An important factor is the 
relationship between political actors, on an individual and collective level, with 
many of the concepts and issues that arose during the post-war period. Along 
with ‘community’ there are other words that became very popular in political 
discourse, including ‘modernisation’ and ‘participation’. These concepts did not 
go uncontested, and their use was often evidence of a particular outlook to urban 
change in Leeds. For those looking back at the era, it is also useful to compare the 
rhetoric with the kind of political activity that took place and the ends that were 
achieved. By the 1970s there was an increasing amount of attention given to 
concepts like ‘community’ and ‘participation’, and it is interesting to gauge 
whether this was merely lip service to disguise other priorities and aims. 
 
One of the more significant issues is the link between local politics and the wider 
socio-economic change that was affecting cities like Leeds. Political actors at all 
levels and of all kinds were confronted with and responding to certain challenges. 
For politicians it was the need to satisfy their particular constituencies while also 
taking into account their personal concepts of the needs and interests of the city 
as a whole. Bureaucrats also had this idea of the broader city in mind, along with 
the duty of fulfilling statutory and professional responsibilities. Community 
activists often had more limited objectives, but covering a much wider range of 
issues. They might regard themselves as protecting their particular community or 
area against unwanted change, or alternatively trying to secure change that they 
felt was long overdue and would benefit local people. The environment they 
faced provided both opportunities and constraints. Over the whole period more 
resources were devoted to investing in and developing the built environment than 
ever before, but this injection of money also created expectations that were hard 
to sustain when the finances ran dry, or led to conditions that other people found 
unsettling and confusing. The demands of responding to economic change that 
many politicians and administrators found irresistible also provided something of 
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a strain, and elicited different responses from sections of the public. At certain 
points it is hard to tell just who is controlling or influencing urban political 
processes, something that is difficult to reconcile with the collective nature of 
urban life, the shared experiences of many citizens, and the fact that so much 
more activity was falling under the onus of democratically elected local political 
authorities.    
 
The post-war period was marked by the tension between the collectivism that was 
engendered by the creation of institutions of mass state provision and 
intervention; the continued existence of a capitalist society with private property 
ownership and profit-making; and the nature of a liberal democracy that was very 
‘top-down’ orientated and dependent on bureaucratic procedures. The increased 
role of the state and its acceptance of the responsibility not just to provide welfare 
directly, but to act as a ‘harmoniser’ of conflicting interests, undoubtedly 
provided a focus for collective political action. Problems arose over how this 
political activism and popular concern over urban change could be related to 
formal politics, and how popular demands could be reconciled with the 
framework of technocratic planning and the broader economic context. There is a 
definite sense by the mid-1970s that these problems had both overwhelmed the 
established processes of urban planning and governance, yet also effectively 
blunted the ‘collectivist’ thrust of local activism and popular political 
involvement. An enhanced focus on individual aspiration and more narrow 
conceptions of personal or group interests were apparent when it came to such 
things as council house sales, attitudes to public space or resisting development 
that might offend against the established social hierarchy. 
 
This thesis focuses on Leeds for various reasons. Some are personal. As a part-
time student it was very helpful to be able to concentrate on sources that could be 
accessed locally. Coming to live in Leeds as an undergraduate student and then to 
reside permanently has encouraged me to become inquisitive as to how the city 
has developed in the form it has. Hearing from older local people about buildings 
such as Quarry Hill and Leek Street Flats was a catalyst for further research, and 
features such as Leeds’ extensive tracts of back-to-back housing are practically 
unique in British urban life. Much historical writing about Leeds has concentrated 
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more on its Georgian and Victorian rise to prominence.78 The impact of the post-
war era is also worthy of investigation. More broadly, Leeds provides an 
excellent example of post-war urban history, both for its similarities and 
differences from other British cities. Slum clearance, multi-storey building, Green 
Belts, traffic problems and economic restructuring were all common issues that 
Leeds approached in its own way. The city had the fortune to escape relatively 
unscathed from Second World War bombing and the immediate need for 
reconstruction that entailed, but also ‘missed out’ on the opportunities that large-
scale bomb-sites presented for reimagining the city. Leeds was also burdened 
with the unusual problem of dealing with tens of thousands of back-to-back 
houses in a period when they were initially seen as hopelessly outdated. All of 
these factors make Leeds a suitably significant place to study. 
 
Given the relatively extensive coverage of the immediate post-war period and the 
consensual nature of formal party politics, particularly at local level, this thesis 
has 1954 as its starting point. This particular year marks the resumption of slum 
clearance programmes, but the mid-1950s also saw the commencement of the 
transformation of inner city housing and the rise of multi-storey building. These 
trends continued until the late 1960s when the impetus was checked for financial 
reasons and because the technical and social justifications for multi-storey 
building started to be heavily questioned. By the 1970s the housing system hits a 
period of uncertainty as new building slowed, councils experimented more with 
improvement and renovation of property, and social problems mounted that 
impacted on the administration and management of housing as well as 
demonstrated the need to approach housing issues in their full social context. 
1979 is traditionally seen as a watershed in British politics and, despite some 
continuities in housing and urban policy with the ‘years of decline’ in the 1970s, 
the Thatcher governments also marked the end of an era with the arrival of the 
compulsory ‘right to buy’ in public housing, further heavy public spending cuts, 
and a more relaxed attitude to planning. Issues relating to management of the 
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housing stock or housing finance are not dealt with in any great detail, except 
where they impacted on decision-making or elicited a political response that 
affected the built environment in a significant way. Thus rent issues and changes 
in national policy like the 1972 Housing Finance Act are not featured. 
 
To begin with, the specific housing concerns of Leeds are placed in their context 
in two chapters which look at the issues surrounding planning in the post-war 
period and provide some background information on the city of Leeds. The 
interlinked issues of slum clearance and housing improvement are then explored. 
At first they had a reciprocal relationship, but in time they were often taken to be 
dramatically opposed to each other. The subject is a major one, and is tackled in 
two chapters, before and after 1970. Leeds saw extensive slum clearance from the 
late 1950s, and it will be interesting to further explore the assessment of ‘unfit’ 
housing, especially in view of the fact that many ‘unfit’ dwellings that escaped 
the bulldozer were judged to be more than capable of improvement and even 
‘gentrification’ less than twenty years later. Many of the inner-city areas suffered 
from ‘planning blight’ and the inhabitants often lived in a situation of constant 
uncertainty. Their reaction to this was to be of increasing importance.  Leeds was 
relatively ‘ahead of its time’ in approaching the issue of housing improvement, 
but it was also a contentious policy within the bureaucratic and political spheres 
of the council. 
 
The construction of public housing and the experiences of those living in it are 
then treated in two chapters that approach the topic before and after 1968. The 
first half takes in the ‘boom’ housebuilding period of the 1950s and 1960s, and 
the rise of multi-storey construction. The latter section looks at the council’s 
response to the demise of high-rise, the problems managing modern housing, and 
the declining fortunes of certain public housing developments such as Hunslet 
Grange flats, along with the response of tenants.                   
 
This is followed by an examination of the city’s approach to residential land-use 
planning. This includes the often controversial nature of the Green Belt and 
proposed developments on or adjoining it, and also takes in political disputes 
over land disposal and allocations of land for public or private housing. This was 
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significant in areas in the north of the city, and also in Whinmoor and Colton 
which were considered by the council to be natural areas for expansion. 
                   
Non-residential functions such as road-building, industry and shopping are also 
linked to the themes above. Leeds quite proudly declared itself ‘Motorway City 
of the Seventies’ for a time, and the Inner Ring Road, M1 and M621 caused 
major upheaval to certain parts of Leeds. Other traditional residential areas were 
to see a change of emphasis as they were demolished and replaced by industry or 
business, while shopping and social facilities were an important part of the living 
environment. As issues of zoning and segregation of land uses were integral to 
planning in the modern city they will be given close consideration. 
                   
The conclusion will bring these various themes together and assess how the 
issues of housing and planning in residential Leeds were influenced by the 
process of ‘modernisation’. In many ways it could be said that there was a kind of 
‘arrested modernisation’ in many British cities as the plans and hopes of the 
1950s and 1960s were only partially completed before the backlash of the 1970s. 
The different political and ideological approaches towards modernisation are also 
interesting, taking bureaucratic and corporate forms, sometimes involving radical 
social transformations, and also provoking radical and conservative reactions 
from various groups within the local population. Housing is one of the most basic 
social needs, and how it is acquired, allocated, constructed and disposed of 
should form an important part of any history of Leeds in a time of rapid social 
change that included economic affluence, industrial restructuring and decline, 
extensive programmes of social provision, alterations in family structure, 
unparalleled social mobility, and the swift growth of mass motor transport.  
40 
 
Chapter One: The Role of Planning, 1945-1979 
 
The nature and role of planning in the post-war transformation of Britain’s cities 
is a subject that has tended to assume something of a popular consensus since the 
1970s, when a violent change of opinion took place about the value of much of 
the urban change that had taken place in the preceding two decades. The mood 
had been captured in the works and endeavours of John Betjeman and various 
local and national societies for the preservation of Victorian Britain, but it also 
found a very practical form in many of the local struggles that affected cities in 
the 1970s over issues regarding slum clearance, the management of council-
owned housing, and the redevelopment of declining city districts. ‘Planning’ was 
an all-purpose target for some of this criticism, and often with a rather wide and 
subjective focus on what ‘planning’ represented in practice. A quote from Alison 
Ravetz in 1980 helps to demonstrate this. She said that post-war planning ‘was 
based on strong government, special executive and managerial classes, the 
centralisation of industry, and the dispersal of work, family life, education and all 
other activities among the separate parts of the city.’1 She added that, ‘it was the 
ruling out of evolutionary patterns, rather than its alleged bias to physical forms, 
that was the hallmark of the post-war style of planning.’2 Some of this is 
undoubtedly an accurate description of some of the processes that affected post-
war Britain, but such issues as strong government, industrial policy, work and 
social life were far from under the control of town and country planners. As far as 
her second point was concerned, the major buttress of the post-war planning 
regime was the 1947 Town and Country Planning Act which, along with the 
creation of Green Belts, actually gave much of development planning a very 
conservative style and made change in some facets of planning a rather tardy 
process.  
 
One of the main problems with many approaches to ‘planning’ is that they do 
relatively little to define what ‘planning’ is and who ‘planners’ were. My own 
view is that planning was essentially a tool, used by public authorities to provide 
expertise on many of the problems that affected post-war cities. Both planners 
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and councils were thus subject to swings in political leaning, economic boom and 
bust, social trends, and intellectual fashion. At times, the context that planners 
operated in gave them opportunities to dream about a future in line with their 
personal and professional preferences, but these moments were quite fleeting. For 
all the expansion of their career prospects in this period, it must have been a 
frustrating time as well. 
 
Management of cities had become an increasing problem during the nineteenth 
century. The rapid growth in urban populations led to difficulties involving issues 
such as transport, housing and health. Local authorities rationalised their 
functions and bureaucracies in order to deal with these on a day-to-day basis, but 
the roots of planning lay in the need to transform the city to adapt to the effects of 
urbanisation and change. The planning profession, from its onset, had to try and 
forecast the needs of the city of the future and anticipate many of the trends that 
would affect it. At first this was more wide ranging in theory than in practice, as 
planners in the pre-Second World War era were often involved primarily in 
problem-solving affecting narrowly-defined areas such as traffic management, 
public spaces and the layout of new greenfield local-authority housing estates. 
The Second World War itself was to put planners in a position where their 
thought could range across the whole city. 
 
Land-use planning had evolved in the twentieth century influenced by the utopian 
ideas of Ebenezer Howard and the Garden City experiments at Letchworth and 
Welwyn, US ‘zoning’ schemes and the early plans of local authorities. World 
War Two and the intensive planning of the war economy were to give a much 
greater boost to proposals for the planning and control of land. The wartime 
Barlow Report on the distribution of the industrial population, the Scott Report 
on the utilisation of rural land and the Uthwatt Report on compensation and 
betterment all made recommendations on the subject, but firm proposals for 
legislation came from the post-war Labour government, significantly with the 
Town and Country Planning Act of 1947. This created a framework for effective 
planning controls and post-war redevelopment, and declared that each planning 
authority had to prepare a development plan for its whole area, based on a 
thorough survey and analysis, as well as giving planning authorities the discretion 
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to refuse or impose conditions on detailed aspects of all development proposals, 
subject to appeal.3 The legislation also involved state acquisition of development 
rights on all land and a 100% tax on rises in land value caused by development, 
and though these latter conditions were subsequently relaxed by the Conservative 
government, the remainder of the act provided the basis for post-war planning 
orthodoxy. This provided greater influence and freedom for private developers 
than the more ‘statist’ system of the late 1940s, but nonetheless involved 
restrictions based on development control and the establishment of Green Belts 
where differing conceptions of property rights clashed.4  Short has argued that the 
effects of this were to be a smaller supply of land for development and an 
associated increase in land prices, which ‘has been passed on to consumers by 
builders in the form of more expensive housing or in the form of higher-density, 
poorer-quality housing.’5 McKay and Cox recognised this, but pointed out a 
relative absence of conflict over land-use policy, partly as the technical aspects of 
the planning process were left to professional experts, but also because there was 
a consensus on values such as urban containment and rural protection.6 Indeed, 
what overt conflict took place over planning issues tended to focus around a 
defence of these values. 
 
As part of the post-war Town and Country Planning legislation local planning 
authorities were obliged to produce Development Plans that involved forecasts of 
future needs and the zoning of the city according to the desired use of particular 
pieces of land. This involved strict requirements for planning permission for any 
changes in land use, and the major intention and effect of this legislation has been 
described as ‘the containment of the physical spread of urban areas over the 
countryside.’7 Suburbanisation had proceeded very quickly in the inter-war 
period and large council estates and private speculative building had engulfed the 
old rural and industrial satellite villages of Leeds, requiring a string of extensions 
to the city boundaries. After World War Two these trends continued, as the 
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country needed to make up for the wartime postponement of housebuilding, 
provide dwellings for an increasing population, and rehouse many of the 
inhabitants of the overcrowded slum districts.  
 
The 1947 planning system came to be criticised for its rigidity and tendency to 
lapse into ‘dull, regulatory, local authority bureaucracy.’8 By the late 1960s it was 
judged to be in need of revision, and the Town and Country Planning Act of 
1968, with the creation of broader ‘structure plans’ and detailed ‘local plans’, 
coupled with the Skeffington Committee’s report People and Planning, were 
intended to inject some flexibility and popular involvement in the system. These 
changes had little practical effect when it came to decision-making, but did help 
to create a broader input for public opinion into planning issues and proposals. In 
the 1970s this led to some difficulties, with planning, which ‘has preferred to be 
apolitical, standing aloof as paternalist or technocratic’9, struggling to adjust to 
the changed circumstances. Indeed, it could be argued that the incompleteness of 
the institutional ‘settlement’ created in the late 1960s and early 1970s influenced 
the increased politicisation of the planning system while diminishing the ability 
of planners, local authorities and the public to control their local environments. 
There were frequent cases, the Skeffington Report and the 1974 government 
circular on ‘Gradual Renewal’ being two examples, where central government 
issued policy proclamations with very little guidance or support given on how 
these aspirations should be put into practice. 
 
So far I have lapsed into using the word ‘planners’ without providing an adequate 
definition. In the early years of ‘planning’, the people who were involved in the 
acts of problem-solving and forecasting changes in the urban fabric were largely 
city engineers, who would have the ability to manage projects that would 
improve and extend the infrastructure of cities. In the inter-war period they would 
often be joined by local-authority architects departments, who designed the 
plethora of public buildings of various types, and crucially the housing that 
councils increasingly supplied. Town and country planning as a profession in the 
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UK dates from the establishment of the Royal Town Planning Institute in 1914, 
but town planners in local authorities were still in their infancy at the outbreak of 
the Second World War, and were often uncertain of their position in the 
established ‘hierarchy’ of planning.10 The role of town planners was largely that 
of spatial planning, which seemed to those from an engineering background to be 
more aesthetic than scientific, and the ‘scientific’ basis of many planning 
decisions was to come under scrutiny in later years. Nevertheless, the need for 
reconstruction of British cities after the destruction and the neglect of the war 
years was to give spatial planning a boost, though it particularly benefitted from 
the development plan system instituted through the Town and Country Planning 
Act of 1947. The early development plans were often relatively brief and 
produced, like Leeds’, mainly by the City Engineer, but the process of revision 
that took place in the 1960s saw a much deeper analysis.  By the early 1970s, 
after corporate reorganisation, Leeds’ planners included a Chief Planning Officer, 
City Development Officer and City Architect.  
 
The development plan system did give planners an extensive input into the future 
of the built environment of the city, but there were many other local politicians 
and bureaucrats who took part in and influenced the planning process. As has 
been argued in relation to Cardiff, development planning in the initial post-1947 
period was mainly a response to issues, but it required political and business input 
to establish a ‘planning doctrine’ ‘in the sense of a plan or vision that developed a 
coherent spatial form and urban design for a town or city as a long-term goal, 
achievable in stages, by means that were discussed and intended to achieve a 
particular type of place.’11 This was especially important for cities that were 
trying to change their image and engage in reconstructing the local economy. The 
council leader and the councillors who filled important positions, such as chairing 
the Housing and the Town Planning and Improvements committees, played an 
important part in setting council policy. In mid-1960s Leeds the Housing 
Chairman, Karl Cohen, was able to obtain a reduction in the demolition rate 
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against the wishes of the City Engineer and City Architect, and also other 
councillors. Similarly, statements in the late 1950s from the experienced City 
Architect R.A.H. Livett about the possibility of siting tower blocks in parts of the 
city’s main parks were quickly repudiated by the Town Planning and 
Improvements chair. When political imperatives coincided with planning 
ambitions, planners were held with greater esteem and allowed to indulge 
themselves. In Leeds this was the case in the late 1960s and early 1970s, when 
the Conservative administration sought to accelerate the process of 
‘modernisation’ and promote the city as a regional centre. Unfortunately for the 
planners, these initiatives were to run out of impetus when finances ran short and 
public opposition began to grow.  
 
Other council bureaucrats were also important in decision-making. The Housing 
Director frequently came into conflict with the planning officers, as he judged 
that his desire to efficiently manage the council’s housing stock was often at odds 
with planning officials’ views on the appropriate types of housing for future 
needs. The Medical Officer of Health and the Public Health Inspector, on the 
other hand, often sided with the planners when it came to the necessity of 
redevelopment in order to create healthy environments. The ‘production’ and 
‘design’ factions within the bureaucracy could also be divided. Birmingham’s 
first City Architect, A.G. Sheppard Fidler, often felt marginalised by the powerful 
and esteemed City Engineer, Herbert Manzoni, and eventually resigned after a 
falling out with the council leader Harry Watton over what he regarded as 
unacceptable interference.12 More widely, the influence of grassroots politics did 
come to bear on the decisions made by the local authority. While it was a 
negligible factor up until the late 1960s, local campaign groups blossomed in the 
1970s and, at the very least, posed a nuisance factor for planners. Where the 
concerns of local activists and demands for broader participation impinged on the 
world of the councillors, then there could be some real pressure placed on the 
planning process. These issues certainly helped to create a much more defensive 
approach on the part of planners in the 1970s. 
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Local authorities were the major force transforming the city in the 1945-1979 era, 
building masses of houses, schools and roads, but their powers and finances were 
crucially granted by central government, which also insisted on supervising many 
of the plans and decisions made at local level. Financial arrangements were 
Whitehall’s main way of ensuring that local authorities followed the broad 
outlines of government policy. Subsidy scales for housing had a great effect on 
the styles and types of dwelling built by councils. The subsidies provided for in 
1956 and 1967 basically marked the start and finish of the multi-storey ‘boom’, 
no matter how enthusiastic architects and planners were about that type of 
housing. Even during this period the Ministry of Housing and Local Government 
insisted on having input into the smallest features of some schemes, where it felt 
that financial savings could be made or national policy implemented better. The 
straitened allowances provided for local government spending in the 1970s both 
dented the ambitions of local authority planners and made it more difficult to gain 
public approval for their proposals. National planning policy could also conflict 
with local. Green belts had been a favourite of many planners, but their 
encouragement by central government made the job of local authority planners in 
allocating scarce land within the city much more difficult. In certain areas there 
could be a major divergence between national or regional planning and the plans 
and objective of local authorities. Glasgow saw a significant struggle in the post-
war era between planners from the Scottish Office who identified a need for 
‘overspill’ of overcrowded Glaswegians into new and extended towns in the 
wider region, and local politicians and officers who wanted to preserve the city’s 
population, finances and integrity by pursuing a ‘high-rise’ housing solution.13 
 
The resolution of urban problems caused by economic, social and technological 
factors was effectively the raison d’etre of planners, but in a period of rapid 
change the tasks thrown up were not easy to resolve. Housing was a prime 
example, compounded by the war and the ‘baby boom’ that followed, but the 
issue of transport was one that really taxed planners in this era. Planners and local 
politicians were acutely aware that the rise of the motor car had not been 
accompanied by as rapid a change in urban environments to accommodate it. 
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Road-building to relieve the increasing traffic congestion was seen as inevitable, 
but planners were also keen to try and control vehicle use through pedestrian 
schemes and planning estates around public transport.14 Enough was achieved in 
Leeds for the city to hail itself ‘Motorway City of the Seventies’, but plans for a 
fully developed network of major roads across the city were to be dashed due to 
lack of finances in the 1970s. This helped to illustrate both the relative impotence 
of planning to achieve its objectives, and the effects of this lack of power in 
blighting many residential areas that had been earmarked for road projects.  
 
‘Planning blight’ was essentially a symptom of the inability of plans and forecasts 
to correspond with the realities of politics and economics or, alternatively, the 
failure of the latter to put plans into practice. Some of this is due to the nature of 
town planning as a discipline. Planners did aim to provide rational, disinterested 
solutions to urban problems, and a more considered approach that would use 
technology to the benefit of society. This could be of great benefit in an age 
where public spending on social programmes had increased and the welfare of the 
general population was a higher priority than previously. Planning did not operate 
in a vacuum, however. Planners themselves were usually from middle-class, 
educated backgrounds and held many of the assumptions of that milieu. Well 
intentioned attempts to provide higher standards of housing and a more pleasant 
social environment were accompanied by a difficulty to understand why some 
people were wary of change or fearful of the upheaval that redevelopment might 
bring. It is this lack of empathy rather than any real desire for popular decision-
making that provoked the push for ‘participation’ in the late 1960s. Planners had 
also to operate in a fundamentally unequal society, where resources were often 
scarce or narrowly allocated. Trying to initiate a plan for society’s benefit in such 
an environment inevitably meant that certain objectives would be unrealised, or 
that priorities would have to be set, such as that for speed over quality in the 
provision of housing. Where planning came into contact with basically capitalist 
fields, such as in the provision of retail facilities or industrial premises, it was to 
find frustration and a lack of control over outcomes. Intellectually, planners were 
                                                          
14 Simon Gunn, ‘The Buchanan Report, Environment and the Problem of Traffic in 1960s 
Britain’, Twentieth Century British History 22, 4 (2011) 
48 
 
open to trends and fashions, both in an aesthetic sense and in terms of the 
application of ever-changing technology. Given that the built environment often 
takes a long time to be altered, this susceptibility to trends could be problematic, 
and often led to over- and under-estimates of the amount of change that might 
occur in a certain field. 
 
One of the major themes in the literature is the idea that planning possessed a lot 
of autonomy in decision-making, but was essentially hubristic in not appreciating 
the limits to its ability to realise its ambitions. This view took a classical 
conservative interpretation in Elie Kedourie’s essay ‘The Crossman 
Confessions’.15 He describes ‘arbitrariness’ as ‘synonymous with planning’, and 
states that ‘…arbitrary decisions are no doubt taken out of benevolence, out of a 
desire to do good. But it does not follow that they will do good or in the end 
satisfy the powerful benevolent urges of those who seek to take them.’16 His 
argument hinges on the limits to knowledge that prevent plans from coming to 
fruition, and is essentially a criticism of ‘over-government’, which in his opinion 
is a futile, but nevertheless harmful, exercise in wishful thinking.17 The work of 
Norman Dennis is in many ways a more in-depth exposition of Kedourie’s 
arguments.18 He states that the bureaucracy in Sunderland ‘planned as if the 
future were not uncertain and ignored the limits set by its inability either to 
predict influences which had not yet disclosed themselves or to control the 
conditions necessary for the fulfilment of their schemes.’19 The weakness of these 
kinds of argument is in their seemingly unwitting construction of a contradiction 
between the overweening ambitions and patrician disregard of a powerful 
planning bureaucracy, and its inability to translate the powerful position it found 
itself in to the achievement of its aims. In essence, there is little awareness of the 
wider role of planning in society and in the post-war state, and thus it seems in 
the work of Kedourie, Dennis, Ravetz et al, to be an independent, almost 
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parasitic, ‘estate’ within the wider government and bureaucratic apparatus, but 
one which seemed to appear without cause or necessary function. 
 
In opposition to those stressing the pernicious nature of planning’s autonomy are 
arguments that stress the limits of the very role of planners and not just their 
inability to achieve their aims. They make much more of an attempt to locate 
planning in the wider decision-making process and analyse its role within urban 
politics as a whole. Castells effectively shares the opinion of Kedourie and 
Dennis that planning has a ‘weak technical function’, but asserts that its increased 
significance in the 1960s and 1970s was due to a broader social function within 
the processes of urban change, describing the role of a planner as ‘much more 
that of an intermediary than that of a technician.’20 He adds that ‘(the planner) 
uses the prestige of neutrality and technical competence to present himself as a 
professional and “scientist” above conflict, and as such is in a comfortable 
position to arbitrate between the various social partners.’21 I feel he minimises the 
technical role of planning, but this argument does at least try to explain why 
planning plays an important part in urban governance despite the frustration or 
incompleteness of many of its technical schemes. In a related argument Tim 
Verlaan points out that historians have focused too heavily on the role of 
planners, ‘…dismissing the political interaction between the different 
stakeholders and the public at large.’22 He stresses that ‘urban renewal coalitions’ 
consisted of politicians, civil servants, businessmen and other professional 
experts, rather than just planners, and that these coalitions were not static but 
‘…were subject to socio-economic change, financial restraint, changing 
resonances of expert discourses and the alleged public good, which contributed to 
the doubtful mindsets of elected representatives in particular.’23 Verlaan also 
provides an important reminder that urban planning processes were influenced as 
much if not more by a fear of not responding adequately to social, economic and 
cultural change than they were by visions of a ‘brave new world’.  
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For cities to adapt to the pace of socio-economic development in the post-war era 
it was inevitable that expertise would need to be applied in the field of planning 
the spatial and physical forms of the urban environment. This was essential in 
providing a framework for the city to develop in and guidance as to what changes 
would be necessary in the future, so planners were a vital part of the process of 
modernisation. As professional people, planners had their own assumptions as to 
how a future society should look, but operated in a context where social and 
economic issues dictated certain paths, and where political and bureaucratic 
conflicts outside their control affected the course that plans would take and what 
type of change was actually realised. That planning was sometimes divorced from 
the feelings and experiences of sections of the public was not the fault of planners 
as much as that of political processes that were unable to involve the wider 
population in the planning process, and the difficulty of controlling private 
property interests and capitalist economic changes. In certain parts of the post-
war period the context was favourable and planners were able to achieve the kind 
of changes they desired. By the 1970s they had reached the point of reacting to 
events and lacking the faith that the urban environment could be moulded in the 
sort of rational, far-seeing ways that the profession hoped for in its more 
optimistic moments.          
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Chapter Two: Leeds—Post War Context 
 
 
Lincoln Field Grove, Burmantofts, 1958. The photograph of these houses was taken as part of the 
evidence for the Compulsory Purchase Order that led to their demolition. (WYAS, Leeds, 
LC/ENG/CP/Box 40/36) 
Policy might be of national origin, and intellectual and technological fashion even 
take on international influences, but planning was still heavily dependent on what 
went on at the city level. Within the framework of legislation local councils 
played a major part in the decision-making process, and were to be affected by 
the local context. Leeds had various political, social, economic and physical 
idiosyncrasies that shaped the development of its residential areas. These 
included such things as the behaviour of local political parties, the extent of the 
city boundaries, the existence of a massive proportion of back-to-back housing 
compared to other cities, and the history of mining in the south and east of the 
city, where fear of subsidence created difficulties with construction. This chapter 
intends to describe some of the factors that provided the background to the 
transformation of Leeds’ residential environment.   
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In the post-war era Leeds was one of the major provincial cities of Britain. It had 
been a county borough since 1889, and the 1951 census gave it a population of 
505,219.  Like other local authorities Leeds saw a shuffling of its functions after 
the Second World War. Some responsibilities were shifted to the national level or 
on to new public corporations, the major ones being health, gas and electricity, 
but existing functions like education and housing were to be transformed as 
central government gave councils the job of extending public provision to 
unprecedented levels. Significantly, the 1947 Town and Country Planning Act 
made Leeds a planning authority, giving it the responsibility of developing a plan 
for land use across its whole area, and imposing development control according 
to the lines of the plan. These changes were to give Leeds a major role in the 
future of its built environment in the post-war years. 
 
In terms of party politics in the period 1954-1979, there was at first a period of 
stability, then from 1967 shifts occurred largely in response to national trends. 
Labour had regained control of the council in 1953 and remained the majority 
party until 1967, when the Conservatives gained control. Conservative 
dominance was established in 1968, when boundary changes brought the entire 
council up for election, and the national trend was reflected in a landslide victory. 
The 1970s saw a Labour majority in 1972 followed by no overall control in the 
new Leeds Metropolitan District Council from 1974 to 1976, after which the 
Conservatives were once again able to form a majority administration. The 
impact of these results was not usually particularly momentous, though the 1967 
and 1968 elections were more significant. The Conservatives used their 1967 
victory as an opportunity to reshape council procedure, the beginning of a 
concerted ‘modernisation’ programme, while the 1968 vote saw the election of 
the first Liberal councillors since the war. The reinvigoration of the Liberals was 
accompanied by populist attacks on the ‘establishment’ parties and an emphasis 
on community politics, which arguably contributed to an increased focus on local 
issues and a decrease in the legitimacy of the council amongst many citizens. 
 
The administration of housing policy generally tended not to involve a great deal 
of upheaval. Housing Chairman was one of the prize political appointments, and 
usually went to a leading figure in the Labour or Conservative parties. The 
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longest serving and most high profile Housing chair was Karl Cohen, who held 
the position from 1956 to 1967.  First elected as a Labour councillor in 1945, he 
represented Armley Ward from 1952 to 1968, then Burmantofts from 1970 to his 
sudden death in 1973 while occupying the role of Planning Chairman. He was a 
solicitor and for a time headed the Housing Committee of the Association of 
Municipal Corporations, which contributed towards him being awarded a 
knighthood in 1968. Richard Crossman, the Minister for Housing and Local 
Government from 1964 to 1966, described Cohen as a ‘dominant personality 
controlling Leeds housing’ and said that he ran the housing chairmanship ‘very 
much as his personal possession.’1 His Conservative successor was Irwin Bellow, 
chairman of Bellow Machine Company, who was first elected in 1965 and 
occupied the Housing Chair from 1967 to 1972. He followed this by becoming 
leader of the Leeds MDC in 1975, his reputation for frugal spending catching the 
eye of his national party and winning him a life peerage and promotion to the 
Thatcher government in 1979 as Minister for Local Government. Bellow was 
briefly followed as council leader by Peter Sparling, another solicitor who served 
as Housing Chair from 1975 to 1979.  
 
The biographies of these figures demonstrate their stature and that of their role, 
which was of some significance at a local, and sometimes a national, level. This 
impression is magnified when the two leaders of the council from 1958 to 1975 
are included. Albert King, who occupied the position from 1958 to 1967, and 
again from 1972 to 1975, was knighted in 1975, while Frank Marshall, the 
council leader from 1967 to 1972, was knighted in 1971. He left his position as 
Conservative group leader in 1973 to become chairman of the Maplin 
Development Corporation which had the job of building London’s third airport, 
and received a life peerage in 1980. These examples provide some credence to 
Hartley’s statement that party politics in Leeds was not ideological or interest-
based, but ‘provided a framework for individuals to practise their skills and fulfil 
their ambitions.’2 More bluntly, and with a distinct touch of metropolitan 
snobbery, a London City Council architect who moved to work in Leeds in the 
                                                          
1 Richard Crossman, The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister: Volume One  p.127, January 13th 1965 
2 Owen Hartley, ‘The Second World War and After, 1939-74’ in A History of Modern Leeds, 
edited by Derek Fraser (Manchester, 1980), p.438 
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late 1950s described the leading councillors as ‘blustering, coarse heavy men who 
were extremely ambitious—60% proof personal ambition, to get knighthoods or 
hold the Mayor’s mace!’3  
 
Continuity at political level was mirrored within the council administration. In the 
immediate post-war period the dominant figure in housing policy was the City 
Architect, R.A.H. Livett. He arrived in Leeds as Housing Director in 1934 and, 
after establishing his reputation by designing the modernist Quarry Hill Flats in 
the late 1930s, was made the first City Architect in 1946. He had a reputation for 
favouring flats, and his obituary said ‘he constantly urged the need to build 
higher’.4 After Livett’s death in 1959 he was replaced by J.R. Sheridan-Shedden, 
another man known for the design of flats. He left to become Birmingham City 
Architect in 1964, and on his death in 1966 the Yorkshire Evening Post 
commented that he was ‘renowned for his happy knack of securing co-ordination 
so as to get big jobs done.’5 This suggested that management and administration 
were held to be as significant to the role as architectural skills in this period.  
Diplomacy and assertiveness were also important traits, as the bureaucracy was 
by no means unified during this period. Housing and Planning involved the input 
of figures ranging from the City Architect and City Engineer, who were 
responsible for the more technical aspects of policy, through the Town Clerk, as 
the chief legal officer, and the more administrative role of the Director of 
Housing, to the profession of Medical Officer of Health, in charge of the sanitary 
aspects of the urban environment. The legal and professional imperatives of these 
positions often led to conflicts in the internal politics of the council.        
 
The role of the leading council bureaucrats was very important, as their technical 
expertise was judged to be vital in making as well as implementing policy, and 
theirs were full-time positions as opposed to the part-time councillors. Their 
influence was greater in certain fields and at certain times. Housing was a more 
popular issue than most others, and one that impacted more on the councillors’ 
relationship with their constituents. This meant that there was more political input 
                                                          
3 Glendinning and Muthesius, Tower Block, p.166 
4 YEP, 21/09/1959 
5 YEP, 20/05/1966 
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when it came to policy and setting priorities and, as one of the major political 
figures, the Housing Chairman held more power vis-à-vis the leading council 
officials. In planning the situation was different. Hartley argues that there was 
little party and councillor interest in the subject, and that ‘major proposals were 
made and implemented without arousing more than the faintest political 
interest.’6 The longer term focus of planning probably contributed towards its 
public disregard, along with the fact that implementation took place on a 
piecemeal basis and often involved a great deal of revision.  Planning did receive 
more public attention after the creation of the Leeds Metropolitan District in 1974 
and the drawing up of local plans for districts such as Hunslet and Stourton, in 
response to the promptings of the Town and Country Planning Act of 1968. 
Nevertheless, public participation was never seriously attempted in the field of 
planning to the extent that it was in housing.  
 
The biggest shift in the relationship between the elected and bureaucratic sides of 
the council took place when the Conservative administration embarked upon a 
‘corporate’ style restructuring process in 1967. The main reforms involved a 
decrease in the number of committees from 26 to 11, reduction in the frequency 
of council meetings from 12 a year to 7 with a six-weekly cycle of committee 
meetings, and increased delegation of certain powers and duties of the council to 
committees, sub-committees and chief officers. These changes were intended to 
improve efficiency and speed of decision-making within the council, and Council 
Leader Frank Marshall argued that ‘high powered’ chief officers were paid ‘to 
boss their own departments, because their own departments are administrative 
and executive. It is easy to make the policy. The officers and their departments 
execute the policy.’7 He claimed that the proposals had been made before the 
publication of the Maud Report on Local Government, but that they corresponded 
with its findings. Labour responded by saying that the previous arrangements had 
worked well for them, and that the Conservatives were passing Council 
responsibility over to the bureaucracy, but they kept the system when they 
regained control in 1972. Coupled with the concentration of major policy in a 
                                                          
6 Hartley; ‘The Second World War and After’, p. 454 
7 LCC, Agenda and Verbatim Reports (July 1967), p.52 
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new Finance and Planning Committee, the new structure did represent a 
centralisation of authority in a smaller group of senior councillors and officials 
and, contrary to Marshall’s stated aspirations, heavily involved the ‘high 
powered’ officers in the creation as well as the implementation of policy. The 
streamlining was also intended to be an integral part of the modernisation process 
that would create ‘The Motorway City of the Seventies’. 
 
After the 1974 local government reorganisation Leeds became a Metropolitan 
District Council under the West Yorkshire Metropolitan County Council. Leeds 
retained control over housing, but planning functions were split between the two 
authorities, with ‘strategic’ planning decisions emanating from County Hall in 
Wakefield. Responsibility for trunk roads was also taken from Leeds. The 
‘corporate’ transformation of the council bureaucracy was continued, though the 
streamlining process did not particularly impact on residential Leeds, which was 
affected by the processes of at least four committees, and the input of bureaucrats 
including the Director of Housing, Director of Architecture and Landscape, 
Director of Public Works, Director of Planning, Chief Environmental Health 
Officer, Director of Administration and the Director of Estates and Development. 
Despite losing some of its status, Leeds did see a significant increase in its 
boundaries, which raised the population of the local authority from 500,000 to 
approximately 700,000. The social and political background of the district stayed 
roughly the same, with the prosperous commuter and country areas added on the 
Northern boundary balanced by the mining villages of the South and East, and the 
old industrial boroughs of Morley and Pudsey. These latter areas were the ones 
that received more attention with regard to their housing. The evidence suggests 
that these administrative changes did little to alter the trends in housing and 
planning within Leeds, with the general financial situation having more of an 
impact at this stage.   
 
Informal political action on local issues was relatively limited within Leeds at the 
start of this period. Associations representing groups of private householders 
were occasionally active in attempting to resist the incursion of new housing8, but 
                                                          
8 YP, 24/09/1955 and 01/03/1956; YEP, 05/07/1956 and 11/07/1956 
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there is little evidence of tenant organisation within slum areas, and tenants’ 
associations on public housing estates tended to stick to social activities. In the 
later 1960s more local groups were formed to campaign on issues relating to 
housing, a trend that mushroomed through the 1970s. Most of these groups were 
narrow in aim and intended to resist clearance proposals or road schemes. There 
were also organisations that sought to encourage the council into improving local 
environments that suffered from design or construction flaws. In some areas, such 
as Chapeltown and Woodhouse, community associations were established that 
were wider in scope and demanded to be involved in local decision-making on a 
range of residential issues. They were brought into consultation with the council, 
but had quite a rocky relationship with council bureaucrats and occasionally their 
local councillors.9 The Leeds Civic Trust was founded in 1965 as a non-partisan 
body, campaigning on issues affecting the social and physical environment. They 
were drawn into a more political function in the 1970s, raising matters related to 
older housing and helping to co-ordinate and give support to local organisations 
that were campaigning against urban renewal.10 The council’s connections with 
these community groups tended to wax and wane. They could gain valuable 
information about feeling within areas of Leeds, but were often unwilling or 
unable to give serious consideration to their demands.   
 
Mass immigration was to be one of the major features of the post-war era to 
impact on urban Britain, and Leeds was no exception. Groups of Poles, 
Ukrainians, Indians, Pakistanis and West Indians all made the city their home in 
the post-war era. The main area to receive immigrants was Chapeltown, formerly 
a middle-class residential district which had also seen many Jewish immigrants 
reside there in the earlier years of the twentieth century. Chapeltown was to 
become quite significant in regard to Leeds’ housing on account of the fact that it 
was the area that first saw the conversion and improvement of older housing take 
place under local authority auspices.11 As a result of this history and its current 
                                                          
9 See Leeds, WYAS, WYL5041/41/10 ‘Participation’ in Chapeltown, Woodhouse Housing 
Action Group, Which Way Woodhouse? (May 1976), Leeds City Council, Gradual Renewal and 
its Application to Woodhouse (June 1978), and Leeds City Council, Gradual Renewal and its 
Application to Woodhouse: Report of the Directors of Administration, Architecture and 
Landscape, Environmental Health, and Housing and Planning (19th December 1978). 
10 See the group’s newsletter, Leeds Civic Trust, Outlook  
11 See the chapter on ‘Clearance and Improvement’ for further details. 
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population mix, Chapeltown was the focus of a 1970 study commissioned by the 
Institute of Race Relations.12 
 
The author, Christopher Duke, described Leeds as a model housing authority ‘in 
many ways’, ‘where the acceptance and integration of coloured newcomers could 
be effected with minimal discomfort.’13 He saw the conversion schemes in 
Chapeltown in terms of the preservation of potentially good housing that was 
threatened with decay, rather than as a reaction to the spread of the immigrant 
population within the area.14 His study, which focused on particular areas 
bordering Leopold Street and Roundhay Road, was described as ‘an example of 
clearance in a cosmopolitan area by an unusually good housing authority’, and 
found no evidence of blatant racial discrimination such as that unearthed in other 
cities.15 Indeed, the major issue seemed to surround the ethics of allowing too 
great a concentration of coloured tenants in Chapeltown as against trying to direct 
them against their will to other areas of the city in order to avoid ‘ghettoisation’.16 
Leeds, ‘unlike Birmingham’, is held to be a city that ‘was and is not generally 
defined as a city with a “colour problem”, despite its estimated coloured 
population of 12,000 in 1967.’17  
 
It seems that racial issues played relatively little role in the transformation of 
residential Leeds. Shortly after Duke’s study Chapeltown became the focus of 
some vigorous local campaigns, but while many revolved around housing, this 
was not linked directly with racial concerns. Max Farrar, subsequently a 
sociologist but then a committed local activist, has identified two phases of local 
community action, based around his own experiences of the Chapeltown 
Community Association. He describes an earlier period from 1971 to 1973 
focused on reform of local social and environmental grievances, of which 
housing was one of the main issues, and a spell from 1973 to 1975 which had 
more of a libertarian socialist orientation, which sought alliances with black 
                                                          
12 Christopher Duke, Colour and Rehousing: A Study of Redevelopment in Leeds (London, 
Institute of Race Relations, 1970) 
13 Ibid, p.13 
14 Ibid, p.12 
15 Ibid, p.71 
16 Ibid, pp.72-76 
17 Ibid, p.12 
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radical groups, and which was more confrontational in nature.18 Both strands of 
community action saw themselves as multi-racial, but were predominantly white 
in composition with some staunch black participants. Issues relating to race and 
identity did achieve a great deal of significance in Chapeltown during the 1970s, 
notably regarding relationships with the police, but local campaigning on housing 
and planning issues tended to adopt a radical approach that had relatively little to 
do with racial discrimination.19  
 
One of the most important factors that should not be overlooked is the weight of 
history. Leeds had a reputation as a Victorian city at a time when this was 
considered to be a major disadvantage in terms of aesthetics and infrastructure. 
Central to this was the predominance of a certain type of housing, the back-to-
back. These dwellings had evolved in Leeds in response to the form and pattern 
of landownership, but construction of them achieved such momentum that, even 
after they were officially banned in 1909, as the legislation did not apply to 
streets approved before the Act, back-to-backs continued to be built until 1937.20 
The standards of back-to-backs differed according to when they were built, but 
they were generally seen as an obsolete form of housing well before the 1930s. 
Tackling the unusually poor nature of much of Leeds’ housing had been 
something of a crusade for the first Housing Chairman in Leeds, the Labour 
councillor Revd Charles Jenkinson. Appointed in 1933, he was instrumental in 
cataloguing slums that were judged to be in dire need of replacement on what 
became known as the ‘Red Ruin’ map. These houses had only partly been dealt 
with before the Second World War, and provided the basis of Leeds’ slum 
clearance efforts well into the 1960s. Jenkinson and R.A.H. Livett also provided 
Leeds with impetus for the future in their planning of Quarry Hill Flats, built in 
the late 1930s as one of the first large comprehensive redevelopment schemes in 
British inner cities, and a prototype for much of what was to come.  
 
                                                          
18 Max Farrar, The struggle for ‘community’ in a British multi-ethnic inner-city area: paradise in 
the making (Lampeter, Edwin Mellen, 2002) pp.183-189 
19 For references to some of Chapeltown’s campaigns on housing and planning issues, see the 
chapter on ‘Housing Construction and Production (Part Two)’. 
20 Maurice Beresford, ‘The Back-to-back House in Leeds, 1787-1937’ in Time and Place 
(London, 1984) p.369 
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Since the Industrial Revolution Leeds had been one of the leading provincial 
cities in Britain, and this provided it with rivals both with regard to economic 
competition and civic pride. In the post-war period Leeds was to compare its 
performance frequently with other cities when it came to demolition and building 
rates, and it was important just how eyecatching and pioneering the latest public 
housing schemes were. Karl Cohen was to state proudly in December 1962 that 
Leeds had demolished more slum property than any other housing authority in the 
country, bar London.21 Later comparisons were less concerned with cities like 
Sheffield, Manchester or Liverpool, and showed an increasing concern for the 
widening ‘North-South divide’. When reappraising Leeds’ housing situation in 
the early 1970s, council officials judged it ‘vital to raise housing standards in 
inner Leeds until the point is reached that they do not offer markedly inferior 
conditions to the high growth areas of the Midlands and South.’22 In an age of 
innovation in methods, technique and style, Leeds was to find it crucial to 
establish an image as a progressive city that was casting off its past. This 
modernisation of image was to find its first practical application in the 
resumption of the slum clearance process.
                                                          
21 LCC, Agenda and Verbatim Reports (December 1962), p.98 
22 LCC, Older Housing in Leeds: An Assessment of Redevelopment Potential and Priorities. 
Volume 2- Formulation of Strategies (January 1972), p.14 
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Chapter Three: Clearance and Improvement, 1954-1970 
 
 
Back to Backs, Harehills, 1953. A layout typical of many areas of Leeds. (Leeds Library and 
Information Service, www.leodis.net) 
To sum up post-war housing policy in the most straightforward way, it could be 
said that the major issues involved how to deal with the current aging housing 
stock while rapidly expanding the supply of modern dwellings in the increasing 
numbers required. On closer inspection, though, the complexity becomes evident. 
Given finite amounts of money, resources and labour, the two priorities had to be 
balanced, but expectations of what housing policy should aspire to achieve were 
constantly rising. In the mid-1950s the overwhelming problem of the existing 
housing stock was deemed to be a public health one, making sure that housing 
was fit to live in. The input of planners, architects and politicians broadened 
conceptions further, and older housing often came to be considered both 
incompatible with modern standards of living, and inappropriate as a general 
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environment for healthy, efficient social life. Cities like Leeds were in a position 
where they were legally and morally obliged to eliminate slum housing 
conditions, politically and professionally inclined to seek a modern, rationally-
planned built environment, but often financially and administratively unsuited to 
carrying these objectives out in a straightforward manner acceptable to the whole 
community. Indeed, the nature of the slum clearance drive was to lead to 
differences over the very concept of modernisation, with division between those 
who wanted the worst excesses removed but essentially a ‘renovation’ of the old 
Leeds, and those who felt a clean slate was necessary to reap the benefits of 
modern life. Dealing with older housing in Leeds was a task that was to involve 
adjustments in response to legal, financial, environmental, social and political 
constraints, but nonetheless one that saw much progress made and many 
interesting expedients used.         
 
Systematic clearance of slum housing for public health reasons first started in the 
Victorian era, but did not achieve a great deal of momentum until the inter-war 
period. Accompanied by legislation that defined conditions such as ‘unfitness’ 
and overcrowding, codified procedures for compulsory purchase, and introduced 
subsidies for rehousing, a slum clearance ‘boom’ occurred in the 1930s, 
culminating in 1939 with the demolition of almost 90,000 houses across England 
and Wales.1 Leeds cleared 3098 of its slum dwellings in 1939, a figure that was 
never to be reached in any single year of the post-1945 period.2 This ‘boom’ was 
interrupted by the Second World War, when a more crude form of slum clearance 
from the air caused shortages of housing and a more pressing need for attention to 
be given to short-term repair. By March 1954, with construction of new housing 
progressing quickly, the government felt able to encourage local authorities to 
recommence their slum clearance programmes. At this stage there was a 
consensus of opinion that demolition and redevelopment was the best way of 
dealing with the problem of substandard housing. This acceptance was to come 
into question by the 1960s, when it appeared that clearance was unable to keep 
pace with the constant upward trend in the number of houses considered to be 
                                                          
1 English, Madigan and Norman, Slum Clearance, pp.10-25  
2 Leeds City Council, Annual Reports of Committees, 1940-41 
63 
 
unfit.3 This revelation led to more interest in the improvement of unfit housing, a 
phenomenon which had been given a legislative basis and a system of grants in 
1949, but which had been considered merely as a kind of palliative ‘patching’ by 
councils. Leeds, however, was a pioneer in the renovation of older housing, and 
the uneasy relationship between clearance and improvement was established in 
the city well before it had become a concern for central government.     
 
There were several issues concerning slum clearance and housing improvement 
that were always present but never quite resolved during this period. Clearance 
was undoubtedly the most thorough and effective way of transforming housing 
conditions in a city. What made it so advantageous in this way also meant that it 
was a highly disruptive and difficult to understand process for many people living 
in these areas. As English, Madigan and Norman have stated, ‘Slum clearance 
puts the ordinary citizen in a position of extreme dependence relative to his local 
authority. In carrying out a clearance scheme a council decides not only that 
people are to leave their homes but where and in what conditions they are to be 
rehoused.’4 The procedures involved and the legislative framework that had to be 
followed encouraged the bureaucratisation of slum clearance, which councils 
judged to be necessary for reasons of efficiency and legal standing, but which left 
residents feeling themselves to be caught in a very impersonal process with little 
access to information about their position. Tenants were not legally required to be 
informed of most stages of the slum clearance process, and had no legal right to 
object to a compulsory purchase order. This situation was one that created both 
feelings of powerlessness but also of resentment, and this second emotion was to 
ultimately lead to political action. One of the other major controversies affecting 
demolition was the issue of compulsory purchase and compensation. The earlier 
phases of slum clearance had mostly affected private landlords, who were in 
decline during the post-war era in the face of rent control and a lack of wider 
political sympathy. As demolition progressed, however, compulsory purchase 
orders took in more owner-occupied housing, much of which had been purchased 
from landlords in the 1950s and 1960s. Despite the extension of more generous 
                                                          
3 English, Madigan and Norman, Slum Clearance, p.38 
4 Ibid, pp.9-10 
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compensation terms to owner-occupiers by the late 1960s, there was some 
discontent among them as the compensation received was frequently still too low 
to enable them to buy another house, and they were forced to seek council 
rehousing. Both owner-occupiers and tenants displaced by slum clearance were 
often daunted by the increased cost of council rents compared to what they had 
been used to paying.5 
 
As far as improvement was concerned, the problems that were confronted 
essentially involved the difficulty in targeting renovation on the most appropriate 
housing, and the need to ensure that improvement took place comprehensively on 
an area basis, rather than wasting resources on individual houses when the 
condition of others left streets continuing to deteriorate. Leeds dealt with area 
improvement of houses very well, but found it more difficult to extend their 
expertise to environmental improvement when this became fashionable in the 
later 1960s. This was partly due to the unusual nature of Leeds’ housing stock, 
but also because of the conflict between ideas of improvement as a temporary 
expedient or as a more enduring solution to the problems of ‘twilight areas’.    
 
Slum clearance in Leeds remained fairly limited until 1933, when Leeds’ Labour 
Council decided to embark on an ambitious project of clearance. Led by the 
influential Housing Chairman, Charles Jenkinson, the council produced a map 
which coloured houses red that were judged ripe for demolition. Wide areas were 
shaded and it became known as the ‘Red Ruin’ map. The most notable district to 
be cleared in the 1930s was Quarry Hill to the east of the city centre, and it was to 
see the building of the landmark Quarry Hill Flats development in the later years 
of the decade.6 The outbreak of war put an end to the clearance programme, and 
housing policy directly after the war had concentrated on providing houses on 
greenfield sites. It was judged by the government that enough houses had been 
provided in the early 1950s, and ample resources were available, to allow slum 
                                                          
5 Ibid, pp. 60-70 and Murie, Niner and Watson, Housing Policy and the Housing System pp. 232-
250 
6 Michael Meadowcroft, ‘The Years of Political Transition, 1914-1939’ in Fraser (ed.) A History 
of Modern Leeds; Gibson and Langstaff, An Introduction to Urban Renewal, Chapter Eight 
‘Leeds Leads’ 
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clearance to begin again by 1954.7 Housing subsidies were adjusted accordingly 
so that public housing was encouraged to replace slum property, with other types 
of housing intended to be provided by private developers. With its ‘Red Ruin’ 
programme only partially dealt with before World War Two, Leeds was in a good 
position to adapt to the new policy. The situation was quite urgent, as the houses 
condemned in the early 1930s had suffered another twenty years of deterioration, 
while older housing in general had become more dilapidated owing to lack of 
manpower and materials, which had been prioritised by the house building 
programme.8 
               
The task of clearing the mass of substandard housing was a massive one which 
would take years to achieve. As such, it was realised after the war that some form 
of rehabilitation would be needed to make older housing fit to live in for the short 
to medium term. In 1949 a Housing Act introduced the concept of an 
improvement grant that could provide landlords and owner-occupiers with fifty 
percent of the cost of building work. Landlords were subsequently allowed to 
make a small increase in rent for an improved property.9 In the immediate term 
this incentive wasn’t enough and take-up rates were low. One of the main 
problems was that landlords and occupiers were reluctant to spend money on 
individual houses if other houses in the vicinity were unimproved and therefore 
their own property would not increase greatly in value. As a result, it was 
considered that some sort of area improvement might need to take place whereby 
the status and standards of housing in a certain locality could be improved on a 
wider basis. Leeds was to be one of the pioneers of this kind of approach.   
 
From the point of view of the planners, slum clearance provided a clean slate for 
the projects of the future. Clearance of individual properties or small groups had 
occurred frequently, but from 1954 demolition was normally to be the prelude to 
large-scale redevelopment. Most of the time the sites were intended to be used for 
building more modern housing, but they could also be cleared for public open 
                                                          
7 Ravetz, Council Housing and Culture, pp. 95-97; Short, Housing in Britain: The Post-war 
Experience, pp. 48-51 
8 Gibson and  Langstaff, An Introduction to Urban Renewal   
9 English, Madigan and Norman, Slum Clearance, pp.22-24 
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space, commercial or industrial development, or to allow for road projects. When 
representing properties for slum clearance the main consideration was that the 
Medical Officer of Health needed to find the house unfit for human habitation. 
The Housing (Repairs and Rents) Act of 1954 laid out a new standard definition 
of unfitness, which stated that a house was to be deemed unfit if it was judged not 
reasonably suitable for occupation due to defects in one or more conditions. 
These included repair, stability, freedom from damp, natural lighting, ventilation, 
water supply, drainage and sanitary conditions, and facilities for preparation and 
cooking of food and for disposal of waste water. This last condition was taken out 
in 1969, but internal arrangement was added.10 The Medical Officer of Health 
was to decide whether properties fell into these categories, and much more often 
than not he was backed at a Public Local Inquiry. Nonetheless, given the legal 
niceties involved and the procedures that needed to be followed, a shortage of 
skilled technical and legal staff could often slow the process of clearance.11 
Where the council was able to make a good case, procedurally the application of 
the legislation was quite smooth, but given that the judgements made were quite 
subjective, they were to become more controversial at a political level. This 
situation would become especially acute as general housing standards and 
expectations increased, and planners came to see themselves as arbiters of the 
acceptability of types of housing. 
               
When areas were earmarked for clearance, the council acquired two types of 
property. ‘Pink’ properties were those regarded as unfit, and the owners received 
compensation only for the site value, with an additional allowance if the property 
was judged to be ‘well-maintained’. ‘Grey’ properties were those that, while not 
ripe for demolition due to their physical failings, needed to be knocked down on 
practical grounds to enable a convenient site to be created for future 
development. The council was obliged to pay full market value for these 
properties. Practically all Compulsory Purchase Orders were to see objections on 
the grounds of fitness, as many owners were eager to gain ‘grey’ status and a 
higher level of compensation. There was also the same desire to see unfit 
                                                          
10 English, Madigan and Norman, Slum Clearance, p.46 
11 Ibid, p.27 
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properties marked down as ‘well-maintained’, a status which could see a payment 
granted to either owner or tenant, depending on who was judged to have created 
this condition.12 The council were often willing to accept this if it meant a 
smoother passage for the CPO. Apportioning properties was not a straightforward 
job, and the council was warned at quite an early stage by the Ministry of 
Housing and Local Government that they were ‘concerned at the amount of 
‘grey’ property included in Leeds’ compulsory purchase orders and they asked 
that the City Council should limit ‘grey’ properties to those which they can say 
with reasonable certainty are required for the redevelopment of the ‘pink’ 
property within a reasonable period and take care to prove the need for them at 
any inquiries.’13  
               
The vision of the planners and their assumptions were evident in many of the 
responses that they gave to objections that arose from CPOs. It was clear that the 
goal was to clear sites in a way that was to make redevelopment as easy as 
possible, and it was hoped to avoid having to retain any infrastructure that might 
act as an obstacle to reconstruction. At the public inquiry into the Camp Road 
CPO of 1958 the Chief Assistant Surveyor answered objections to the demolition 
of a group of shops by stating that ‘its exclusion from the order would mean that 
an area of future Open Space for the neighbourhood would not be available to the 
public and that shops would be left in a position detached from residential 
development.’ Another frequent claim was that the retention of certain properties 
would lead to the ‘sterilisation’ of land, which in this case ‘would result in the 
deletion of some 60 flats from the proposed development.’ Aesthetics were also a 
major feature of the planners’ desire to start from a blank page. One objection 
was countered by saying that ‘it would be an isolated building of low standard 
among modern redevelopment. Its acquisition is held to be reasonably necessary 
for proper redevelopment and provision of amenity.’14  
               
                                                          
12 Ibid, pp. 55-70 
13 Leeds, WYAS, Redevelopment and Housing, LLD1/2/817233, (Memo from MHLG, 
25/06/1956) 
14 Leeds, WYAS, Little London (Camp Road) Compulsory Purchase Order 1958 Public Local 
Inquiry 10/02/1959 LLD1/2/831060. (Account of Leeds’ Chief Assistant Surveyor) 
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Keeping up with the requirements of ‘modern’ society also played a part in the 
plans for clearance in the Lovell Park and Little London area. Leeds’ Chief 
Assistant Planning Officer declared that the area needed to be developed to deal 
‘with the conditions of bad layout and obsolete development. The most 
satisfactory way of dealing with conditions in this area is to bring the land into 
single ownership.’15 There was also further evidence of the planners’ desire to 
reshape the Lovell Park/North Street area and change its function somewhat. 
Some local businesses had objected to the proposals and were concerned about 
the lack of provision for small industrial and retail concerns in the plans for the 
locality. The Chief Assistant Surveyor was adamant, however, that ‘the existence 
of central area type shopping and industrial and warehouse premises on an 
outward traffic route from the city centre, may have been a desirable feature in 
the late Victorian and Edwardian years, before the motorcar and self-propelled 
traffic grew to the proportions that are with us today….North Street will in the 
future become a one-way traffic road for outward bound vehicles and therefore 
shops along its fringe would be an undesirable feature’16. Again, ‘modernity’ was 
the motivation, or at least the defence, for the comprehensive redevelopment of 
the area. 
               
These examples might give the impression that planners were very powerful and 
enjoyed great freedom to shape the environment. In reality they did face a lot of 
constraints. This could be seen in the plans for Little London, when central 
government had a great deal of input into proceedings. One of the major reasons 
for this was the type of procedure that the council decided to use. The Minister in 
Whitehall ultimately had to approve all Compulsory Purchase Orders before they 
could be acted on, but in the vast majority of cases this was basically a rubber 
stamp action. This applied when housing was acquired under the 1936 Housing 
Act, but if the land was to be taken into council ownership as a Comprehensive 
Development Area under the 1947 Town and Country Planning Act, ‘planning 
and redevelopment become subject to a greater degree of control by the MHLG 
                                                          
15 Leeds, WYAS, Lovell Park and Little London CPO 1965 Public Local Inquiry 10/05/1966 
LLD1/2/835375 
16 Ibid. 
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than is the case under the Housing Acts.’17 The advantage to declaring a 
Comprehensive Development Area was that it made it much easier to acquire 
properties, particularly as there were a lot of ‘grey’ houses which, in the Medical 
Officer of Health’s words, ‘are not in a sufficiently bad condition to require 
immediate demolition….and many of these houses would normally be retained 
for several years’18. The council’s wish for a more manageable site and a 
smoother clearance process did mean that they were faced with a number of 
frustrating meetings with officials from the Ministry, who suggested greater 
provision of public open space and playing fields, and more private garages.19 
               
The planning community was occasionally prone to disagreements and disputes, 
whether over procedural matters or in a more professional sense. In the Bagby 
Fields Compulsory Purchase Order there were a number of ‘grey’ properties that 
were to be used as public open space in the redevelopment of the area. The 
owners objected to this and wanted to know what changes they could make in 
order to preserve their properties. The planners were quite agreeable to this 
suggestion, but the Medical Officer of Health was disappointed that his 
recommendation for clearance had not been backed up in the case of this site ‘in a 
fringe area which is physically capable of detachment from the main area, and 
when the case on the grounds of unfitness is not the strongest in the whole 
area….the site is a very poor one. The streets slope steeply and to the north and 
they are overshadowed by the tall bulk of a busy factory on the south east side of 
Devon Road.’20 The interesting thing was that he admitted that the legislation 
made no mention of the unsuitability of the site or the proximity to industry, but 
he thought that these were matters that should be considered. In the majority of 
cases the opinion of the Environmental Health department was a sufficient 
recommendation for a clearance order to be successful, but, as this case 
demonstrated, this depended on a position of unity from the planning professions.                
 
                                                          
17 Leeds, WYAS, Redevelopment in the Camp Road Area. LLD1/2/817225. (Meeting of officers, 
03/09/1958) 
18 Ibid, (Meeting of 29/06/1954) 
19 Ibid, (Meeting of 14/09/1959) 
20 Leeds, WYAS, Bagby Fields Public Local Inquiry 27/07/1971. LLD1/2/840826 
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One of the practical problems with slum clearance was that there was quite an 
extended process between the actual representation of houses by the Medical 
Officer of Health, the compulsory purchase of the properties by the council, the 
demolition of the buildings, and the redevelopment of the site. The existence of 
blighted areas, derelict property, piles of rubble and unused waste ground was to 
be the source of a number of complaints from councillors and the public. After 
the clearance of part of the Woodhouse Cliff/Delph Lane area the council 
received complaints that the site of Delph Terrace was being used as a rubbish 
dump.21 There were some good reasons why these unfortunate situations arose. In 
response to a question from a councillor wanting assurance from the chairman of 
the Housing Committee that he would concentrate on clearing one area at a time 
and not deal with too many areas at once, he replied ‘there is the odd person in 
the block who will not move until a special house is provided. Should we, then, 
penalise the rest of the people living there?’22 
 
In fairness, these problems had been taken seriously by the council officers from 
quite an early stage. In July 1960 it was agreed that a detailed plan should be 
drawn up before the beginning of redevelopment.23 A year later the Deputy Town 
Clerk commented that tenants should not be rehoused from clearance areas until 
the Compulsory Purchase Order had been confirmed. This was supported by the 
Works Department and Housing Department as it would be better financially and 
lessen the consequences of having empty houses in an area.24 Nevertheless, the 
side-effects of the slum clearance programme were to remain, and by the end of 
the 1960s were to be the subject of greater political pressure within the council. 
               
In March 1969 the Liberals put forward a motion in council to ‘try and ensure 
that areas are not demolished a long time before redevelopment, and that the 
council enables rehousing to take place before areas become derelict.’ Alderman 
Bellow, responding for the Conservatives, admitted that the process could be 
                                                          
21 Leeds, WYAS, Woodhouse Cliff/Delph Lane CPO 1961. LLD1/2/815933 (Meeting of officers, 
July 1965) 
22 Leeds City Council, Agenda and Verbatim Reports, October 1962, p.57. 
23 Leeds, WYAS, Redevelopment and Housing 1956-64. LLD1/2/817233. (Meeting of officers, 
21/07/1960) 
24 Ibid, (06/04/1961) 
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delayed, but he claimed this was due to the fact that tenants in clearance areas 
were given a choice over where they wanted to go, and were not arbitrarily 
rehoused at the council’s convenience.25 Issues relating to the dangerous or 
unsightly condition of clearance sites and long delays between buildings being 
vacated and demolished were also to be raised in October 1969 and April and 
July 1971. Again, the bureaucracy did look to deal with these problems, and in 
August 1971 a Working Party was set up ‘to co-ordinate and plan more 
systematically the clearance of properties prior to redevelopment and to avoid as 
far as possible large numbers of empty dwellings remaining uncleared for long 
periods of time.’26 They produced a report that proposed changes in procedures 
that would create manageable clearance areas which could be dealt with 
programmatically, but seemed to remain unconvinced that the troubles around the 
clearance process could be properly dealt with. The City Architect’s Department 
said that shortage of labour was a problem, and emphasised ‘that a pool of empty 
properties awaiting demolition is essential to maintain a steady workload.’ It was 
also added that ‘it is the persistent refusers and the selectors of accommodation in 
short supply who delay the completion of rehousing’ and as a result, ‘it is 
normally only practicable to demolish houses block by block and therefore if one 
or two houses in every street remain tenanted demolition cannot take place.’27 It 
is likely that there was some scapegoating in these statements, but there were 
undoubtedly unavoidable problems connected with slum clearance which could at 
best be ameliorated rather than eliminated. This was to be an inevitable part of 
the clearance experience that many areas were to seek to avoid in the future by 
opposing compulsory purchase and redevelopment altogether. 
 
In the more immediate term, objections to clearance of a more fundamental 
nature were seldom expressed. Landlords often opposed Compulsory Purchase 
Orders on the grounds that their properties were fit for purpose, but there was 
rarely any opposition to the principle of slum clearance or its application to wider 
areas. An objector to demolition in Woodhouse argued that ‘the Council wishes 
                                                          
25 LCC, Agenda and Verbatim Reports, March 1969, pp. 17-18. 
26 Leeds, WYAS, Demolitions and Clearance Redevelopment Working Group. LLD1/2/842663 
(Meeting of 23/08/1971) 
27 Ibid. 
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to use its powers as overlords of the citizens of Leeds and to be the sole landlord 
of the City’, but also more soberly added that ‘the Council cannot offer properties 
to rent at anything like the cheap rents which the tenants enjoy, and it must also 
be pointed out that the Corporation properties, in the main, are scattered in 
outlying districts which causes the tenants considerable travel problems.’28 This 
second point was one that was infrequently articulated at public inquiries, largely 
due to the fact that the procedure tended to focus on property-owners rather than 
tenants. Nonetheless, at this particular time those kinds of complaint found no 
organised outlet. Within the press the momentum of slum clearance was 
welcomed, even slightly criticised for being too slow. In 1958 a Yorkshire 
 
Castleton Terrace, Armley, 1964. (West Yorkshire Archive Service, Leeds, LC/ENG/CP/Box 1/28) 
 
Evening News editorial welcomed the Housing Committee’s proposal to up the 
clearance rate by about forty per cent and argued that ‘there are houses in Leeds 
whose continued existence would be a scandal were it not for the brake in 
housebuilding caused by economic factors.’29 In January 1960 the Yorkshire Post 
                                                          
28 Leeds WYAS, Woodhouse Public Local Inquiry 27/09/1960. LLD1/2/831066 
29 YEN, 17/04/1958. 
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reported that 848 properties had been involved in one clearance inquiry, the 
biggest since the war, but there had been few objectors.30 
 
In 1963 a survey of people living in 914 houses in clearance areas within Leeds 
was published.31 Two-thirds of these houses were built before 1866, only eight 
per cent of the 914 were owner-occupied, sixty-three per cent had only cold water 
supplied, and seventy-one per cent had neither an inside lavatory or a bath. When 
asked if they were in favour of moving, eighty-two per cent replied in the 
affirmative, the most important reasons concerning dissatisfaction with the house 
and district. A lot of antagonism towards landlords was also commented on, 
mostly due to a reluctance to make repairs. Of those that were opposed, the 
converse was true and satisfaction with the dwelling and the area was the main 
reason given. Wilkinson and Sigsworth describe most of the latter residents as 
‘elderly people averse to leaving a particular district, or people who had made 
considerable improvements to their houses, or both.’32 They compared the Leeds 
results to a similar survey in Liverpool that stated that thirty-six per cent did not 
want to move, and concluded that one reason might be that people in Liverpool 
were often rehoused in ‘overspill’ estates, while Leeds usually housed people 
within the city boundary. 
 
The results of this survey suggest that demolition at that stage was still focused 
on old, demonstrably unfit housing, and that the prevailing opinion among 
residents was that they wanted better housing and environmental conditions. In 
his 1970 study Colour and Rehousing Christopher Duke stated that ‘what has 
been lost deserves few tears, and much now intended for demolition will 
probably be mourned, if at all, only by romantics who do not live there.’33 
Nevertheless, the feelings of those opposed to moving were to assume a greater 
prominence in years to come. The ‘injustice’ of uprooting elderly people was to 
become something of a cause celebre, and as more houses were improved by their 
owners there was seen to be less justification for them to be erased. A telling 
                                                          
30 YP, 13/01/1960. 
31 R.K.Wilkinson and E.M.Sigsworth, ‘A Survey of Slum Clearance Areas in Leeds’, Yorkshire 
Bulletin of Social and Economic Research, Vol. 15, No.1, May 1963. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Duke, Colour and Rehousing, p.13 
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comment from Wilkinson and Sigsworth was that there were concerns about a 
lack of communication regarding the clearance process, another issue that was to 
become more significant in later years.        
 
With an unusually large proportion of back-to-back housing in its stock, Leeds 
faced a problem when it came to post-war housing policy. These houses could not 
all be cleared immediately, and in many cases the problem was that they were 
relatively new houses that were not unfit from the point of view of dilapidation or 
physical condition, but that they were too small by modern standards and lacked 
sanitary facilities. As such, they were often prohibitively expensive for landlords 
and poorer owner-occupiers to improve. Also, like many major cities, Leeds had 
areas that had once been high-class environments with large villas and stately 
town-houses, but which had been vacated in the middle-class ‘flight to the 
suburbs’. These houses were now often derelict or rented out to a number of 
tenants, a situation that became known as ‘multi-occupation’. As these properties 
had not been designed for the use of multiple families, they were overcrowded 
and lacking in kitchen and bathroom facilities, but fundamentally still well-built 
houses.  
 
In dealing with these houses Leeds was really engaging in conversion rather than 
improvement. Plans to use compulsory purchase to convert these properties had 
been made in 1951, but were shelved when the Conservatives took control of the 
council later that year. When Labour became majority party again in 1953 they 
proposed an Improvement Area for Louis Street in Chapeltown. The council 
would buy the houses and convert them to self-contained flats with modern 
facilities. Unfortunately, the process was to prove a slow one. Acquiring the 
properties took time, as did the progress of the quite specialised building work 
required. These troubles led to a switch in policy by 1957. Research had been 
carried out by the Environmental Health Officer on ventilation in back-to-back 
houses in Leeds, with regard to the possibilities of improvement. After seeing this 
research the MHLG approved the idea of grants for back-to-backs and 
acknowledged that the ubiquity of this type of housing created a special problem 
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for Leeds.34 As a result, procedures for area improvement were devised. ‘The 
council made the first moves and were willing to purchase, or even to purchase 
compulsorily, if the owner was unable or unwilling to act. But their primary 
intention was to encourage primary improvements.’35 The emphasis of 
improvement was now to be on back-to-backs, starting with the Hill Street and 
Lincoln Road area of Burmantofts. This was also intended to be a voluntary 
scheme with grants as a sufficient incentive, ‘but the response of landlords and 
owners was cautious so that, finally, 151 of the 174 suitable houses were 
purchased by the Corporation.’36  
               
This compulsory purchase aspect was to be one of the more controversial issues 
surrounding the conversion and improvement schemes, along with the time taken 
for the work and the means of carrying it out. In May 1956 Councillor Lyons 
               
Louis Street, Chapeltown, 06/06/1950 (Leeds Library and Information Service, www.leodis.net) 
                                                          
34 Leeds, Medical Officer for Health, Report on the Health and Sanitary Administration of the 
City for the Year 1955, p.129 
35 S. Pepper, Housing Improvement: Goals and Strategy (London, 1971) pp. 69-70 
36 Ibid, p.70 
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complained that the council should stop acquiring conversion properties ‘because 
the corporation is at the moment not able to handle them.’37 Leeds’ method of 
housing improvement did cause some distinct ideological differences within the 
council. In July 1956 Karl Cohen defended the policy in strong terms, stating that 
large houses ‘instead of being looked after by their owners, instead of being 
repaired, are being let off room by room, basement by basement, as much rent 
extracted from that property, and nothing or hardly anything put back into it.’38 
He justified compulsory purchase by adding that he believed ‘that we are the 
better arbitrators of how such property should be used than is, apparently, private 
enterprise.’39 This drew a complaint from the Tory Alderman Walker, who was 
disappointed by Cohen’s ‘attack’ on private landlords and claimed that they were 
restricted by rent controls.40  
               
The other major ideological issue was that the council’s improvements were 
carried out by direct labour. In May 1957 Alderman Hargrave complained about 
the estimated cost of improving houses in the Hill Street/Lincoln Road area and 
stated that the work should be put out to tender rather than carried out by the 
Works Department.41 Councillor Matthews responded with a strident defence of 
the direct labour section and stated that it was Labour Party policy to build up the 
Works Department so that it could carry out all the work needed by the 
Corporation.42 A month later Councillor Lyons claimed that improvement work 
should be competitively tendered for, but Councillor Happold replied from the 
more pragmatic point of view that ‘...this improvement work on these old houses 
is very difficult indeed; there are all sorts of odd, very difficult jobs to be done, 
and I think that is the reason why private builders have not found it attractive.’43  
               
                                                          
37 LCC, Agenda and Verbatim Reports, May 1956, p.26 
38 Ibid, July 1956, p.12 
39 Ibid. 
40 Ibid, p.14 
41 Ibid, May 1957, p.29 
42 Ibid, p.30 
43 Ibid, June 1957, pp.39-43 
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Eventually, by the mid-1960s the ‘Leeds Method’ was a fully functioning 
process, described by one commentator as ‘highly efficient’44. The objects of the 
area improvement policy were to secure greater use of improvement grants for 
suitable properties, to ‘avoid a piecemeal peppering of improved houses while 
leaving adjoining houses dilapidated and unimproved, and ...to obtain the 
complete improvement of sizable areas or groups of adjacent houses which are 
sufficiently well built and have the capacity which justifies the operation.’45 The 
Public Health Department would put one area each month forward for 
improvement and completions were made at a steady rate. The high rate of 
compulsory purchase orders that were required in the first Improvement Grant 
Areas had declined dramatically, something that was put down to personal 
interviewing of the owners by public health inspectors, while ordinary 
applications for improvement grants had increased dramatically from landlords 
rather than just owner-occupiers, a factor that was attributed to the success of the 
area improvement procedure.46 By the late 1960s the Department was quite self-
congratulatory and stated that the scheme’s smooth running was down to the fact 
that ‘owners and agents in Leeds now fully appreciate the advantages of 
comprehensive improvement.’47  
                
Ultimately, the major constraints on the planning process were to be political. 
Planners were working within a framework dictated by central government, both 
in terms of the legislation they were working to and the financial situation they 
were operating in. At a local level they had the advantage of technical expertise 
and procedural experience, but were still obliged to face the desires and concerns 
of elected local politicians, other council departments and, increasingly, the 
organised opposition of local communities. While possessing a substantial degree 
of leeway when it came to executing policy, the priorities and aims of policy 
were often influenced by councillors, in particular those on the Housing 
Committee.  At other times, though, councillors were left impotent against the 
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bureaucratic and technical practices of the council departments, often backed by 
the leading council members and committee chairmen.  
 
Political attitudes to slum clearance were fairly consensual at first, as it was 
generally accepted that there were a substantial number of houses that needed to 
be demolished, especially given that there had been a fifteen year period of 
deterioration since the start of World War Two. In Leeds itself there were still the 
remaining areas of the ‘Red Ruin’ map to tackle, and these were to receive the 
initial attention. The priorities and progress of the clearance process were largely 
left to the council officers to decide. Councillor Happold gave a typical statement 
of the attitude of the time when she said, ‘the timing of our slum clearance 
programme depends on the priority that the Medical Officer of Health gives to 
the clearance of unfit houses, and is not determined by the use to which the land 
is to be put.’48 As we have seen, this was slightly misleading, as Leeds was to be 
relatively free when it came to knocking down houses in order to give an easier 
base for future development. But nonetheless, these matters were usually left to 
the experts. 
               
The problems that tended to be raised at a political level were of a technical 
nature, or were simply general debates on the numbers of houses demolished and 
those built in their place. In January 1957 Karl Cohen, the new head of the 
Housing Committee, had to admit that clearance had had to be slowed down 
because the council was unable to build sufficient homes to rehouse slum 
dwellers. He raised the alternatives of improvement, which he termed ‘patching’, 
or ‘first aid’, defined as essential maintenance of houses with only a few years 
life.49 Either way, it seemed that these would be temporary solutions. 
‘Improvement, therefore, was regarded as a palliative: the removal of improved 
houses was simply deferred for some fifteen to twenty years and no real future 
was seen for the old brick terraces and back-to-backs of the city.’50  This was to 
be an accurate statement of the outlook of the Public Health and Planning 
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sections of the bureaucracy, but was to cease to be a matter of political consensus 
in years to come. 
               
For the meantime, the political and bureaucratic sections of the council executive 
were to be united behind the programme of slum clearance. In a discussion on the 
issue of demolishing ‘fit’ houses in order to make way for future housing 
development, Cohen declared that ‘sometimes you have to use surgery in order to 
make the body politic healthy, and I am afraid that in this case we have also to do 
it.’51 By December 1962 Cohen was proudly declaring that Leeds had demolished 
more slum properties since 1945 than any other authority outside London. He 
used this to soften the news that the council had been unable to keep the building 
rate up with the rate of clearance representations. This was put down to labour 
shortages.52 A year later the Deputy Town Clerk ‘reminded officers that the 
Chairman of the Housing Committee had recently expressed the hope that all the 
areas which were on the original ‘Red Ruin’ map prepared in 1933 would be 
dealt with this year.’53 In hindsight it was to appear that Cohen’s ambition here 
was to get the worst slums cleared so he could focus on other issues, and he was 
to make this clear in discussions on the Development Plan review in 1965.  
                
Cohen took issue with a number of the review’s assumptions relating to housing 
matters, but the most relevant disagreement was his refusal to accept the 
necessity for the demolition of all houses which were 100 years old by the year 
2000.54 He rejected an accelerated programme of demolition, and ‘thought the 
time must come when they could say that they were seeing the end of the slum 
clearance programme.’55 In this he was backed by the Director of Housing, who 
declared that ‘improvable back-to-back houses are very popular. In his view 
demolition and rebuilding of this type would be going against the wishes of the 
people.’56 The ‘planning’ officers of the council were to disagree, as did some 
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other councillors. The City Engineer ‘explained how back-to-back houses, 
obsolescent areas, lack of play space, insufficient space for schools, no open 
views and obsolete standards of layout contributed to make areas ripe for 
renewal.’57 Councillor Klineberg expressed the point of view that improvement 
grants would not preserve property forever, and Councillor Happold, who lived in 
an ‘improved’ house, was of the opinion that they were outmoded and difficult to 
live in. The argument had moved on from ‘fitness’ to ‘obsolescence’, and from 
the house to the wider environment, as the City Engineer demonstrated when he 
stated that he ‘thought that dwellings with no external amenity of any sort were a 
social ill.’58 The controversy seemed to hinge mainly on issues of past versus 
present rather than any specific political or ideological grounds, and in particular 
on ideas of progress of the most immediate kind. Cohen, certainly, had quite 
dramatically lost faith in the modernist approach to reshaping the urban 
environment, coming to favour more conservative methods that involved less 
upheaval. 
               
In 1966 the committee managed to agree that a clearance target of 2300 a year 
should be adopted until 1971, when it would drop to 1800.59 By 1967 the long-
serving Cohen’s position as head of the Housing Committee came to an end with 
Labour’s catastrophic defeat at the council elections. With its new Conservative 
leadership the council continued the clearance programme without any decisive 
shift in direction, but the debate of 1965/66 was a sign of things to come. From 
this period on, the issue of ‘slums’ was to become a lot more politicised as the 
definitions of ‘viability’, ‘fitness’ and ‘obsolescence’ came under question from 
councillors, residents and, importantly, central government. For Leeds these 
problems were to be increased by the fact that its previously successful 
improvement programme was beginning to collapse. 
 
By the late 1960s the issue of improvement had come under close central 
government consideration. In 1968 the White Paper ‘Old Houses into New 
Homes’ was published, in preparation for the Housing Act of 1969 that created 
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the idea of ‘General Improvement Areas’ and allowed for more generous 
improvement grants. As a pioneer of this type of approach Leeds might be 
thought to have had a head start, but the opposite proved to be the case. By 1971 
there had been a reduction in completions of ordinary improvement grant work, 
and area improvement had ceased altogether. The Public Health Department tried 
to put a brave face on, putting the change down to the fact that a ‘very vigorous 
improvement grant programme with considerable pressure on owners to 
participate had been maintained for at least the previous fifteen years’, and that 
area improvement had already covered most of the eligible areas of the city.60 
One of the main problems was that the compulsory purchase sanction that had 
backed Leeds’ area improvement policy had been removed by the council in June 
1968.61 This was justified as taking into account the terms of the recent White 
Paper, but coming so closely after the Conservatives’ decisive victory at the 
council elections was almost certainly a political decision to get rid of a tactic that 
the Tories had always opposed, initially out of a defence of property interests, but 
increasingly due to an unwillingness to spend money preserving ‘obsolete’ 
housing. Again, the Public Health Department played down the significance of 
this change, claiming that area improvement was beginning to run its course 
anyway due to the previous success of the policy and stating that ‘large tracts of 
well built houses, lacking modern amenities, and having a clear future anticipated 
life sufficient to justify extensive investment of this sort are far rarer than they 
were at the inception of the area improvement policy’.62 They also pointed out, 
however, that ‘for its impetus it depended on the willingness of the local authority 
to acquire and improve whenever any owner did not desire to improve, or was not 
able himself to effect improvement’.63 Thus it was still made clear that the 
department regarded compulsion as an essential part of an effective improvement 
strategy. In this case it seemed like a combination of national policy and local 
politics had frustrated one of Leeds’ more effective housing processes.  
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Improvement was certainly a policy where Leeds had developed its own 
individual approach and agenda. Other cities had a completely different trajectory 
when it came to rehabilitation of older housing, with political reactions that 
reflected this. In Birmingham, Labour councillors feared that the effects of the 
1968 White Paper meant that ‘a “second-best” solution was being forced upon the 
areas which they had expected would be cleared’, while Conservatives united 
around improvement as a cheaper option than previous policies.64 These contrasts 
are perhaps due to the nature of Leeds’ older housing stock, with the much higher 
proportion of back-to-back housing necessitating a varying approach, but also 
because Leeds’ Conservatives felt that their aims to modernise the city required a 
more ‘ruthless’ attitude towards its housing.  
 
The issues discussed in Leeds’ halls of power reflected those at a national level. 
When slum clearance had resumed in 1954, the assumption was that there was a 
backlog of unfit housing to be dealt with incrementally, but that within a 
relatively short period the ‘slum problem’ would be solved. By the early 1960s 
this belief was looking less valid. Clearance rates remained lower than they were 
just before the Second World War, and were inevitably linked to the progress of 
housebuilding in order that displaced slum dwellers could find somewhere to 
move to. Meanwhile, older housing that was not yet considered to be unfit was 
continuing to deteriorate to the extent that it was feared it would soon fall into 
slum condition. This process was also accelerating due to a lack of repairs and 
improvement stemming from such factors as underinvestment, rent control and 
uncertainty as to future housing policy. As Merrett has said, ‘if this was taking 
place on a substantial scale the clearance target might have to be raised annually 
for an indefinitely long time period’ and clearance could become ‘a treadmill’.65 
Given the political consensus on the need for modernisation and higher standards, 
central government searched for a solution to the problem of what had become 
known as ‘twilight areas’. The Wilson government created the Denington 
Committee to investigate the situation and consider definitions of standards of 
housing fitness, which marked a shift from public health requirements towards 
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social considerations and concentration on the wider environment.66 Yelling has 
argued that the Denington recommendations served ‘greatly to widen the scope of 
planned government intervention in housing’67, but the committee decided that it 
was too difficult to impose a range of standards as a comprehensive national 
strategy. In the end, and facing financial difficulties, the government came down 
on the side of improvement, eventually passing the 1969 Housing Act that 
created General Improvement Areas in an attempt to encourage private 
investment into areas that were judged capable of transformation. The problem 
for Leeds was that it had been well ahead of other authorities in the promotion of 
housing improvement, and there were politicians and officials who believed that 
most of the ‘improvable’ areas within Leeds had already been dealt with. As 
such, Leeds parted company with Westminster and Whitehall and took different 
steps to tackle obsolescence and solve the housing problem, as will become clear 
in the next chapter. In doing so, it was in many ways taking an approach which 
tried to combine efficiency with paternalism. By this stage, however, this kind of 
outlook was becoming more incongruous in a political and economic 
environment that was much less favourable than it had been before. Even the 
most well-intentioned managerialism would have found it difficult in a situation 
where both public opinion and public finances were to slow the pace of 
modernisation.  
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Chapter Four: Rehabilitation or Redevelopment? 1971-1979 
 
 
Marian Terrace, Woodhouse, 15/07/1975. By this stage the spread of tower blocks had stopped 
and sights like this were becoming more rare. (Leeds Library and Information Service, 
www.leodis.net) 
Despite the stalling of Leeds’ own improvement programme by the start of the 
1970s, the shift in government policy represented by the 1969 Housing Act led to 
a reappraisal of the council’s attitude to older housing. After the discussions over 
the Development Plan Review the annual slum clearance rate had been scaled 
down, but the rapid drop in the progress of improvement, coupled with the new 
popularity in Whitehall of the idea of improvement, meant that this was now open 
to change. The new approach to Leeds’ ‘slums’ was to be stillborn, for reasons 
that were essentially financial, but which also involved an unprecedented 
politicisation of housing policy at a local level and a sapping of the legitimacy of 
the council among sections of the population. The impact of this policy failure 
was to mark Leeds’ attitude to comprehensive redevelopment and the 
rehabilitation of houses for the rest of the decade. Bureaucratically the procedures 
remained similar, but the nature of intervention changed in scale and tone, in 
response to a squeeze on funding and an increased awareness by local politicians 
of community unrest. A greater emphasis was placed on consulting local people, 
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but this was not embraced wholeheartedly by councillors or bureaucrats, and 
popular involvement in issues involving older housing was never given an 
institutional or political basis. Ultimately, the 1970s saw a major shift in 
assumptions regarding the need to modernise and transform the standards of 
housing and the general environment of older residential areas in Leeds. 
 
1970 was to see a thorough appraisal of housing policy on the part of Leeds’ 
council bureaucracy. The council was obliged to survey its housing as part of the 
1969 Housing Act, and took the opportunity to explore the topic of housing 
renewal as a prelude to developing a fresh strategy. The survey, carried out in 
April 1970, looked at the pre-1907 stock from the point of view of housing and of 
planning. Two approaches to the issue of housing obsolescence were 
contemplated, the ‘traditional approach’ which assessed age, structural condition, 
internal amenities and environmental quality, and a ‘socio-economic approach’ 
that would assess the housing stock against expectations of the population’s 
future aspirations and economic capabilities. This ‘socio-economic’ consideration 
was rejected as it was found too difficult to give it a scientific, methodological 
basis.1 The factors that were ultimately used by the Planning and Health 
Departments to survey housing obsolescence were such features as the proportion 
of back-to-backs in an area, front-to-front distance between houses, front 
garden/forecourt space, net residential density, distance to shops and distance 
from major traffic routes. In addition, the Health Department assessed structural 
condition, household arrangements such as internal WCs, and overcrowding, 
while the Planning Department looked at existing intentions on property and 
environmental improvement, conservation areas and low density areas. Some 
factors, such as rateable value, social stability, distance to schools, bus services or 
telephone, and incidence of private rented accommodation, were discarded as 
they were judged to be either too difficult or time-consuming to ascertain, or were 
generally in the process of improvement.2 The Planning and Property Department 
concluded from the results that ‘because of the likelihood that the least defective 
areas revealed by the survey are likely to be redeveloped in any case, it seems 
                                                          
1 J.Rawling and R.Normington, Older Housing in Leeds: An Assessment of Redevelopment 
Potential and Priorities Volume 1 (Leeds City Council, October 1971) p.27 
2 Ibid, pp.30-32 
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appropriate to regard the whole of the pre-1907 housing stock, covered by the 
Planning Survey, as redevelopment potential.’3  
 
In response to the survey a Housing Conference was arranged, with a range of 
leading officials from across the bureaucracy taking part. The most controversial 
questions involved the establishment of a new clearance rate and attempts to 
assess the level of housing standards that would be judged acceptable in the 
future. The most determined advocate of a high clearance rate was the Town 
Clerk, K.H. Potts. He argued that the only satisfactory way of dealing with 
obsolescence was by demolition, stated that it was difficult to resume an 
increased clearance rate after it had been reduced, and urged that ‘the existing, 
dated image of Leeds needs to be improved if we are to move forward.’4 Mr 
Wyatt, of the Environmental Health Department, felt that the rate at which 
housing was falling unfit would fall, and that buildings were not always deficient 
due to structural condition. He was backed by the City Engineer, C.G. Thirlwall, 
who said that some people were happy with improved back-to-back 
accommodation at cheaper rents, that it was essentially a subjective opinion 
whether older housing should still be standing by the end of the century, and that 
with private building stagnant, the municipal building rate would have to be 
much higher if the clearance programme was increased. Opinion was generally 
quite polarised on the issue of an appropriate demolition rate, though a few 
wanted to recommend sticking to a rate of 1800 a year.5 In hindsight, one of the 
more significant facets of the conference was the debate over the discrepancies in 
figures relating to dwellings represented or confirmed for demolition, those 
awaiting demolition and those already cleared, and the number of clearance 
families on the waiting list. This suggests a less than ‘scientific’ basis for 
establishing a new strategy. In addition, there was also a great deal of uncertainty 
as to government policy, perhaps understandable in the wake of a general 
election, but still not a great basis on which to build a new policy. 
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Following the conference a Working Party of council officials was set up with 
two sub-groups, one to discuss priority groups for clearance and the other to 
consider the role of house and environmental improvement.6 The main factors 
affecting the scale of the clearance rate were judged to be ‘scale of obsolescence’, 
scale of replacement building, land resources, future housing demand, ministry 
advice, avoiding regional disparities in housing conditions and labour and 
administrative resources.7 By November 1970 the City Development Officer, R. 
Normington, was able to confirm that the redevelopment potential was judged to 
be 32,000 dwellings8, and though the Housing Director Syd Benson questioned 
the idea that as standards changed the demand for small improved houses would 
‘be translated into a desire for something better’9, the consensus was that this 
figure was about right.  
 
This comprehensive assessment of Leeds’ housing stock was to feed into the 
policy recommendation document that was published in October 1971.10 In this 
they were to accept that a different set of priorities had been established in the 
fifteen years since slum clearance was resumed in the mid-1950s, but argued that 
this meant that redevelopment proposals needed to be based on an alternative 
approach. Indeed, they were very quick to point out that ‘…it would be a grave 
mistake to base a housing philosophy on the unsound premise that slum 
clearance, let alone clearance for environmental reasons, is virtually at an end in 
Leeds…’11 They argued that a plan was essential in order to avoid uncertainty 
hanging over a large number of properties, and would actually reduce the 
incidence of planning blight as a result. They came up with nearly 43,000 
dwellings which might be candidates for redevelopment between 1971 and 1991, 
which after taking away houses that were already in the clearance ‘process’ and 
those which featured on the previous 1961 plans, left just over 29,000 houses for 
consideration. 
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In deciding how to deal with this section of the housing stock another set of 
considerations was adopted. Firstly, it was argued that demographics would 
provide a basis to redevelop in the 1970s as there was anticipated to be a dip in 
housing demand. That would have meant that clearance and rebuilding would be 
less constrained by scarce building resources.12 Rising expectations in society and 
demands for higher standards of housing were commented on, but, as mentioned 
above, it was pointed out that it was difficult to estimate demands of this kind 
because acquiring data was difficult and factors such as technological growth, 
owner-occupation, economic climate and government policy were very 
unpredictable.13 It was thought that a high clearance rate would help 
improvement proposals as ‘effort would be directed exclusively to a superior type 
of property with a longer life and yielding a more economic return’14 An 
important issue was the image and atmosphere of the city, since ‘much of Leeds 
has a drab and deprived environment inherited from the 19th century in which row 
upon row of closely packed housing, often ill-sited, is a major element….the 
earlier these outdated and unsightly conditions are removed the earlier will Leeds 
become a more attractive and efficient city in which to live and work.’15 This was 
significant partly due to the growing North-South divide that led to investment 
and people draining from the Leeds area. ‘It is vital to raise housing standards in 
inner Leeds until the point is reached that they do not offer markedly inferior 
conditions to the high growth areas of the Midlands and South.’16 Some of the 
problems of large-scale clearance were also considered, and it was judged that it 
would be a mistake to plan too high a clearance rate that would lead to physical 
disruption of communities and infrastructure, along with unbalancing housing 
tenure and reducing the availability of cheap privately rented housing. It was also 
recognised that there was a need to conserve housing of character and historical 
significance.17 
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Various redevelopment programmes were considered, but ‘Strategy D’ was 
favoured. This proposed upping the clearance rate to 2300 per annum for the 
period 1971-77, a lower rate of 1700 per year between 1977 and 1987, and 
leaving the rate for 1987-91 for determination nearer the time. There were 
multiple reasons given for backing this strategy. The momentum of the present 
clearance rate could be continued, with expected reductions in housing demand 
providing an opportunity to replace existing stock. It represented a determined 
attack on the backlog of demonstrably obsolete housing, leaving some better 
quality improvement area housing unaffected and therefore providing some older, 
cheaper options. In addition, it anticipated pressure on housing resources after 
1978, and recognised the need to conserve some housing for environmental and 
historic reasons.18 It was regarded as a flexible approach ‘preserving options in 
both building rate and improvement policy, and making a concentrated onslaught 
on obsolescence while avoiding undue disruption of communities.’19 
 
This new redevelopment programme did seem to take into account many of the 
lessons of previous slum clearance policy, and, unlike some of the previous 
planning agendas, actually disregarded the impulse to base future plans on 
abstract considerations of future expectations and rising affluence. There was at 
least some attempt to give the approach an objective basis in the survey of 
housing stock, but there was still much in the report to provide a great deal of 
controversy in the future. The recommendation of Strategy ‘D’ represented in 
some ways the temporary ascendancy of the planning side of the bureaucracy, but 
this position was not to last. For some sections of the council and the populace, 
helping Leeds ‘to assume its full regional role as a modern, dynamic and efficient 
centre’20 was not as straightforward a process as the planners envisaged. 
 
Within formal politics, the main articulators of the anti-clearance mood were the 
Liberal Party. Campaigning on the basis of local issues was all part of the 
‘Community Politics’ strategy they had adopted in the late 1960s. They had been 
unrepresented on Leeds City Council for many years, but won seats in traditional 
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Labour areas such as Armley and Hunslet at the 1967 and 1968 municipal 
elections, assisted by the strong anti-government national trend. Housing was to 
be an area where they placed a great deal of emphasis, looking to work closely 
with any groups who were discontented with council policy. They strongly 
supported the policy of compulsory improvement where landlords were unable or 
unwilling, but were also sympathetic to landlords at other times. Councillor 
Meadowcroft voiced his opposition to government plans to restrict ‘full market 
value’ compensation to owner-occupiers, arguing that receiving only the site 
value for their properties would not encourage landlords to keep them in good 
condition.21  
 
After Strategy ‘D’ was adopted by the council in December 1971, the Liberal 
campaign against redevelopment was to push its opposition even further. Its 
policy was based on a rather unusual mixture in ideological terms. Their leading 
spokesman, Michael Meadowcroft, argued that ‘the key thing is that we must not 
destroy the communities that exist. In so many things that we thought in the past 
to be progress, it has turned out not to be the progress we imagined.’22 Councillor 
Austick was to argue that ‘we should accept that an Englishman, whatever his 
station in life, has the right to choose his own castle, or his own back-to-back if 
he wishes’23. These were very conservative statements, and went totally against 
the grain of slum clearance policies since the First World War. Their position 
tended to represent an almost unconditional preference for conservation of older 
housing. When Councillor Austick commented that ‘the Tories in their self-
contained “Wigton Towers” and “Alwoodley Heights” presume that people want 
to be moved out of their old way of life into the drab and characterless jungles of 
the Hunslet Granges or the Middletons’24 he came close to some form of 
reactionary inverse snobbery. These sentiments were part of a changing definition 
in the use of the concept of ‘community’. From the idea of a group of people who 
shared a particular area or space it had become part of a rather anti-modern 
discourse. As Glendinning and Muthesius have commented; ‘that which already 
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existed was almost automatically good. “Community” became completely 
redefined: it was applied to a group of people who were settled in an environment 
completely familiar to them.’25   
 
From the Liberals’ point of view, they were voicing the concerns of the public, 
and helping to resist the machinations of an impersonal bureaucracy which 
openly disregarded the wishes of local communities. Their political adversaries 
were united, however, in seeing Liberal tactics as populist and an opportunist 
means of acquiring a political base in older areas of the city. Councillor Gould, 
the Housing spokesman for the Labour Party then in opposition, proposed an 
amendment in which he criticised the Liberals for ‘the raising of unfounded fears, 
consternation and misery in people’s minds for nothing but short-term political 
advantage.’26 The Conservative Council Leader, Alderman Frank Marshall, spoke 
even more strongly, adding ‘great personal anxiety has been caused to many 
people and many families by the needlessly irresponsible way—and I can only 
say it has been from purely political motives—which certain councillors in this 
chamber have presented partial information on the Council’s proposed housing 
re-development programme to the public.’27 The Liberals were a fairly negligible 
presence in the council chamber in terms of numbers, but these accusations, and 
the unity between Labour and Tories, were evidence that their influence in the 
city was growing and that they represented a challenge to the future plans and the 
established housing policies of the council. 
 
With their strong rhetoric and abrasive style of campaigning the Liberals gave the 
impression that they were battling against a monolithic bureaucratic and political 
machine. This was far from the truth, as slum clearance policy was already 
softening by the time Labour regained control of the council in 1972. 
Emboldened by this, and by the establishment of a ‘powerbase’ in the Castleton 
and West Hunslet wards, if anything Liberal policy became even more anti-
clearance. The promise of better consultation with communities and their 
councillors was used as a stick with which to beat the council’s clearance 
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decisions. In September 1972 Councillor Meadowcroft questioned the need for 
properties in Armley to be listed for slum clearance and declared that the 
promised consultation had not materialised.28 The arguments used to battle the 
idea of demolition were broadening. In November 1973 Meadowcroft seized on 
the council’s problems maintaining a high house building rate against manpower 
and materials shortages to argue for improvement rather than clearance.29 His 
colleague Councillor Greenfield followed this up later by appealing to the spirit 
of economy. He said ‘if the Tories were really interested in keeping down the 
rates, then surely the first thing to cut down is the rate of clearance, so that we 
can cut down and do not have to borrow money to rebuild it, and if the Labour 
Party are really not interested in helping the money-lenders, they likewise should 
be thinking of getting down the clearance programme.’30 
 
Against this, there was still a core of politicians that remained strongly in favour 
of redevelopment. They were in both Labour and Tory ranks, but it was the 
Conservatives who seemed to be most solid in defending slum clearance and the 
Strategy ‘D’ policy. They aspired to fully establish Leeds as the modern centre of 
Yorkshire and, with reference to the extensive road-building projects that had 
been executed or planned, promoted the city as ‘Motorway City of the Seventies’. 
Local election candidates boasted of ‘slum property being demolished at an 
almost unbelievable rate, and new houses rising on the barren soil’31 and ‘a 
mammoth attack on slums and decay’32. They also appeared more supportive of 
the council officials, frequently defending planning decisions against criticism in 
the council chamber.  In a ward meeting Labour’s Councillor Moynihan 
bemoaned the fact that ‘all department officials under the Tories have complete 
control over the city’.33 On the subject of deciding which houses were unfit, 
Alderman Bellow declared that ‘I think we really have no alternative but to be 
guided by what the Chief Public Health Inspector and his colleagues tell us as 
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regards that point.’34 In the Strategy ‘D’ debate Councillor Redmond, then in 
charge of the Planning Committee, said that his aim was to ‘improve the standard 
of housing and make people be able to afford to live in that better standard of 
housing by extending the rebate scheme. Surely this is far better than lowering 
our standards purely to keep people in cheap housing.’35 Support was given for 
long-term planning of demolition on the grounds that aging housing would 
become steadily more obsolete over time. Councillor Sparling responded to 
Liberal arguments by sarcastically claiming that ‘they go on as though the 
desirable properties were those with toilets up the street.’36 More seriously, in 
response to Labour’s decision to stop long-term housing renewal planning past 
1982, he stated that ‘there are thousands of outworn houses in Leeds, and there 
are thousands more which will become outworn and obsolete over the next ten to 
twenty years, and surely no one can seriously suggest that any of the houses 
which were in the 1982/86 period, and many others which are only slightly better, 
should still be standing in twenty years’ time.’37   
 
These councillors were very concerned with the improvement of housing 
standards, but it is clear that they had a belief in the benign nature of the 
bureaucracy and the ‘experts’’ ability to manage housing renewal. The curious 
thing about the Conservative slum clearance policy is that it showed a disregard 
for small property-owners and landlords, established supporters of the party. This 
attitude can possibly be explained partly by the change of structure in the 
economy and in housing away from small business and rented accommodation 
towards owner occupation and a greater concentration in commerce and retail. 
Politically speaking, it has also been suggested that the Conservatives wanted to 
concentrate on clearance and local authority rehousing for the poorer sections of 
the population while leaving the rest of the housing stock to the market.38 
 
                                                          
34 LCC, Agenda and Verbatim Reports, October 1970, p.141 
35 Ibid, March 1972, p.457 
36 Ibid, September 1972, p.196 
37 Ibid, July 1973, p.45 
38 Jim Yelling, ‘The Incidence of Slum Clearance in England and Wales 1955-1985’ Urban 
History, 27, 2 (2000), p.250 
94 
 
Within the Labour ranks there were still a number of politicians that were 
strongly in favour of redevelopment.  The most vocal supporter of wholehearted 
continuation of clearance was Councillor Prichard, who became deputy chairman 
of the Housing Committee after May 1972.  Just before the local elections of 
1972 he warned that ‘if the Liberal campaign on redevelopment succeeds Leeds 
will be one vast depressing slum.’39 He also defended the council officials in 
response to attacks from Councillor Meadowcroft40, and he pointed out later that 
consultation was a two-way process and that the officials had a right to have their 
views heard and discussed as much as campaigning groups did- an unusual 
twist.41 After Labour’s victory in May 1972 he was one of the voices within the 
new administration that backed council intervention.42 In the same vein, 
Councillor Jeffrey (Labour) declared that ‘...it would be a tragedy if sentiment 
and false associations between old housing and ‘the old ways’ were to stop Leeds 
from continuing as the leading city in Britain for courageous new development 
and the energetic removal of slums and potential slums.’43  
 
Nonetheless, there were trends in the local Labour Party that had a different view, 
and the attitude of councillors to council policies on redevelopment was often 
based on whether they had faith in top-down planning and application of 
expertise, but also on conditions at the local level. This meant that some Labour 
and Conservative members were sceptical of clearance policy, at least in their 
areas, if they had witnessed some of the extremes of planning blight and 
residents’ unrest. Councillor Beevers, from Labour, raised the issue of a petition 
from Holbeck residents in 1970 asking to be excluded from a Compulsory 
Purchase Order, focussing in particular on demolition and subsequent large areas 
of wasteland in an area which wanted more homes. He was backed by Karl 
Cohen, who criticised the demolition of houses which were not ‘unsound’ and 
added that ‘planners and architects are far too prone to wish for open spaces to 
develop, instead of using the ingenuity they might have and develop round 
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existing properties.’44 In July 1971 Councillor Haughton brought up the long 
delays involved in the clearance process, stating that one clearance order made in 
East Hunslet was still waiting for a public inquiry after two years.45 A few 
months later a Labour Councillor was opposing clearance in Burmantofts on the 
grounds of social upheaval.46 The most radical example of anti-clearance 
sentiment came from Labour’s Councillor Sedler, who represented the marginal 
Labour-Liberal Castleton ward. He claimed about Strategy ‘D’ that ‘...the criteria 
in the report are, I quote, “image, mobility of labour, haphazard and unplanned 
attraction of investment.” It is thoroughly imbued with the spirit of Big Business; 
it carries its stamp throughout. The motivation is a rapid turnover of labour, not 
the needs of the people. The old communities are to be broken up.’47 On the 
Conservative side, there was some criticism of planners’ intentions at Cottage 
Road in Far Headingley, particularly their dislike of ‘untidy crooked streets, 
antique inconvenient plumbing (and) higgledy-piggledy houses.’48 
 
This latter example was a relatively rare case of potential slum clearance in a 
typical Conservative-supporting area, and this was no doubt one reason why they 
were a bit more cavalier when it came to some of the side-effects of 
redevelopment policy. Labour had no such luxury. Generally, Labour politicians 
wanted to see the removal of slum housing and the development of poorer areas, 
but individual councillors, as we have seen, were concerned about local clearance 
problems, and by the early 1970s they were looking over their shoulders 
nervously at the Liberals, who had supplanted Labour in some core working-class 
communities within Leeds. As a result of this Labour housing policy was very 
cautious. In 1971 Councillor Gould, Labour Housing Spokesman and later 
Housing Chairman, had declared that he thought the existing clearance rate was 
too low, and that clearance processes should be speeded up.49 However, when the 
issue of Strategy ‘D’ came up he criticised it as an ‘administrators’ report’, 
lacking ‘the social awareness that we as councillors should bring to bear on the 
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matter.’ Also, the new magic words ‘public participation and consultation’ were 
used, Labour wanting to show that it listened to the concerns of working-class 
voters.50 At the same time, to demonstrate their underlying responsibility as a 
potential governing party, Labour attacked the ‘scaremongering’ of the Liberals. 
Councillor Atha summed up Labour’s attitude fairly well in the same debate 
when he said ‘people have every right to say where they want to live, but equally 
we, as a community and a country, say we expect people to live at a certain 
standard.’ Nevertheless, he offered the assurance that Labour ‘shall only develop 
our plans after the fullest participation of the people affected.’51 
 
On regaining control of the council in May 1972, Gould announced that Strategy 
‘D’ would not be binding on the incoming administration, and was proud to 
confirm that certain areas had been deleted from the clearance programme after 
consultation with local councillors. He added that this would require a bigger 
improvement policy.52 By September 1972 he was able to state that Strategy ‘D’ 
no longer existed, and in the following year he gave his reasons for this, being 
‘increasingly convinced that it was becoming intolerable, the further into the 
future one attempts to predict the necessity for clearance due to either physical or 
social conditions.’ He admitted that ‘the current climate of public opinion is 
against clearance.’53 Despite this, there was no complete U-turn and a significant 
demolition rate was to continue. Gould was to stick by many of the clearance area 
representations that were made, and was especially robust against the arguments 
of the Liberals. He was keen to give a retort to their complaints about the wisdom 
of demolishing houses in the face of a slowing house-building rate by pointing 
out that they had overlooked the existence of ‘re-lets’, where council houses were 
vacated and could be allocated to new tenants. ‘Last year in West Leeds there 
were some 753 re-lets available, which far outweighed the number of demolitions 
that are going to take place during the next two years in West Leeds.’54  
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The fact that the leading councillors and council officials were placed so much on 
the defensive is testament to the shift in emphasis that public discontent had 
caused, from issues about the condition of individual houses or collections of 
houses, to the future of the ‘community’. A prime example of this in the 
Woodhouse area was at the local inquiry for the Jubilee Road Compulsory 
Purchase Order, which took place in June 1972. Rather than individual property-
owners putting their case, Woodhouse Community Association and 
representatives from Leeds University and Polytechnic argued for the future of 
the whole area. The Woodhouse Community Association was represented by a 
local clergyman, Rev. Simpson, who pleaded for a policy of improvement 
coupled with a slowly phased redevelopment, so that houses would be occupied 
for as much time as possible and only a minimum of people would be forced to 
move.55 One of the main concerns was for the future viability of the area, as he 
raised the issue of small businesses and their inability to afford council rents, and 
declared that ‘grass verges are salutary, but whole fields of grass as appear on the 
plans depriving the future Woodhouse of population potential are not 
necessary.’56 The universities, on their part, stressed problems that were likely to 
arise with student accommodation, and the President of Leeds Polytechnic Union 
said that ‘…any redevelopment must take into account dwellings for students and 
other single people. Unfortunately, experience has shown that the type of house 
built is too small to allow tenants.’57 
 
On the council’s side, the Deputy Chief Public Health Inspector stated that the 
age, condition and arrangement of houses in the Jubilee Road area had prevented 
them from being considered for area improvement. The Inspector at the inquiry 
agreed that they were incapable of improvement due to ‘serious defects’, most 
notably the ‘dangerously steep and winding stairs’ and ‘the absence of any 
private space attached to the houses which compels children to play in the 
streets.’58 In this instance the paternalism of the bureaucracy received some 
backing. Despite its recent commitment to local consultation, the local Labour 
                                                          
55 Leeds, West Yorkshire Archive Service Woodhouse (Jubilee Road) Clearance Areas CPO 
1971. Public Local Inquiry 12/06/1972. LLD1/2/840882 
56 Ibid. 
57 Ibid. 
58 Ibid. 
98 
 
newspaper criticised the opposition to clearance at Jubilee Road, claiming that 
‘the Vicar picked one of the worst cases that can now be found in Leeds for his 
case against the Leeds City Council.’59 Nevertheless, this did recognise that there 
were better causes to champion, and the Rev. Simpson had already led a 
deputation to the council in March 1972 opposing proposals for clearing the 
Hartley Improvement Area of Woodhouse. He complained that ‘some of these 
properties were stated by Council only six months ago to have a useful life until 
the late eighties’, argued that there was already much cleared land that could be 
used for immediate building, plus that with easy access to Woodhouse Ridge and 
Woodhouse Moor, the area needed no more than a minimum of public open 
space. 60 As with the Liberal members of the council, the representatives of local 
residents’ associations were also very uncompromising in their desire to preserve 
areas as intact as possible. By the early 1970s almost every council proposal for 
redevelopment was meeting with some opposition, and deputations opposing 
clearance were a monthly feature at council meetings. 
 
 
The purely oppositional attitude within the community was beginning to change 
during the early 1970s, as groups began to develop an agenda of their own, often 
in connection with the Leeds Civic Trust or various sociologists, architects and 
journalists who had concerns with urban renewal issues. These agendas were 
closely linked with proposals for housing and environmental improvement, and 
one of their most interesting features was their relationship with various 
legislation and guidelines emanating from central government. The Housing Acts 
and government circulars of this period were intended to give direction and 
inspiration to local authorities, but were used by tenants and residents groups, and 
by opposition political parties, as a tool with which to provide alternatives to 
Council redevelopment proposals. Proposals for clearance in areas such as 
Burley, Woodhouse and Armley were countered by local groups who advocated 
that the housing should be treated according to the latest government policy, 
which was often rather vague when it came to guidelines for its application.   
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Leeds’ leading councillors and officials often found themselves on the back foot 
when confronted with conflicting judgements of such concepts as Housing Action 
Areas, Gradual Renewal and Community Participation. Interpretation of 
legislation and central government policy was a major source of politicisation in 
the mid to late 1970s, and, unlike the climate of the 1950s and 1960s, local 
politicians and the bureaucracy were to find it much more difficult to implement 
their own redevelopment schemes against increasingly well-informed and 
organised local groups.  
 
As previously described, Leeds was relatively ahead of its time in terms of 
improvement programmes, and national government did not show a great deal of 
interest in housing rehabilitation and environmental improvement on an area 
basis until the Deeplish project in Rochdale, commenced in 1966. From the point 
of view of Whitehall, the ambitious slum clearance schemes embarked upon in 
the 1960s were starting to outstrip the ability to fund and construct replacement 
housing, ‘so increasing pressure on the existing stock and generating ever 
growing zones of vacant land awaiting redevelopment.’61 This was coupled with 
the growing movement of opinion towards renovation of older housing that was 
judged by some to have a much longer life than that envisaged by many planners. 
These factors influenced government policy as reflected in the 1968 White Paper 
‘Old Houses into New Homes’, and the 1969 Housing Act that followed it. This 
act introduced General Improvement Areas (GIAs), which were to comprise 
sound houses with a potentially long life, most of which would be owner-
occupied. The act was to rely largely on voluntary action and allowed local 
authorities to spend up to £100 per dwelling on environmental improvements. As 
we have seen previously, Leeds’ improvement programme actually went down in 
the period after 1969, and with Strategy ‘D’ the council even showed its intention 
of upping the clearance rate, contrary to national policy.  
 
GIAs were relatively limited in scope and, despite a burst in private improvement 
nationally from 1971 to 1973, spurred by increased subsidies, improvement had 
largely missed the lower quality pockets of housing, particularly in the private 
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rented sector. This meant that there were a lot of unimproved dwellings that were 
increasingly unlikely to be cleared and therefore continuing to decay.62 This was 
a cause for concern to Leeds’ Housing Director Syd Benson, who raised the issue 
with the Town Clerk and urged that the emphasis of improvement should switch 
to the shorter term and relieve hardship for people who were living in older 
housing that did not feature in the immediate clearance programme.63 This issue 
was also brought up when Paul Channon, Under-Secretary at the new Department 
of the Environment, visited Leeds in October 1970.64 Reflecting an increasing 
degree of party consensus on urban renewal at national level, a Conservative 
White Paper of 1973 was mostly incorporated into the Labour government’s 
Housing Act of 1974. This act brought in the concept of Housing Action Areas 
(HAAs), which were intended to focus attention on areas where housing ‘stress’ 
and the need for improvement was greatest. In these areas high rates of 
renovation grants were to be paid, compulsory powers to improve were available, 
though there was more limited assistance with environmental work than in GIAs. 
Coupled with this councils also had the power to introduce ‘Priority 
Neighbourhoods’ which needed to have a common boundary with an HAA or 
GIA and were to be areas that would be considered for HAA or possibly GIA 
treatment in future. 
 
Leeds’ approach to environmental improvement had little of the initiative that 
was demonstrated in its earlier programme for rehabilitating back-to-back 
housing. A prime example of its difficulties came at Burley Lodge Road. This 
area had been adopted by the council in 1967 as part of an experiment carried out 
in conjunction with the Department of Housing and Local Government, which 
aimed to discover the effects of a limited amount of environmental investment in 
an improvement area. The cost of the programme was minimal, about £6 per 
house compared with over £100 per house in other cities, and basically put into 
effect a traffic management scheme which involved a small pedestrian ‘precinct’ 
and the placing of bollards to create cul-de-sacs, the planting of some trees and 
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the placing of a few benches.65 The traffic management scheme proved unpopular 
with residents, and so little changed in the area that the council abruptly cancelled 
the improvement scheme in November 1972. They declared that the area would 
be divided in half, with the southern area that comprised better quality through-
terrace housing receiving the focus of improvement efforts, while the northern 
half would be cleared.66 This decision met with protests from residents and 
shopkeepers, some of whom had only just acquired or improved their 
properties.67 The haste of the decision was defended by Labour Deputy Housing 
Chairman Jack Prichard, who said that a quick decision would avoid further 
hardship in the area, though Labour Councillor Amy Donohoe, who represented 
Burley, blamed the failure of the scheme on the unwillingness to compulsorily 
improve housing, and urged that this policy be reinstated.68 The Belle Vue and 
Burley Community Association, created after encouragement from the council in 
1967, took a determined stance against the council’s decision. After the Housing 
Chairman Kevin Gould had attended a public meeting of residents on 16th 
November, a decision was made to postpone clearance until at least the 1982-86 
period.69 The Community Association and Leeds Civic Trust decided to 
commission expert help to fight the council’s proposals, and approached Tom 
Hancock, an architect and planner with Peterborough New Town. Along with 
Robert McKie from the Institute of Planning Studies and an architect, James 
Hook, he produced a survey and report into the area. They started by saying that 
they could not accept the division of the area which they felt was ‘one 
community’.70 This echoed what a council report had itself said before the 
improvement scheme was commenced, namely that ‘there is a strong social 
identity within this area, having been established as a stable residential area for a 
considerable time’.71   
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The survey claimed that they were unable to ascertain any significant differences 
between the houses in the north and south of the area, that the standard of the 
three-quarters of properties that had been improved was consistently good, and 
that the structural condition of unimproved houses was also good.72 They 
admitted that the unimproved dwellings were statutorily unfit because of their 
internal arrangement, but believed that this should not matter. Indeed, they 
asserted that one of the main issues relating to the area was the gap between ‘the 
official standards of fitness and the different standards of Burley Lodge.’73 The 
council’s decision to reprieve the northern part of the area for only fourteen years 
was held to have blighted the district, and it was forecast that this would infiltrate 
the southern section, which would ‘find its decaying northern half an appalling 
neighbour.’74  They concluded by arguing that the Burley Lodge Road district 
should be declared a General Improvement Area, which could ‘ensure continuing 
investment in the area and meet the expressed preferences of the population.’75 
As part of this strategy they said that owner-occupation should be encouraged, 
and the council should use its status as landlord of 43% of the houses to 
‘influence the status of the area through its selection of new tenants.’76 This latter 
tactic was to avoid ‘more affluent non-family households in furnished 
accommodation’ who could affect the area by pricing out other potential 
residents, a factor which did tend to be one of the features of General 
Improvement Areas elsewhere. 
 
The council did finally give General Improvement Area status to the Burley 
Lodge Road area, but it was to be three years later, and was only to consist of the 
southern half.77 The northern half was now not to be cleared before 1990, but this 
did not satisfy Labour and Liberal councillors, who stuck to the idea that the area 
should be treated as one. Arguments within the council were over the nature of 
GIA treatment. Labour’s shadow housing chair, George Mudie, argued that the 
northern section met the qualifications for GIA status, namely that they were 
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sound houses, a stable community and not a ‘stress area’.78 Housing Chairman 
Peter Sparling responded by saying that the two halves of the area were 
fundamentally different, and the Environmental Health department believed that 
it was ‘completely unrealistic’ to expect houses in the northern part to have the 
necessary thirty years life expectancy for a GIA declaration, something that the 
Department of the Environment had confirmed informally.79 In 1972 Alison 
Ravetz claimed that ‘the people of Burley Lodge are now, like many other Leeds 
citizens, victims of the rolling clearance programme, by which the whole housing 
stock of this city is to be renewed over and over again, for all foreseeable time to 
come.’80 In reality the situation was not quite as stark, and more complicated in 
nature. The Burley Lodge Road ‘affair’ showed that improvement could be 
marked by the same kind of uncertainty and differences of opinion that affected 
the clearance drive. It also suggested that the gap was increasing between the 
council’s attempts to implement policy based on professional standards and legal 
norms, and the feelings of those opposed to the council’s decisions, who claimed 
they had the backing of the community. Indeed, it was the identification of ‘stable 
communities’ and ‘sound houses’ that was becoming very difficult. The refusal of 
grassroots organisations to accept the council’s interpretation of the law was 
making political consensus impossible, but not reaching its logical conclusion of 
questioning the legitimacy of the local state altogether.     
 
While slum clearance in Leeds had been scaled down by 1974, it was still a 
favoured option for Leeds’ planners. The national economic problems that 
affected local government finance, coupled with central government legislation, 
meant that Leeds would have to engage with the problems of restructuring the 
clearance programme while incorporating newer features like GIAs and HAAs 
into their housing strategy. They were confronted, therefore, with decisions that 
needed to be made on interpreting and implementing the Housing Act, and 
choosing which areas to focus attention on first. As a result, 1975 saw a 
comprehensive clarification of the council’s housing policy. In April 1975 the 
Housing Services Committee approved a ‘medium’ rate of clearance up to 1981, 
                                                          
78 LCC, Agenda and Verbatim Reports, November 1976, p.458 
79 Ibid, p.460 
80 YEP, 08/12/1972. 
104 
 
and this had involved a re-examination by the departments of Environmental 
Health, Planning, and Housing of all houses in the Housing Renewal Programme. 
Some houses were removed from the clearance programme and recommended for 
improvement. Tellingly, it was stated that ‘such dwellings were included in the 
HRP in anticipation of raised standards of statutory unfitness which have not 
materialised.’81 Linked with the release of these houses was the recommendation 
of programmes of HAA declarations in the immediate and medium terms. It was 
also suggested that a detailed year-by-year clearance programme be formulated 
that would involve consultation with local councillors and community groups 
and, as a result of the increased deliberations and wider improvement 
programme, the need for increased staff resources was emphasised.82  
 
Later in 1975 the Housing Working Party reported back with two documents, one 
on Area Improvement, and another on Clearance and Local Rehousing. On 
improvement it was suggested that four HAAs and four GIAs were to be initiated 
each year, but only the first two years of the programme should be publicised, 
‘because of the need to gain experience, the retention of flexibility, possible 
blighting effects, and uncertainty about resources given the present economic 
climate.’83 The decision-making process was largely governed by the principle 
that priority should be given to houses lacking amenities, such as inside toilets, 
bathrooms and central heating. Areas in disrepair or suffering from poor 
environmental conditions were discounted and the Committee warned that if they 
‘wish to give higher priority to these factors then any areas so chosen may be at 
the expense of areas where a proportion of households lack basic amenities.’84 
The main determinant of whether an area became a HAA or GIA was to be where 
the percentage of privately rented households exceeded 40%. The report admitted 
that, as a result, there was an obvious overlap between the bottom of the HAA list 
and the top of the GIA list, but that it was difficult to place a dividing line 
between the two.85 Other criteria to differentiate ‘competing’ areas included 
                                                          
81 LCC, Clearance and Improvement Programmes: Report of the Housing Working Party (April 
1975) 
82 Ibid. 
83 LCC, Area Improvement Programme: Report of the Housing Working Party (November 1975) 
p.2 
84 Ibid, pp.9-10 
85 Ibid, p.10 
105 
 
where social ‘stress’ was known to exist, where urgent action was judged to be 
necessary to arrest rapid decline, and areas that adjoined clearance areas.86 The 
whole document seemed quite frank about the difficulty of establishing objective 
criteria for apportioning improvement areas according to HAA and GIA 
standards, and hastened to add, again, that ‘the “pool” of areas for examination 
has not been derived from an up to date comprehensive and systematic survey of 
housing stock and social conditions in the MD (Metropolitan District) due to lack 
of staff resources.’87 In a sense, the report seemed to have been written with an 
eye on both Whitehall and the local community, emphasising as it did the lack of 
resources and the need to make harsh decisions between different areas. 
 
The linked report on Clearance and Local Rehousing represented an intention to 
co-ordinate clearance and building programmes in an attempt to minimise the 
dispersal of cleared households, it being recognised that the disruption of social 
life was one of the factors that caused most discontent in areas represented for 
demolition.88 The novelty of the proposals was that clearance plans, the building 
programme and potential housing land were to be considered by ‘Key Localities’. 
These ‘Key Localities’ were to be drawn up ‘on the basis of local knowledge of 
communities or groups of communities within each of which it was assumed 
residents would wish to be rehoused if they wanted to stay local.’89 The problem 
with this was that the council’s assumptions did not always prove to be local 
enough for certain groups of residents. Despite, or even because of, their attempts 
to adjust to changes in national policy, economic circumstances, and popular 
concerns, these reports created many contentious issues. It was interesting that 
clearance and improvement continued to be discussed separately rather than as 
parts of a unified renewal process. One of the main problems the council was to 
face was that the relative inexactness of the decision-making process and 
definitions used opened up the issue of renewal to political action, because it 
appeared that the technical ‘expertise’ applied was so uncertain. In places like 
Burley Lodge Road and the ‘Ebors’ area of Hyde Park, where a deputation to the 
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council protested that an ‘arbitrary’ decision had been made to reprieve only half 
of the area from clearance90, residents seemed genuinely puzzled as to the criteria 
the council had used to make their decisions. 
 
Suffice to say, the Environmental Health Department was not too pleased with 
the framework it was obliged to operate in. Its head, E.C.Lewis, declared in 1976 
that the switch in policy away from clearance towards Housing Action Areas 
meant that ‘the problems of effecting rehabilitation of what are grossly unfit 
houses in areas mainly occupied by low income families in a climate of rapidly 
declining public funds are proving almost insoluble.’91 Lewis’ successor, J. 
Garforth, followed this in the following year by warning that ‘in a city of more 
than a quarter of a million houses, the present rate of 500 houses per year 
clearance can only serve to build up a backlog of trouble for future generations.’92 
He added that ‘…the bureaucratic machinery for declaring Housing Action Areas 
is so cumbersome that in itself it acts as a deterrent to an increase in the rate of 
declaration.’93 The ‘sanitary’ side of the council thus found itself in the situation 
where neither clearance nor improvement was really possible to the level it 
considered necessary. From a choice of urban renewal options the council 
bureaucracy was left with scrambling around to do as much as was financially, 
legally and administratively possible in the circumstances, and with little chance 
of actually being able to set an agenda or take an initiative. This was not a happy 
position to be in when the political environment was becoming less friendly.  
 
‘Key Localities’ were one of the first features of the council’s new policies to 
come under attack. Rev. Simpson from Woodhouse Community Association 
criticised the concept as ‘this lie’ when leading a delegation to the council 
chamber.94 In more temperate language, the Community Housing Working Party 
described the ‘key locality’ as too large an area, and argued that the new 
dwellings that were intended to rehouse residents were inappropriate for the 
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families affected.95 One of the major factors that agitated local community and 
residents’ groups about the council’s stance was that they just could not see the 
difference between areas that had been reprieved from clearance, areas that were 
to become HAAs, and adjoining streets that were still in the demolition 
programme. In this confusion many were eager to use the legislation and the 
signals coming from central government in order to advocate alternatives. 
Woodhouse Housing Action Group appealed to the council in May 1976 to 
declare one of the clearance areas an HAA while making the others a priority 
neighbourhood, stating that it ‘would lead to the removal immediately of the 
effects of blight and lead to the gradual improvement of the whole area.’96 In 
another area suffering badly from planning blight, the Cross Streets Housing 
Action Group carried out a survey of local residents and even went as far as to 
ask the Public Health Advisory Service to assess the housing conditions in the 
area. The PHAS found that the houses were statutorily unfit from the point of 
view of bad internal arrangement and inadequate ventilation, and the majority 
also in respect of sanitary conveniences and inadequate natural lighting to attic 
rooms. However, they did state that the houses were found to be in a fair state of 
repair with no evidence of instability. The CSHAG argued that the addition of 
internal amenities and extra ventilation would rectify these problems, and said 
that they disagreed that steep, winding staircases and front doors that opened 
directly onto the street rendered a house unfit for human habitation. They claimed 
that the clearance process had already caused enough stress in the area, and 
appealed to the council to make a section of the area an HAA, with adjoining 
areas as a Priority Neighbourhood. As an extra boost to their arguments they 
commissioned an architect to produce a report stating how the area could 
eventually become a GIA.97 The CSHAG was to be less than happy with the lack 
of reception their report received from the council, and a delegation told a council 
meeting that ‘what we find particularly galling is that after spending so much 
time and effort producing a competent technical report recommending a Housing 
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Action Area, and doing this in accordance with DOE Circular 14/75, that no-one 
concerned with council housing has bothered to reply to us.’98  
 
Cross Streets Housing Action Group had been formed with the specific aim of 
opposing redevelopment in the Fitzarthur Street clearance area in Armley. The 
clearance process here was to demonstrate many of the changes in public 
perceptions and community action that had occurred in the previous ten years. 
Many of the arguments made were typical of the period. Leeds’ Senior Housing 
Inspector, S.R. Sneddon, said that ‘the structure of the houses in the area showed 
signs of decay and disrepair and because of their age and condition were not 
considered suitable for general upgrading.’99 On the other side, a surveyor giving 
evidence on behalf of landlords in the area said that they had been improved eight 
years ago and passed for a life of at least fifteen years100, while Leslie Webb, a 
member of the Royal Institute of British Architects, claimed that the houses in the 
CPO could have been put into good repair for just a few hundred pounds.101 
Local councillor Michael Meadowcroft argued that ‘the Cross Streets area could 
not be divorced from the adjoining streets, and it was feared that morale would be 
so depressed after the clearance that the council would have the excuse it sought 
to clear the whole area.’102 Residents and the CSHAG extolled the virtues of the 
local communities and facilities and stated that they did not want to be 
uprooted.103     
 
These familiar claims and counter-claims were less momentous than the overall 
impact of the inquiry. The CSHAG had managed to successfully campaign to 
have the public local inquiry concerning the Fitzarthur Street area moved to West 
Leeds Working Men’s Club rather than the traditional venue of the Leeds Civic 
Hall, a significant sign of the amount of pressure they were able to exert.104 This 
was not the only important feature of this particular inquiry. Leading councillors 
George Mudie, Labour Shadow Housing Chair, and Michael Meadowcroft, the 
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local Liberal leader, both gave evidence against the CPO.105 Due to local feeling, 
the inspector held an informal meeting at Hall Lane Community Centre to allow 
residents who were unable to attend the inquiry to put their point of view.106 
Altogether, the Fitzarthur Street Public Local Inquiry lasted six days with 186 
objections.107  
 
Despite this opposition, the inspector’s report backed the council with minor 
alterations and was approved by Minister for the Environment Peter Shore in 
March 1978, but the whole episode was something of a watershed. Responding to 
a complaint from local Liberal councillor Chris Greenfield, who said that the 
delay in approval had blighted the area a second time, Shore’s deputy Ernest 
Armstrong replied that the ‘order was most unusual in the weight of objections 
and the length of the inquiry. It takes a great deal of time to write, type, check and 
consider.’108 The Fitzarthur Street CPO procedure had demonstrated that the legal 
process of slum clearance could be transformed into an effective arena for 
conflict and something akin to political theatre. Leeds’ Housing Department 
commented that ‘it is hoped that it will not be necessary to go to such lengths at 
every future clearance inquiry since this would leave no time to implement the 
existing programme when one considers the staff resources available.’109 
 
The mention of ‘DOE Circular 14/75’ by the Cross Streets Housing Action Group 
reflects an interesting slant on government policy, and one that was to be very 
popular with local campaigning groups. This circular outlined the possibility of 
‘Gradual Renewal’, which approached the issue of substandard housing 
‘carefully-not by attacking whole areas one at a time, but evenly, in all areas, 
over a period of decades. This would prolong the useful life of houses which 
would otherwise have been cut short by blight.’110 Though Gradual Renewal had 
already been mentioned in the council chamber in 1975111, the first detailed 
advocacy of it within the community came in the Community Housing Working 
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Party’s report Gradual Renewal in Leeds. The Community Housing Working 
Party was a collaboration of several community groups, including the 
Woodhouse Housing Action Group and Cross Streets Housing Action Group, and 
financially assisted by the Leeds Civic Trust. They shared a common opposition 
to slum clearance and enthusiastically embraced the concept of Gradual Renewal. 
This provided an alternative to the council’s recent reports which, they argued, 
were not in sympathy with the ideas of recent government circulars. The phased 
redevelopment that the council intended to implement was forecast by the CHWP 
to cause increased disruption and planning blight over a longer term, and they 
claimed that any hold-ups in the programme would cause drastic changes in its 
implementation, something that was almost inevitable given public expenditure 
cuts, labour and materials shortages.112 Thus the report combined many of the 
established criticisms of demolition with a remedy that appeared to take account 
of the political and economic circumstances that the council were facing. 
 
One claim that Gradual Renewal in Leeds had made was that local authorities 
had not adjusted organisationally from redevelopment to rehabilitation.113 In 
Leeds’ case they were right. The Housing Services Committee did respond to the 
CHWP report in November 1976 by resolving that the whole of the proposed 
Woodhouse clearance area should be assessed as an experiment into the 
feasibility of Gradual Renewal, and that residents and community groups should 
be consulted as part of this process. The Woodhouse clearance area was cited in 
1962 for demolition in the 1972/76 programme, but was assigned as an 
improvement area in 1966 until the City Engineer refused to give the area the 
necessary 15 years life. Nonetheless, improvement grants were made available 
until 1972, when the houses were reviewed and placed in the 1977/81 clearance 
period. In 1974 the area was phased for demolition in 1976/77.114 This 
uncertainty and confusion was one reason why Woodhouse was thought to be a 
good prospect for the exercise. 
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In the end, suspicion was raised that the council’s decision was a delaying tactic 
to avoid difficult decisions, as it was to be June 1978 by the time a report was 
presented to committee, and this was before any public consultation had taken 
place.115 The report did give the council officials an opportunity to give their 
interpretation of the concept of Gradual Renewal, which they acknowledged had 
been introduced into government policy in 1975, ‘though little practical guidance 
on its application to large areas of older housing has emerged since.’116 Gradual 
Renewal was described as ‘a mixture of courses of action potentially ranging 
from clearance and redevelopment, upgrading of existing houses through to 
‘conversions’ of back-to-backs into through houses.’ Tellingly, it was suggested 
‘for application in industrial cities like Leeds, that there are minimum practicable 
areas applicable to each option which would seem to preclude the very detailed 
application of gradual renewal though a ‘coarser grained’ approach seems 
feasible.’117 It was suggested that the council’s current side-by-side operation of 
clearance and improvement programmes effectively constituted a form of 
Gradual Renewal, though it was recognised that the ‘specific form of gradual 
renewal that is required to be investigated is one where the scale of change is 
small and the pace slow and over a much longer period than the current timespan 
of the Clearance Programme.’118 The CHWP’s claim was at least partly 
acknowledged when the council stated that case studies of Gradual Renewal 
demonstrated ‘the need for co-ordinated management of widespread change on a 
continuous basis which is quite unlike the area-programmed, departmentally-
based approach to renewal currently operated.’119 
 
As advice for the forthcoming public consultation, the report suggested that the 
council should put forward a series of reservations which included limits imposed 
by central government, inability to assure which residents would need to be 
rehoused, that the inclusion of many Type II back-to-backs in the improvement 
programme would be at the expense of better housing in other areas, and 
basically that converting back-to-backs into through houses was so expensive that 
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it would only be considered in the face of overwhelming evidence. The six 
options given for the future of the three areas of Woodhouse included phased 
demolition and rebuilding; improvement as an HAA or GIA; retaining all the 
houses with only minor repairs and provision of amenities; varieties of partial 
demolition; and Gradual Renewal—described as complex and small scale 
combinations of all the options.120 
 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the results of the consultation and survey were rather 
inconclusive and pleased nobody. Only 38% of residents responded to the survey, 
one group of (largely tenanted) streets came out strongly in favour of clearance, 
areas with more owner-occupiers were less keen, while landlords as a group 
strongly supported retention.121 These results aligned closely with the 
assessments of local feeling that were reported back from public meetings. These 
included the fact that landlord opposition was described as unsurprising as they 
would not receive market value compensation, that tenants were eager to be 
rehoused locally, and owner-occupiers were largely satisfied with their own 
personal conditions but alarmed by the deterioration of the area.122 The 
Woodhouse Housing Action Group were concerned about the amount of time it 
had taken to prepare Gradual Renewal and its Application to Woodhouse, thought 
that the council had misread the concept of Gradual Renewal, and felt that the 
council’s consultation leaflet was confusing for residents and unfairly weighted in 
favour of rebuilding.123 Following on from the public meetings the council also 
held a meeting involving departmental representatives, a local councillor, and 
members of various local groups including Leeds Civic Trust, the CHWP, 
Woodhouse Community Association, Woodhouse Landlords and Owners 
Association and the Small Shopkeepers Action Group. This meeting also saw 
most groups advocate gradual renewal methods based around the ‘key elements 
of no planned ‘life’, small-scale action, and full resident participation.’124 
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In the end the officials recommended that the area of the ‘Gantons’ that had 
overwhelmingly welcomed rebuilding should be represented for clearance, along 
with the ‘Hawes’ that had been identified as suffering from ground instability. 
Residents from both areas were to be offered local rehousing. For the rest of the 
areas where the evidence was less clear, a rethink and a detailed costing of 
options was suggested. The Housing Chairman, Councillor Sparling, said that 
‘the preparation of this report follows the most extensive public consultation ever 
undertaken in a proposed clearance area and it has inevitably caused considerable 
delay in making decisions about the future of the area. There are differing views 
as to whether this delay has been worthwhile or not.’125 
 
This ‘experiment’ demonstrated many of the problems with urban renewal during 
this period. The idea of consultation and participation had proved to be another 
factor adding to confusion and conflict rather than any real extension of 
democracy. For one thing, the council was in control of the process and felt 
obliged to frame the questions and make warnings of the potential consequences 
of residents’ choices. In some ways this was an attempt to guide the results of the 
exercise on lines that were amenable to the council’s way of thinking, but the 
council officials themselves were also acutely conscious of the limitations they 
faced in terms of finance and resources. The final inconclusive results of the 
survey exercise did give them more scope to make their own recommendations. 
Slow progress with the preparations and process of consultation was undoubtedly 
the major failing of the exercise, and in many ways could have been said to have 
made blight and local conditions worse. Liberals suspected a conspiracy and a 
deliberate delaying process so that residents would eventually come round to the 
idea of demolition, but a Labour councillor for Woodhouse declared ‘quite 
categorically, and it is the view of my colleagues, that the worst thing that 
happened to Woodhouse was this survey. It deliberately put back any action by 
something like three years.’126 He added that he believed the ‘proper machinery’ 
for renewal was to leave the decision-making to the Environmental Health 
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Officers, ‘people who know’, rather than Liberal councillors and ‘some of those 
people who are the pressure groups of Woodhouse.’127 
 
This point of view had become more unfashionable through the 1970s, but it did 
bring to the fore this issue of how representative some local groups were. The 
survey results in the area of the ‘Gantons’ had shown that many private tenants 
were only too willing to be rehoused, but their opinions were not reflected in 
community group politics. Many councillors saw themselves as more in tune with 
local conditions than community groups, who were often thought to be out of 
touch with practicalities and advocating the views of a small section of the 
residents.  
 
On the other hand, it did seem that Gradual Renewal had not received full 
consideration during this period. The various groups that advocated Gradual 
Renewal felt that Leeds council had misinterpreted the concept to its own 
advantage, and had not put the issue to local residents in a fair manner. Council 
officials were clearly dubious about the practicality of small-scale action spread 
over the whole city, and their concerns were threefold: the lack of staff 
experience in dealing with that kind of work; generally depleted staff and labour 
resources; and the lack of guidance from central government.128 This last point 
was definitely a cause for grievance. Whitehall had publicised the idea of Gradual 
Renewal in its 14/75 circular with the idea that it was a desirable policy for local 
authorities, but these councils had also to work on implementing the 1974 
Housing Act with its emphasis on intensively improving small areas that faced 
the worst conditions. In a period of rapidly deteriorating financial assistance from 
the centre, councils were bound to find it difficult to set priorities, a situation that 
left them open to discontent from below. 
 
Within the council the trends that were set during and after the ‘Strategy D’ affair 
tended to reinforce themselves throughout the remainder of the 1970s. The major 
factor that led to controversy was the continuation of clearance against the 
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background of declining public and private housebuilding and a rising council 
house waiting list. Liberal arguments consistently focused on opposition to 
clearance, but these arguments were still given at least some consideration until 
Labour lost control of the council in 1975. The problem was that local politicians 
shared the frustrations of much of the bureaucracy when it came to implementing 
policy. Responding to a question from a Liberal councillor asking what action he 
intended to take on a recent survey that showed residents in an area of Hunslet 
wanted to remain in their present houses, Housing Chair Councillor Gould 
(Labour) said that it was a ‘good survey’ and options would be considered with 
regard to financial and staff resources and government conditions on 
improvements.129 The emphasis on resources echoed what he had said a few 
months earlier on similar issues.130 Gould also showed an early interest in 
Gradual Renewal, admitting that it ‘might seem to herald a new understanding of 
the complexities of urban renewal that we have never understood before.’131 He 
added that Gradual Renewal should not necessarily mean a reduction of 
clearance, but the refinement of renewal action and a means of achieving more 
community involvement and local rehousing. A more radical stance was taken by 
Gould’s successor as Labour housing spokesman, Councillor Mudie, who 
declared that ‘it is accepted that the areas are smaller than they were in the past 
but they are still areas; they are still circling areas and they are still clearing them, 
and the whole basis of the area seems to be that there is a certain type of house 
and that type of house, regardless of whether it is owner-occupied, regardless of 
whether the people want to stay in that house, is demolished.’132 He outlined his 
preference that the Environmental Health Officers should continue to propose 
properties before they went into a clearance programme.133 Later that year Mudie 
stated that there were at least two parties in the council opposed to wholesale area 
clearance134 and he later said that ‘we want an objective look at individual 
properties so that the poor individual who has got a grant, who is buying his 
house, who is pouring his investments into that house, does not suddenly find that 
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he is told by some bureaucrat that his house is not fit to live in.’135 This was very 
close to the line that the Liberals had been advocating for years, but despite the 
apparent rapprochement between ‘official’ Labour and Liberal opinions on 
redevelopment policy, there was still a close rivalry within the council. 
 
Liberal opposition to clearance seemed to increase in momentum rather than 
show signs of satisfaction that the demolition rate was slowing down. They 
embraced the idea of Gradual Renewal at its most conservative interpretation, 
though Councillor Meadowcroft, one of the more ‘reasoned’ Liberals, conceded 
that ‘looking at the City as a whole, the number cleared each year could 
conceivably be greater than we are presently clearing and so it is not numbers, it 
is the style of the policy we are talking about.’136 Other Liberal councillors were 
more uncompromising, arguing against setting any clearance targets137 while, on 
the subject of council-acquired properties, Councillor Clay went as far as to claim 
that the Conservatives were ‘buying up these houses and deliberately letting them 
rot, all in order to justify their lunatic clearance programme.’138 In certain areas 
the established conflict with Labour councillors continued, particularly where 
these Labour members were in favour of clearance. Councillor Millett (Labour) 
claimed that ‘some of the people in my ward are suffering from the results of the 
dogmatism of the Liberal Party’ and accused them of letting their obsession with 
community politics blind them to unfit housing.139 In his ward the East End Park 
Residents for New Homes Association sent a deputation to the council pleading 
to be rehoused, another sign that the swing away from clearance was not 
universally popular.140 Another sign of Labour-Liberal rivalry came in October 
1978, when councillors ignored the Conservative administration to have an 
argument about the whole nature of post-war housing policy and which side had 
more effectively opposed ‘Strategy D’ and recent clearance proposals.141 Liberal 
attacks on council renewal policy showed increased emphasis on comparing their 
own ideas to traditional Tory values, and contrasting this to the modernising 
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agenda of the Conservative controlled council. Councillor Greenfield argued that 
clearance discouraged thrift by reducing the proportion of owner occupiers and 
reduced choice by removing private renting as a form of tenure,142 a position that 
was backed up by Councillor Meadowcroft who stated that the policy 
‘undermines thrift, it discourages prudence, it breaks up communities and is 
inimical to stability.’143 
 
Ironically, the most extreme example of this kind of argument came from 
Labour’s Councillor Driver, who declared that ‘the Tory plan to demolish is 
certainly not in keeping with declared Conservative aims of supporting the 
individual against the corporate state that they profess so much to hate. What is 
more, this Tory action is simply uneconomic on the Conservatives’ own market 
terms.’144 This was quite a significant statement, as it reflected the fact that the 
Conservatives in Leeds were still employing a technocratic approach to urban 
renewal even on the eve of the Thatcher government. With Councillor Sparling as 
Housing Chairman, the Conservatives still looked to favour clearance as the most 
desirable solution to older housing in Leeds, albeit constrained by financial 
pressure and government shifts towards improvement—in November 1976 he 
declared that it was an ‘absolute tragedy’ that the clearance programme was 
having to be cut back.145 He felt that the problem with reducing redevelopment 
and promoting improvement was that ‘you are just pushing the problem further 
and further into the distance, with the result that sooner or later you are going to 
come to the point when there are more and more properties to be dealt with at 
once.’146 Sparling himself was very consistent both in his determination to attack 
unfit housing and his faith in the council officials’ ability to manage change. He 
showed typical contempt for Liberal arguments when he stated that Councillor 
Greenfield’s ‘idea of progress is to perpetuate slum housing conditions.’147 The 
policy of local rehousing on the basis of ‘key localities’ was defended, as was the 
more selective method of allocating clearance areas. Where the limits of the 
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Conservative ‘statist’ approach could be detected was in their attitude to 
‘municipalisation’. When Councillor Mudie attacked the local policy of not using 
the loan allocation the council was entitled to in order to buy up vacant properties 
for council ownership, Sparling countered by referring to the government’s 
mortgage loan scheme that had been suspended, saying ‘there appears to be 
money for municipalisation but it is rather different when it is a question of 
enabling people to own their own houses.’148 Thus some ideological differences 
were still apparent. Nevertheless, Conservative policy at local level still appeared 
to follow the line of bureaucratically-directed clearance of ‘slum’ housing 
combined with the building of council housing for those unable to enter the 
housing market. There was little encouragement for private landlords, nor for 
owners who occupied the poorest and cheapest houses. Sparling’s faith in public 
officials seemed to be a lot more secure than that of his party’s national 
leadership. When replying to a Liberal councillor who declared that he could not 
differentiate a local clearance area from an HAA, he suggested that he should get 
‘Mr Garforth, a very highly respected official of this Council, to take him round 
and he will show him the difference in no time at all.’149 In this particular period 
the Conservative outlook on urban renewal in Leeds seemed to follow what might 
be called a corporate paternalist line, their traditional commitments to inequality 
not yet implying a rejection of the functions of the state to implement necessary 
change.  
 
Urban renewal in Leeds had become a very different process politically during 
the 1970s, even though the institutional forms had stayed pretty much the same. 
The differences lay in the changing context that Leeds’ political and bureaucratic 
leadership had to operate in. The main factor was the deteriorating economic 
situation and the reduction of funds from the centre. This meant that ambitious 
programmes such as ‘Strategy D’ had become impossible to finance, and 
throughout the 1970s the money available from the exchequer steadily reduced, 
with a corresponding reduction in Leeds’ clearance programme. Where money 
was allocated to local authorities it tended to be targeted to programmes that 
                                                          
148 Ibid, June 1976, p.140 
149 Ibid, April 1979, p.42 
119 
 
focused on the worst-affected areas, in the form of Housing Action Areas. 
Unfortunately, in a situation of limited finances, there were only certain locales 
that were able to receive this status, and with no real system for prioritising areas, 
confusion often occurred. Leeds was not alone in its dilemmas. As Paris and 
Blackaby point out, urban renewal policy in Birmingham was also dominated in 
this period by issues relating to the ‘life’ of older houses and the classification 
and official designation of areas.150 Leeds was also to suffer from inconsistent 
national policy in the form of recommendations from central government. 
Gradual Renewal and other forms of improvement were encouraged, but 
instructions and information on how to implement them tended to be vague, and 
with a shortage of staff experience and time the council was reluctant to devote 
too much attention to experimenting with them. The council bureaucracy also 
found it difficult to adjust an organisation used to operating wide, area-based 
slum clearance schemes to the new government trend for encouraging micro-
management of smaller, selected environments. At the same time the 
Conservative administration that ‘ruled’ Leeds in the late 1970s still retained a 
commitment to the state-directed transformation of ‘slum’ housing areas. As a 
result, council programmes generally operated on scaled down versions of 
previous processes, and the fewer sections of Leeds that were affected by 
redevelopment or improvement, the more questions arose from those groups who 
demanded attention or wanted to be left alone.  
 
The reduction in size and scope of demolition and improvement operations, and 
the seemingly more haphazard and subjective decision-making processes, gave 
great impetus to community groups and party-political opposition to council 
policy. The more that the Housing Committee or official working parties 
removed areas from the clearance programme, or included them in HAAs, the 
more local organisations were encouraged to press their demands. This reached 
the stage where the council, and particularly the ‘expert’ officials, struggled for 
legitimacy, and was forced to justify at length almost every decision it made that 
related to urban renewal. This also had its effects on local party politics, as the 
electoral competition between Labour and the emerging Liberals led to Labour 
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softening its attitude on slum clearance and placing more emphasis on 
demonstrating that it was listening to the people. Unfortunately, participation and 
consultation were to be quite vague concepts and, as it was difficult to give 
participation any real structure, informal consultation was employed more often. 
This was much quicker than more thorough attempts at residents’ involvement, 
though its democratic nature was often dubious. By the end of the 1970s the 
whole political, ideological, financial and legal context was working against the 
development of urban renewal programmes, though the organisational structure 
of the local authority was still struggling to adjust to that situation. In the end, 
given that opposition to urban renewal seemed more active than discontent 
related to declining standards, political expediency suggested that the most 
effective way was simply to accept that the council should do less and decrease 
the expectation on it to provide results. This response effectively involved a 
drastic scaling down of the interventionism that had marked post-war urban 
policy and of which slum clearance was one of the most intensive strategies. 
While discontent and community action remained at a relatively high level 
compared with the 1950s and 1960s, shorn of their major target and many of their 
most pressing grievances, they became more inchoate. The state, both locally and 
nationally, found itself with something of a breathing space but had left many of 
the collective causes it embraced in the post-war period to the play of large and 
small private interests in a less ordered capitalist environment. 
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Chapter Five: Housing: Construction and Production, 1954-1968 
 
 
York Road and Ebor Gardens Estate, 1963. (Leeds Library and Information Service, 
www.leodis.net) 
 
In the realm of housebuilding, 1954 is less of a rigid dividing line than it is for 
slum clearance and housing improvement. Nevertheless, the early 1950s does 
mark the beginning of a shift in the aims and methods of construction in response 
to the great political significance of housing in this period. Central government 
was determined to respond to popular pressures to increase building rates, but it 
was local authorities who had to provide the bulk of these houses. Even allowing 
for the relaxation of post-war controls on materials, labour and finance, there 
were still significant constraints on councils’ ability to increase construction, 
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particularly after the resumption of slum clearance and the need to compensate 
for the loss of demolished property by carrying out inner-city redevelopment. It 
could be argued that it was the necessity of dealing with the housing shortage 
while simultaneously carrying out a renewal of aged residential districts that led 
to the adoption of modern styles and methods of building. As Dunleavy has 
claimed, pursuing high-rise projects and using systems-building offered a 
‘technological short-cut’ solution to the problems of local authorities.1 For a 
relatively short period in the late 1950s and early 1960s these ‘solutions’ 
contributed to an extensive reshaping of much of Leeds’ residential environment, 
and a brief glimpse of novel modern ways of living. 
 
Simmonds has argued that ‘Leeds’ housing programme in the 1950s unfolded 
purely as a product of a political-cum-administrative vision, which was carried 
through with relatively little public debate or discussion….this may help to 
explain why Leeds produced distinctive forms of housing at odds with most 
people’s preferences.’2 This seems unfair and slightly misleading when hindsight 
is taken away. There was little effort made to ascertain public opinion on 
housing, and there are occasions where disapproval was expressed concerning the 
form and style of modern dwellings, though seldom on any organised level. Yet 
the primary political imperative of the housing programme in the 1950s was the 
production and provision of increasing numbers of houses in order to reduce 
overcrowding and rehouse those living in slum conditions. No real precedent 
existed for mechanisms that could assess the desires of the users of public 
services, with or without their active involvement. There are many instances 
documented where people were extremely happy with their new living 
environments, particularly such features as indoor toilets, bathrooms, central 
heating and modern kitchens, and most of the new housing constructed in Leeds 
during the 1950s was traditional in style, and semi-detached with gardens. In 
resorting to bureaucratic decision-making processes and high-rise flats for some 
of its housing programme Leeds was not unique, and formed part of a trend with 
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other provincial cities such as Birmingham, Sheffield and Liverpool.3 
Nevertheless, it is worth considering why Leeds’ housing programme unfolded in 
the way it did, particularly as the overwhelming majority of multi-storey blocks 
in the city were constructed in a ten-year period starting in 1956, and modern 
methods of building occupied an increasing part of construction projects.   
 
After the end of the wartime hiatus on housebuilding, things continued to a great 
extent as they had done pre-war, minus the significant levels of private-sector 
construction of the 1930s. All aspects of economic life were still subject to many 
of the controls that had applied during the war, in order that the country could 
adjust to the peacetime economy and fulfil the social objectives of the post-war 
Labour government while avoiding disorder and waste. The minister responsible 
for housing, Aneurin Bevan, believed strongly in the provision of high-quality 
council housing as the great priority for the resources devoted to his department. 
As a result, a strict system of licences was imposed on private building, but local 
authorities were also subject to shortages of such vital inputs as steel, timber and 
labour. These tight restrictions were loosened as the economy recovered, but 
central government was still to exert extensive influence over local authority 
housing policy through legislation, manipulation of finance through changing 
subsidies, housing allocations, cost controls for individual schemes, and design 
specifications or standards. Councils were often to find Whitehall as much of an 
unpredictable factor as the uncertainties associated with acquiring materials, 
obtaining labour or facing extreme weather conditions. 
 
Within Leeds the post-war situation did lead to some experimentation with 
prefabrication and non-traditional materials, but construction was largely of the 
cottage-type dwellings familiar from the inter-war years, semi-detached or in 
small terraces, with gardens, and massed on suburban sites that the council had 
acquired before the war, such as Belle Isle, Beckett Park and Ireland Wood. 
Building contracts were also carried out by a range of small, local firms, as many 
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as 18 in 1950-51.4 Modest increases in output were achieved, but the council was 
already planning for the future. Land scarcity was to be the initial spur to the 
consideration of developing cleared inner city sites, which were also held to have 
the additional advantages of prior provision of streets and sewers, easy walking 
distances to employment, and breaking up congested industrial development.5 
Multi-storey flats were contemplated, along with ‘modern’ terrace houses and 
three-storey flats, of which new designs had been approved. The City Architect 
was also preparing an updated scheme at Marsh Lane, near the city centre, which 
had been suspended at the outbreak of war.6   
 
Increasing building rates and obtaining a continuous flow of completed dwellings 
was the council’s main aim during the 1950s. As such, they were receptive to 
almost any means of achieving this and breaking some of the barriers that 
frustrated their objectives, such as finance, resources and even weather. The 
number of building firms awarded contracts to build municipal housing declined 
markedly through the 1950s, even as the number of dwellings constructed 
increased. By 1962 this had fallen to six companies plus the direct labour of the 
Works Department. This seems to have been caused at least in part by conscious 
decisions made by the council. In 1955 the City Architect urged that more large 
areas of land needed to be acquired ‘with a view to encouraging big contractors to 
come in and be assured of continuity of work’.7 Five years later the sporadic 
construction on small pockets of land in Swinnow was bemoaned, as it was held 
that ‘this sort of development results in the letting of a series of comparatively 
small contracts which are more difficult to administer.’8 This bureaucratic desire 
for easier procedures in construction was to have a particular effect in 
redevelopment areas, where it often led to ‘fit’ dwellings being demolished to 
provide more ‘suitable’ areas for rebuilding.9 Control over the process of 
construction was much sought after by the council, and a major reason why they 
preferred to consolidate large contracts in the hands of ‘reliable’ builders. In 
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1958-59 Leeds completed only 1678 council houses, a source of embarrassment 
when it was considered that they had successfully lobbied the MHLG for an 
increase in their quota from 1600 to 1800. Karl Cohen commented ironically that 
‘the (Housing) Committee has no desire to apportion blame in this other than to 
emphasise that all contracts were in the hands of private builders, and for some 
reason or other they have not been able to deliver the goods.’10  
 
Construction was often heavily affected by outside factors such as shortages of 
labour and materials, and also by the weather. Materials shortages had been of 
importance in the immediate post-war period and led to strict national controls, 
but they could impact on building projects into the 1950s. Leeds’ plans for inner 
city flats at Saxton Gardens (formerly Marsh Lane) were affected by a lack of 
steel, both in the preliminary stages11 and in the midst of construction during 
1955.12 This type of difficulty was one of the reasons why multi-storey 
construction was limited until the later 1950s, though in the latter case it did not 
stop the housing committee’s plans to commence flats in the following years.13 
Even as late as 1960, a shortage of bricks and bricklayers led the council to let an 
extra contract for ‘new traditional’ dwellings on the Cow Close and Swinnow 
estates, making use of pre-fabricated materials.14 In 1961 slower building rates 
were put down to shortages of labour on building sites as well as a lack of 
professional staff,15 and the issue of a shortage of trained architects to supervise 
building was also raised in 1964.16 The notoriously cold winter of 1962/63 
practically halted building for three months. This latter issue provoked the 
council into looking more closely into ‘industrialised’ building methods which it 
believed might not be as easily affected by weather or labour problems.17  
Connected to the issue of housebuilding rates was the use of multi-storey flats. 
High-rise developments on cleared inner-city sites had been contemplated in 
1949/50, apparently due to limited land availability18, but were slow in coming to 
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fruition. As we have seen, this was partly due to a lack of essential material such 
as steel, but it was also admitted that ‘in a scheme of this nature a considerable 
amount of preliminary work is necessary as it introduces many problems of a 
special character which must be considered and agreed before the detail (sic) 
planning can proceed.’19 The commencement of the council’s large-scale Ebor 
Gardens scheme was also delayed, though this was due to the abandonment of a 
‘district’ heating and hot water scheme in favour of electric floor heating to all 
dwellings.20 In the late 1950s lower rates of construction were explained by the 
switch in emphasis towards high-rise flats, which ‘undoubtedly take longer in the 
early stages’21, while the main reasons for increased payments to contractors were 
described as the large labour force and ‘the considerable amount of work in the 
construction of multi-storey flats which is a more expensive form of 
development.’22  At this stage, therefore, speed was not a major factor in the 
decision to build higher. In the next few years, however, as priority was 
increasingly given both to production of housing units and maximising use of 
land, it became important to seek ways of building more rapidly. By the early 
1960s new designs were proposed taking high-rise well above ten storeys, and 
indeed twenty-three storey blocks were envisaged,23 but this was another area that 
provided a catalyst for the adoption of systems-built housing.   
 
Leeds had pre-war experience with the use of building systems in the 
construction of Quarry Hill Flats at the end of the 1930s, a project that was 
closely linked to the vision of Housing Committee Chairman Charles Jenkinson 
and Housing Director R.A.H. Livett. Jenkinson died in 1949, but Livett was made 
Leeds’ first City Architect in 1945, and exercised major influence in all 
municipal building projects. Quarry Hill Flats was a development of the pre-war 
era, but is worth consideration here both for significant and symbolic reasons. As 
a modernist edifice that was created with a great deal of idealistic intent but 
which ultimately proved flawed and had a short life, it fits into the more critical 
assessments of post-war housing and public architecture. In this way, its 
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demolition between 1975 and 1978 could be seen to be emblematic of the failure 
of urban modernisation. On a more concrete level, it exists as an experiment of 
large-scale public housing as a living environment, and provides some of the first 
evidence of how tenants experienced life in modern flats. It was in this spirit that 
Alison Ravetz carried out the research that was ultimately to become Model 
Estate, in effect the definitive history of the estate.24 This is the main reason why 
this thesis does not delve too deeply into the history of Quarry Hill Flats, but also 
why it cannot be ignored. Of the major features of Quarry Hill Flats, the most 
relevant are the nature of construction and its impact on the history of the 
complex and its residents. As Ravetz points out, Quarry Hill Flats was ‘the only 
large local authority estate of the interwar period to be built unconventionally’.25 
 
Quarry Hill Flats, July 1951. (Leeds Library and Information Service, www.leodis.net) 
The method of construction employed was the French Mopin system, which 
involved the assembly of prefabricated units around a steel frame. Leeds’ 
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Housing Director R.A.H. Livett chose the system both because he doubted that 
the bricks and bricklayers would be available for such a huge scheme, and 
because he hoped that savings in building costs could go on providing more 
modern fittings for the flats. This decision to use system-building was very much 
an experiment in the conditions of the time, and there were to be significant 
effects in the immediate and the longer term.  
 
Ravetz has asserted that ‘the details of design and fittings made these the most 
advanced dwellings that had then been built for working class populations’26, and 
‘it was the fullest and most complete expression of all the social, architectural and 
technical ideas that were then current in model housing.’27 This sense that the 
flats were pioneering and unique was one of the main reasons why there was a 
strong attachment to them among Leeds’ politicians and administrators, and also 
much of the local population. On the other hand, the experimental nature of 
Quarry Hill Flats created significant problems. Difficulties between the system’s 
designer Eugene Mopin, Housing Director Livett and builder Tarran over the 
contract and methods of building all delayed the completion of the flats. The 
short-term cost of construction was roughly as expected, but there were to be 
added costs in terms of maintenance compared with ‘traditional’ pre-war council 
houses. Most importantly, there turned out to be serious structural problems that 
required a massive rehabilitation programme. Ravetz stated that ‘the evidence 
suggests that the Quarry Hill construction suffered first from being a foreign 
importation that was adapted to a different design and in different working 
conditions from its place of origin; and second from an imperfect understanding 
of innovating techniques.’28 Sadly, these lessons were largely ignored when it 
came to system-building in the post-war period. 
 
After problems emerged with the exterior cladding of the flats during the 1950s, 
the council commissioned a report from a firm of consultants that showed some 
serious defects in the cladding of the building, as well as some faults in 
construction and workmanship. As such, the council faced the decision whether 
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to immediately demolish the complex, to carry out remedial work that would 
extend the life of the flats for about ten years, or to permanently rectify the 
problems. Demolition was rejected as it would have required the rehousing of 
938 families and caused a knock-on effect on the waiting list for the rest of the 
city, while a permanent repair was rejected as it would have cost almost as much 
as a complete demolition and rebuilding. Council leader, Alderman King, 
claimed that the ten-year repair option would give ‘an opportunity for proper 
organised rehousing to take place at the appropriate time, without having to rely 
on panic measures.’29 This decision in effect set the course for the ultimate 
demise of the flats, though its fate was faced with some reluctance. The 
Conservative leader, Alderman Hargrave, gave a sense of the esteem in which 
Quarry Hill was held when he said that he felt that not enough consideration had 
been paid to a complete reconstruction of the flats.30   
 
Although contractual and organisational problems occurred during the 
construction of Quarry Hill Flats, the structural issues didn’t come to prominence 
until the late 1950s, so had little impact on decision-making before that time, or 
even after. The various difficulties with materials, labour and the weather 
ultimately outweighed the potential downsides of systems-building, and there was 
a constant rise in the consideration and use of ‘modern’ methods and materials 
through the 1950s into the mid-1960s. From the late 1940s this usually took the 
form of ‘new traditional’ houses and flats which used prefabricated materials, but 
in established designs and styles. This seems to have been a genuine attempt to 
respond to shortages of materials and skilled building labour rather than a more 
radical approach to housing provision. When traditional materials became more 
freely available, the City Architect declared that they would look to increase the 
amount of houses built in familiar construction methods,31 though they still fell 
back on ‘new traditional’ dwellings when there was a shortage of bricks and/or 
bricklayers.32 Some of the council’s 10-storey flat blocks, built in the late 1950s, 
had been constructed by Reema, who set up a factory at Seacroft producing pre-
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fabricated units33, but it wasn’t until the early 1960s that fully ‘industrialised’ 
building schemes assumed a much higher place on the agenda. This was partly 
provoked by the poor weather of 1962/63 and shortages of labour caused by an 
increase in central office and retail developments, but there was also an element 
of party-political competition over building rates, the Conservative housing 
spokesman criticising ‘the absence of a spirit and purpose sufficiently purposeful 
to explore and put to the earliest use the experience of others in the use of modern 
building techniques.’34 Karl Cohen stated that the housing committee was 
‘seriously contemplating calling on the resources of those who can build by 
industrialised methods’, by which he meant that as much of the dwelling as 
possible was manufactured, processed, and put together in factory conditions, 
with work at the site reduced to a bare minimum.35 Nonetheless, he described the 
committee as ‘treading cautiously down this path’36, an attitude that probably 
contributed to Cohen receiving another rebuke from the Conservative spokesman, 
Councillor Lyons, in the following year.37 
 
High-rise flats were the most obvious manifestation of modernity in the 
residential environment of post-war Leeds, and became symbolic of the housing 
of the era, but the application of modern styles and standards was evident in most 
types of dwelling built in this period. As with the construction of tower blocks, 
there were practical, aesthetic and ‘consumerist’ reasons for the provision of 
amenities and the application of technology to new housing.  In the 1950s 
emphasis was placed more on facilities placed in flat blocks and mostly provided 
on a communal basis, like refuse disposal, district heating, laundry facilities and 
clothes drying rooms. By the early 1960s more attention was given to supplying 
modern ‘needs’ within individual dwellings and responding to trends that were 
being pioneered in private housing. Leeds’ Housing Committee made a number 
of suggestions for an Association of Municipal Authorities meeting in January 
1960, including the introduction of new forms of heating, provision for kitchen 
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appliances, quiet areas for children, and better soundproofing and insulation.38 
The council was well-placed to respond to the Parker Morris Committee of 1961, 
with its recommendations for space standards in public housing.39  
 
Prototype houses were built that demonstrated how Leeds aimed to conform to 
Parker Morris standards. It was also stressed that in these new designs twenty-one 
electric power points were provided in a four-bedroom house, and added that ‘it 
could be said that yesterday’s luxury has become today’s necessity, and what is 
perhaps regarded as unnecessary and luxurious today will undoubtedly be 
regarded as the norm tomorrow.’40 Central heating was another facility given 
much attention, and ‘to make the best use of the house the main rooms and 
working areas, and the bedrooms as well if possible, need to be heated.’41 The 
council was very pleased with the publicity and attention given to the ‘L64’ 
prototype houses, which it claimed were ‘generally acclaimed not only by 
architectural and housing experts, but by the ordinary man and woman in the 
house.’42 Buoyed by this, the Housing Committee announced that it was 
considering showers and pedestal sinks in the bathrooms, double glazing, and 
whole house heating. They acknowledged that ‘a limiting factor will be costs but 
the Committee is in little doubt but that in 10 to 15 years’ time these type of 
“luxuries” will be household norms.’43 The council was thus keen to demonstrate 
its commitment to modern interior facilities, evidence that conforming to the 
higher standards of the era was a priority, but also possibly that it was thought 
important to compete with the private sector and prove that council provision was 
a lot more than second-class. 
 
Leeds also embraced modern styles in design and planning when it came to the 
layout of new estates, including such things as playgrounds, open space, shops 
and separation of pedestrians and traffic. Whinmoor was to be the focus of one of 
the most thorough schemes for arranging estates to adapt to the rise of the 
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motorcar. In a form of the ‘Radburn’ system first developed in the US in the 
1930s, most of the houses were to be served by cul de sacs at the rear, containing 
garages and parking spaces. This would allow houses ‘to face on to pedestrian 
ways which will link the various parts of the scheme and provide ways to schools 
and shops free from traffic.’44 There were concerns that previous developments at 
Seacroft had involved too low a density, leaving areas of ‘rough open space’. As 
a result, in the Whinmoor schemes more attention was paid to ‘siting buildings, 
open spaces and communications in such a way as to create conditions where a 
sense of community may develop.’45 The execution of the plans for out-of-town 
estates such as these was not always conducive to community-building though. 
One woman wrote to the Yorkshire Evening Post complaining that ‘after six years 
wait for a shop, the first thing we get built is a public house. I like living in 
Seacroft, but as for amenities, things ARE as bad as they seem.’ The newspaper 
added that it had received several similar letters.46 Nevertheless, it seems that 
people were generally fairly patient when moving into these new environments, 
possibly due to the improvement in the housing conditions, and complaints like 
this are relatively sparing and unorganised at this time.  
 
Leeds’ new multi-storey flats contained many of the new interior features such as 
central heating, hot water and rubbish chutes, but were also highly in favour for 
their environmental impact. The housing committee believed that ‘introducing 
these blocks will greatly assist in the architectural grouping and relieve the 
monotony of two storey development.’47 When opening the Seacroft Gate flats in 
November 1959, Leeds East MP Denis Healey declared that ‘Seacroft Gate 
would for the first time make a really worthy gateway to the great city of Leeds. 
In the past the visual physical aspect had given visitors little clue as to its real 
greatness.’48 Opening ceremonies and the commemorative booklets that 
accompanied them demonstrate the level of civic pride that was taken from the 
construction of Leeds’ high-rise blocks. These booklets usually gave a potted 
history of Leeds Council’s housing achievements, along with plans and artists 
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impressions of the building in question. Other Leeds MPs such as Hugh Gaitskell, 
Alice Bacon and Keith Joseph also officially opened flats, along with other 
dignitaries such as senior civil servants and high-flying councillors. Protocol was 
important on such occasions, and prior to the opening ceremony for Kirkstall Hill 
flats in March 1965 there was an argument between the Housing and Town 
Clerk’s Departments about who should send out the invitations.49 
 
The period between 1959 and 1962 saw the peak of the council’s enthusiasm for 
high rise development, but also a sense that they were pursuing an ‘avant-garde’ 
strategy which many people were unconvinced about. There were some cases 
where the public showed scepticism about the benefits of high flats. Some 
clearance tenants in Burmantofts objected to the council’s offer of rehousing in 
Saxton Gardens, and there was opposition to paying higher rents ‘for an outlook 
such as the flats have got’, and concerns about the safety of children falling from 
balconies.50  Even in statements acclaiming the success of the new flats there 
were often references to convincing the populace of these benefits, and in his 
opening speech for the Seacroft Gate flats Healey referred to ‘a certain amount of 
old-fashioned prejudice against novelty in design’.51 This might almost have been 
a response to a letter written to the Yorkshire Evening News asking ‘why the 
monstrosities now being constructed at the “gateway” to Leeds—namely 
Seacroft’!52 Responding to the death of City Architect R.A.H. Livett in 1959, 
Cohen said ‘I do not doubt that many today are a bit dubious as to the propriety 
of venturing into multi-storey building, but I am equally convinced that in 20 
years’ time the citizens of Leeds will have cause to bless the person who first put 
the idea forward.’53 There were some uncertainties among Leeds’ political class 
about high-rise flats, though with the recognition that they had some practical 
benefits. Leeds’ Lord Mayor, Alderman Mary Pearce (Labour) publicly described 
multi-storey council flats in Moortown as ‘a blot on the landscape’, but added 
that ‘I realise that as costs have to be cut to the quick it isn’t always possible to 
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improve these types of buildings.’54 The local press was quite sympathetic to the 
impact of high-rise flats in the central areas, but a Yorkshire Evening News 
editorial in 1959 declared that ‘we have never become reconciled aesthetically to 
the location of some of the new 10-storey flats, particularly those at Seacroft.’55 
They did, however, acknowledge that they did not ‘wish to oppose the substantial 
arguments in favour of flat-building as the best way of using limited ground 
space in a congested city like Leeds.’56 In the build up to the 1959 municipal 
elections, the local Conservative leader, Alderman Hargrave, stated that he 
approved of tall flats in the centre of city, where land values were high and there 
were advantages of access to work, but was less certain about suburban high rise. 
He claimed, quite prophetically, that prospective tenants were showing that they 
were more ‘choosey’, and that ‘as every point block costs well over a million 
pounds and a 16-storey one will be nearer two million pounds, should we proceed 
full speed ahead or wait to see the reaction of the public?’57 
 
Full speed might not have been reached yet, but a great deal of momentum had 
been built up. Public opinion was not uniformly opposed to multi-storey living, 
and Leeds’ Housing Director said in 1961 that the top four floors of flats were the 
most popular.58 Given that flats were one of the main symbols of mass collective 
housing, it might seem slightly strange that privacy was regarded as one of their 
advantages, but new tenants at Seacroft Gate were said to be looking forward to 
getting away from ground-level noise in 1959.59  In the same year the Housing 
Committee declared itself satisfied that high-rise flats were proving attractive to 
the tenants60, and in 1961 stated that, in spite of some inevitable difficulties with 
such a large programme, its decision to pursue multi-storey development was a 
wise one.61 Nonetheless, these statements give the impression that the committee 
was also trying to convince itself on the issue, and the keenness shown towards 
tower blocks in this period was more likely due to the increased priority given to 
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production of housing units and maximising use of land. Cohen regretted that the 
history of mining in Belle Isle meant that they were unable to erect multi-storey 
flats there, adding that ‘bungalows, though very nice, are indeed a great waste of 
ground which we can ill-afford.’62 As late as June 1964 he told councillors that, 
‘whilst nobody can contemplate a whole series of multi-storey flats and nothing 
else, our advisers, the City Architect and the City Engineer, will have to tell us 
how best to utilise the land so as to provide the biggest density possible.’ 63 
 
This advocacy of high-rise building did prove to be a relatively short-lived one, 
Cohen himself later becoming an opponent of further multi-storey development, 
and contradicting his erstwhile advisers. By 1965 the ‘necessity’ of high rise 
building had obviously become more questionable, as the Housing Committee 
described itself as ‘very conscious of the fact that it might be reaching the 
optimum as far as this type of dwelling is concerned….it must be recognised that 
“consumer preference” might be a determining factor in what the Committee 
should erect rather than mere theories of zoning and densities.’64 Cohen was to 
privately voice these concerns more vociferously in meetings of the Development 
Review sub-committee. When questioning the need for greater housing densities 
he argued that ‘they would have to build a type of accommodation to get these 
densities which was becoming unacceptable.’65 In these discussions he was to 
come into conflict with the City Architect, E.W. Stanley, who claimed that with 
mixed development involving multi-storey flats, four-storey maisonettes and 
three-storey flats, high-densities were easily achievable. Stanley was backed by 
his deputy, who added that high-densities would not mean lower standards and 
lower environmental values. Cohen accepted that people liked multi-storey flats 
once they lived in them, but stated that three storey flats at Moortown were only 
accepted if there was nowhere else to go, and it was not now housing committee 
policy to build at three-storeys. He also said that when there was a surplus of 
housing no-one would want multi-storey flats or maisonettes.66 This was backed 
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by the Director of Housing, who said that two-storey flats that had been built to 
increase densities were now unpopular, in spite of extremely cheap rents.67 As in 
the case of slum clearance, the planners tended to think towards the future and to 
guess what would be desirable in years to come, whereas the Housing Chairman 
and Housing Director felt that they needed to make a stand on what was 
acceptable at the time. 
 
There were multi-storey blocks built in Leeds until the early 1970s, but this is 
largely a reflection of the long timescales involved in planning, as they were 
certainly out of favour by the time that the changed subsidy scales of 1967 and 
the Ronan Point disaster in 1968 hastened the end of the national high-rise 
programme. In June 1968 Councillor Merritt (Labour), representing inner-city 
Little London and Woodhouse, argued that Leeds had enough tall blocks, and that 
practical problems with lifts, vandalism and abuse of common facilities were 
combined with ‘psycho-social’ characteristics, with ‘the novelty of the view 
replaced in time by a feeling of loneliness, and remoteness, and isolation.’68 New 
Housing Chair, Irwin Bellow, responded that ‘we will not build one more multi-
storey block than is absolutely necessary to enable us to maintain our programme 
and to comply with the density and Ministry cost yardstick requirements.’69 The 
lack of enthusiasm for high-rise development was noticeable, especially when 
compared with just a few years earlier, even if it was asserted that some practical 
benefit could still be achieved. It is possible that, with housing demand less great, 
the advantages of tower blocks and flats in terms of density and production were 
diminished, and their novelty as modern living environments was wearing off.  
 
Importantly, central government was also weakening in its keenness for high-rise 
building, despite the heavy emphasis of the late 1960s on increasing the 
production of housing. The main reason for this change seems to be financial. 
Commenting on the council’s layout for stage D of the Whinmoor estate, the 
MHLG stated in January 1967 that the overall density for the estate was 
appropriate, but questioned the need for ‘more costly’ point blocks, advising that 
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three-storey flats would be as effective in achieving high densities while 
‘reducing costs and giving a larger proportion of flat-dwellers easier access to the 
ground.’70 Leeds’ Town Clerk responded that the council felt that it would be 
difficult to let three-storey blocks, an issue that had already been raised within 
various committees. Approval for the scheme was delayed until after August 
1968. The City Architect blamed this on the lack of leeway given to ‘transitional’ 
schemes which were not intended to comply with the MHLG’s new housing ‘cost 
yardstick’,71 a problem that was also faced with the second stage of the council’s 
Hunslet Grange development.72 In the case of Whinmoor, the MHLG Regional 
Officer suggested that, as ‘it would be desirable to avoid a situation in which a 
comprehensive layout could be made acceptable by deleting individual elements, 
I am accordingly to suggest that the better course would be to revise the 
layout…’73 
 
In this period Leeds had been ploughing ahead with the concept of collaborating 
with other local authorities to streamline housing production and make 
housebuilding more efficient. The result was the creation of the Yorkshire 
Development Group in 1962, a consortium initially involving Leeds, Sheffield 
and Hull, but later incorporating Nottingham and associate members in 
Chesterfield and Scunthorpe. It involved co-operation within the levels of elected 
politicians, officials, and architectural staff, and its first efforts were the ‘general 
specification and standardisation of materials and the components that go into the 
average house built by the three authorities.’74 The consortium employed an 
architect and ‘development team’, who were to produce designs within the 
specifications of the local authorities. It was hoped that this type of work would 
give ‘time for greater than normal rationalisation and refinement in design, and 
therefore the discovery of more economical solutions’, and ‘application of the 
solutions to a large programme makes possible added economies at every phase 
of design, organisation, manufacture and creation.’75  
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Bulk purchase and standardisation of materials was an important part of the 
consortium’s role, and each council acted as ‘sponsoring authority’ for a certain 
type of internal fitting, for example Hull took ironmongery and doors, Sheffield 
bathrooms and Leeds kitchen fitments. Specifications were laid down as to the 
materials that should be ordered and used, and lists of approved suppliers were 
circulated.76 This system did not avoid disagreements over tenders and 
contractors for certain types of work,77 and a report in 1967 stated that there was 
a need for a reduction in the variety of Bulk Purchase items, and a more 
restrictive list of joinery manufacturers.78 Later that year, however, when 
confronted with the need to change over to metric measurements, it was decided 
that the Bulk Purchase system had ‘served its useful life’, and in future purchase 
of components should be made individually by each city. It was still stressed that 
the discipline imposed by the standardisation and rationalisation of fittings should 
be continued, but it was also accepted that ‘there appeared now to be no financial 
advantage in the current Bulk Purchase System with the exception of kitchen 
fitments.’79 Ultimately this seems like an admission that the painstaking co-
ordination involved in the standardisation process had not reaped the expected 
rewards, and the unsteady relationships between authorities on Bulk Purchase 
were judged unlikely to have survived the new ‘challenge’ of metricisation. 
 
Of course, the group’s main objective was the use of standardisation in design 
and procurement to produce new types of industrialised housing. The first houses 
completed under YDG specifications were the low rise ‘L64’ dwellings exhibited 
at Whinmoor.80 As well as the provision of modern interior facilities and the 
incorporation of Parker Morris standards, the design offered a great deal of 
flexibility for the provision of dwellings. The plan was that the designs could be 
adapted to various forms of estate layout and could be built in terraces using 
‘rationalised’ traditional methods or system construction.81  The flagship design 
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was for medium rise developments involving ‘a series of elements suitable for 
building dwellings in stacks of up to eight storeys. It was thought that such a 
method could obtain maximum benefits from industrialisation and that a number 
of firms which specialised in this field could be asked eventually to submit 
quotations.’82 This design was known as YDG Mark I and the chosen contractor 
was Shepherd of York. This development featured standards above those of the 
Parker Morris Committee of 1961, including 3.5%-5% more floor space on 
average, double glazing, bedroom cupboards, private balconies, drying cupboards 
and heated bedrooms. It was pointed out that ‘although certain of these items are 
an integral part of the design they represent user bonus to the tenant which can be 
reflected in the rental assessment.’83 These flats therefore were to incorporate 
some of the most modern features and styles, and be regarded as most desirable 
to prospective tenants. The first application of this design was to be at Hunslet 
Green in Leeds, where the deck-access blocks were to be erected on the Leek 
Street clearance site. 
 
From the medium-rise structures of YDG Mark I the consortium moved on to 
discussions of other dwelling types. Their ‘brief’ was quite revealing, and showed 
much of the assumptions of the planning and design professions at this time. 
They admitted that tenant preference ‘had increasingly to be taken into 
account’—perhaps a confession that it had not been adequately considered in the 
past—and acknowledged that deck access without lifts was unpopular, as were 
narrow, high-rise point blocks except in selected positions. Dwellings should be 
low-rise, medium density, ‘two, three and possibly four storeys’. The rise of 
automobile use should be tailored for by the provision of 100% garaging and 
25% visitor parking. Previously garages had only been provided for a sixth to a 
quarter of dwellings. They assumed that cars would be parked at ground level, as 
garages under buildings had the disadvantage of requiring to be built from the 
beginning, while multi-storey garages had difficulties of high cost and 
inaccessibility. Interestingly, multi-storey garages had originally been included in 
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the 1963 layout for Leeds’ Whinmoor B development.84 It was argued that public 
open space should be provided in a ‘hierarchy’, from hard spaces near front 
doors, through spaces with equipment at focal points, organised playgrounds 
further away, to playing fields. Parker Morris standards were to be accepted as a 
minimum and maximum, as the ‘cost yardstick made it unlikely that a higher 
standard could be achieved at present.’  
 
Most new public housing was expected to be for slum clearance rather than 
waiting list tenants, so there was anticipated to be a larger proportion of small 
households. Whole house heating was aimed for, but electric underfloor heating 
was deemed technically problematic, while warm air systems ‘restricted 
planning.’ In terms of private open space, privacy was judged more important 
than size, but the concern was that fencing could be expensive. The most detailed 
prescriptions were devoted to internal layout, where it was considered best to 
provide a separate sitting room and a dining kitchen, that a large sitting room was 
better than a separate dining room and smaller sitting room, and ‘a dining hall 
could be acceptable as long as a door separated the kitchen from the stairs.’ The 
criteria by which these decisions were made were somewhat mysterious, as was 
the importance they attached to certain features. There was clearly some attempt 
to anticipate popular opinion on many themes of the living environment, 
recognition of some of the financial and physical constraints, and rejection of 
some of the previous fashions, including high rise flats and electric underfloor 
heating. Nevertheless, there are still clear signs that this remained a design-led 
process with decidedly paternalistic aspects.85 Indeed, when comparing the YDG 
with other ‘consortia’ in Scotland and the Midlands, Glendinning and Muthesius 
have claimed that while the stated motives of consortia were ‘the creation of “big 
packages of demand”…their underlying intention was to propagate architectural 
control of modern building.’86       
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This period demonstrates the influence that changing subsidy scales had on 
public housing development. The 1961 system had helped fuel the construction of 
increasingly high-rise flats, granting as it did an extra subsidy of £ 1.15.0 for each 
storey above the sixth level. The Housing Subsidies Act of 1967 intended to bring 
costs under greater control. It repealed the subsidy for floors above six, and 
asserted central government control of building plans by taking away subsidies 
for all schemes that exceeded a ‘cost yardstick’ and the denial of loan sanction to 
projects where the cost would exceed 10% of the yardstick. Addressing the 
conference of the National Housing and Town Planning Council in June 1967, 
Leeds’ Deputy Town Clerk K.H. Potts said that this would restrict the 
construction of high-rise flats to ‘exceptional circumstances’ and necessitate 
special consultation with the Ministry for authorities that wished to maintain 
continuity in their building programmes. He added that local authorities should be 
capable of adapting to the changed regime, albeit devoting more time to quantity 
surveying and layout planning, but that ‘whether the machinery will result in the 
creation of the best environment for dwellings which will require to stand for 
sixty or more years will remain to be seen.’87 
 
This helps to illustrate the impact that central government had on local authority 
housing programmes. As well as setting the subsidy rates for local authority 
housebuilding, the MHLG also exercised a general supervisory role. They issued 
general circulars and advice on construction, but also consulted with councils on 
the progress of planning proposals. Usually this was in an advisory sense, but it 
could get to the stage where it was made clear that the advice was expected to be 
followed. Correspondence and meetings between local and national officials, and 
occasionally politicians, could lead to substantial revision of building schemes or 
delay commencement or completion, something which occurred frequently 
during the 1967-68 period as the housing subsidy scales changed. Between 1954 
and 1968 there was relative continuity in political control at Westminster, with 
only one change of government, but in terms of housing policy local authorities 
were obliged to stay on their toes and respond to numerous carrots and sticks 
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emanating from Whitehall, while maintaining as much continuity in their own 
housing plans as possible.  
 
Local authority bureaucrats played an important part in setting housing policy, in 
the initiation of housebuilding projects, and in the day-to-day administration and 
co-ordination of construction schemes. The influence of the City Architect could 
be quite decisive, and it was frequently the design professions that set the lead 
when it came to setting the style and type of dwelling that was built. Leeds’ City 
Architect, R.A.H.Livett, had made his name by designing the pre-war flat 
complex at Quarry Hill, and his preference for flat-building was important when 
it came to the redevelopment projects of the 1950s. Some of his utterances did 
demonstrate the occasionally two-faced nature of bureaucratic approaches in this 
era, and that the design and planning profession’s pursuit of modernism was not 
quite as single-minded as has sometimes been suggested. In 1956 Livett became 
involved in a clash at the National Housing and Planning Council with Konrad 
Smigielski, then head of the Town Planning Department of Leeds College of Art 
and later Chief Planning Officer in Leicester. Responding to Smigielski’s 
assertion that Leeds could rehouse the whole of its population without needing to 
extend its boundaries, Livett stated ‘I do not like flats. I have learnt my lesson. I 
feel the Englishman knows what he wants, and you have to look at the 
speculative builder for the lead in that. He builds semi-detached houses because 
he knows what the people want.’88 Whether he was adopting this position for the 
purposes of that particular argument, or if he was announcing a preference that he 
felt circumstances made impossible in practice, Livett’s renunciation of flats had 
no discernible impact. In 1957 he gave the opinion that there was a future for 
private enterprise in the development of high flats, and wondered whether 
gardens were going to be in such demand as in the past.89 Not long before his 
death in September 1959 Livett promised ‘taller and better buildings near the 
centre of Leeds’, and hailed the thirty tall blocks of flats currently under 
construction.90  Some of his statements verged on the eccentric. He suggested at 
the Institute of Housing that parts of large parks on the perimeters of cities might 
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be used for building, as transport developments were making it easier for the 
public to spend leisure further afield.91 This brought a swift criticism from Leeds’ 
Town Planning Chairman, Alderman O’Donnell (Labour), who assured people 
that this would not happen at Leeds’ Roundhay Park or Temple Newsam.92 Most 
oddly, Livett declared that he opposed the drying of clothes on flat balconies as 
‘perhaps more harm has been done in the development of flats by allowing this 
than by anything else.’93 Nevertheless, his stamp on Leeds’ construction strategy 
continued after his death in late 1959.  
 
There were some divisions within local authority administration. The Housing 
Manager was obviously concerned with the amount of new housing that was 
built, but was also perturbed if certain types of dwelling were difficult to let, as 
often proved the case with some flats. The conversion of Karl Cohen to a position 
that almost represented opposition to flat-building of any height was very 
significant in this regard, and did represent something of an alliance with the 
administrators rather than the planners. In connection with high flats, there is a 
definite sense that politicians lacked the same level of enthusiasm for their 
benefits as the planners showed. Apart from a short period of tower block 
‘euphoria’ in the early 1960s, their desirability for councillors seems to have been 
closely connected to fears over land shortage and the favourable subsidy scales of 
the era. 
 
Local politicians did face a range of constraints on their decision-making, as 
Dunleavy suggests. Financial regulations and restrictions, a lack of technical 
knowledge, shortage of land, and the pressure of the increasing housing waiting 
list all affected the establishment of housing policy. In Leeds, however, the 
politicians that ran the Housing Committee enjoyed high status and influence, and 
there was a great deal of stability. The chairmen of the Housing Committee 
usually had quite a long stay in office, Karl Cohen (Labour) from 1957 to 1967, 
Irwin Bellow (Conservative) from 1967 to 1972, and Peter Sparling 
(Conservative) from 1975 to 1979. For much of the period there was consensus 
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over the need to prioritise housing production, build high rise flats and use 
modern construction technology, and at times in the early 1960s Cohen came 
under fire from the Conservatives for not pursuing system building 
wholeheartedly enough. Leeds, and Cohen, played a major role in the creation of 
the Yorkshire Development Group, a consortium of local authorities who aimed 
to standardise housing design in an attempt to utilise system building in the most 
effective way possible. The actual design and building of houses was not 
discussed often in council, and there was little outright opposition to high-rise 
building within ‘formal’ politics until the late 1960s. 
 
The construction industry itself played an important part in local authority 
building, but also quite a controversial one. Dunleavy argues that their aggressive 
marketing was a vital factor in the adoption of industrialised building, as was the 
fact that they enjoyed a favourable position in the negotiation of contracts due to 
the nationwide rush to build more houses in the 1960s. While the construction 
boom in commercial building was occurring in the early 1960s there was greater 
leverage for builders when it came to public housing contracts, but it has been 
argued that ‘contractors succeeded not because they bullied or bribed weak 
councils into adopting policies against their best interests, but because they gave 
politically strong councils what they required: high blocks, built reliably, quickly 
and in large numbers.’94 In Leeds’ case it appears that the initiative was often 
taken by the council to establish close relationships with the bigger firms, in the 
hope that this would provide continuous building processes and economies of 
scale that would speed up production. System-building was also promoted by the 
council as a means of achieving their own objectives, and it was hoped that the 
Yorkshire Development Group would be a way of utilising systems while 
maintaining some control over their use.  
 
In terms of the response of tenants and residents, there is relatively little record of 
their opinions about the housing and the environments that were provided in this 
period. What impressions we get are usually obtained indirectly through the 
experience of housing managers who found it more or less difficult to let certain 
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types of housing, and councillors who had received individual complaints. There 
certainly seemed to be more problems with flats, and interestingly low-rise flats 
rather than multi-storey blocks, and the housing committee had started to respond 
to these concerns by the late 1960s. Groups organised round housing concerns are 
virtually non-existent though, a factor that certainly helped to keep housing 
design and provision within a firmly paternalistic mould. 
 
The modern style and technology involved in mass public housing was a major 
factor in the policies adopted by local authorities and how councils, architects and 
building firms tried to sell the radical changes to the public. The use of the word 
‘modern’ is ubiquitous in this era, whether in discussing style, layout, materials, 
or interior design and fittings. Both bureaucrats and politicians took pride in their 
ability to provide council housing with many of the latest facilities and features, 
and while this undoubtedly came partly in response to popular preference, there 
was also a great deal of the planners’ own discretion used in deciding the 
perceived needs of the tenant, something that was displayed more blatantly when 
it came to such themes as the layout of estates. Leeds also used ‘modernisation’ 
in a way that made a virtue out of necessity, particularly with high-rise flats and 
system-building. The rapid eclipse of multi-storey building after 1967 was 
evidence that not all facets of ‘modernity’ were judged essential to the reshaping 
of Leeds’ residential environment, but the modernisation programme rolled on 
well into the 1970s, despite coming up against even more constraints than before.
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Chapter Six: Housing: Construction and Production, 1969-1979 
 
 
Pottery Vale, Leek Street Flats (Hunslet Grange), 1973. (Leeds Library and Information Service, 
www.leodis.net) 
 
While there is much evidence of public involvement and political action in 
relation to the issue of slum clearance throughout the 1970s, as far as housing 
provision is concerned the picture is more mixed. There were views expressed 
about the appearance of housing and preferences articulated about the type of 
interior facilities provided, but seldom were these opinions of political 
significance, partly because they tended to lack organisation and focus, but also 
because there was no real mechanism for them to be debated. Where campaigns 
existed they were generally concerned with ‘failing’ houses or estates, the 
outstanding example being Hunslet Grange. As with environmental issues in 
general, there was more effort paid to involving the public in decisions relating to 
housing than had existed earlier in the post-war period. Housing Consultative 
Committees were created to serve tenants administered from each of Leeds’ 
decentralised housing offices, and a system known as ‘pre-allocation’ aimed to 
smooth the way from cleared slums to the modern housing that replaced them, 
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giving people some input into the conditions of their new housing environments.1 
It is possible that the spread of popular campaigns relating to the provision of 
housing was retarded by the expertise needed in the construction process, and the 
complicated financial system involving subsidies and much interference from 
Whitehall. Nevertheless, as in the preceding period, the preferences of individual 
residents did ultimately have an impact on council decision-makers and 
administrators. Various remarks through the 1970s on the popularity of different 
estates and types of dwelling culminated in Leeds’ North-West Housing Office 
commenting that ‘the clamour, and there is no other way to describe it, to move 
away from maisonettes and multi-storey flats continues to grow.’2 
 
In many ways the 1970s was not a promising period for the increase of public 
participation in the processes of housing provision. Local authorities found 
themselves in a sharply deteriorating financial situation. Apart from slowing 
down construction rates and increasing housing waiting lists, lack of funds had a 
major impact on the maintenance of public housing and on projects that aimed to 
involve tenants in housing issues. These problems were aggravated by the need 
for councils to carry out repairs on faulty post-war housing that was in many 
cases no more than a few years old. In combination, these issues did much to 
reduce the credibility of Leeds City Council, and many of the bureaucratic 
processes involved in the construction and administration of housing came under 
great strain in this era. The confidence that many local politicians, planners and 
bureaucrats had in the process and vision that sought to bring modern standards 
and rationally ordered living environments to Leeds was heavily eroded by the 
mid-1970s, and had seemingly been replaced by attempts to patch up some 
increasingly testing problem areas.   
 
For council policy-makers the 1967 changes to housing subsidies and the 
introduction of the housing cost yardstick were to prove a major challenge. They 
had many problems adjusting existing projects to fit the new rules, but devising 
future plans and adapting schemes that were in the pipeline was also tricky. To 
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meet the stipulations of the new system a new balance was required between the 
types of dwellings built, the density of development, and the layout of the 
scheme, and there was the always unwelcome threat of interference from central 
government where proposals infringed upon the rules. In this new situation there 
was some disagreement within officialdom about where compromises needed to 
be made. The Housing Department had managed previously to ally with former 
Housing Chairman Karl Cohen and force a change in emphasis away from flats 
of all kinds, and saw itself obliged to defend this position. The Director of 
Housing reminded his fellow officials of the preferences made by prospective 
tenants, and pointed out that anything other than a house was viewed ‘to put it 
mildly, with the greatest reserve.’3 He stated that the only successful three or four 
storey developments were those that were built in desirable parts of the city, and 
added that the MHLG officials had suggested to him that they were baffled that 
Leeds appeared to be the only place where flats were unpopular.4 
 
From the point of view of the design professions, however, the use of medium-
rise flats was very sensible. In his plans for the Hunslet Hall estate the City 
Architect proposed a combination of high density and low rise development 
‘consistent with the planning principle of location of high density areas adjacent 
to shopping facilities.’5 These high density dwellings were to be deck-access 
flats, which would be in keeping with the ‘scale of the motorway’ in the northern 
area of the site, and in line with ‘the nature of the contours on Algeria Street’.6 
Use of deck access blocks, medium-rise flats with public ‘decks’ at each level 
providing access to the dwellings, was also planned for a development at 
Cottingley, and this time the City Engineer pointed out the desirability for high 
density in order ‘to make the best use of the public transport to be provided for 
the estate.’7 The Director of Housing declared himself unhappy about the 
proposal to build deck access blocks until it was known how acceptable the same 
format was at Leek Street, and was also unwilling to accept deck access forms at 
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Hunslet Hall. As a result, it was agreed that the City Architect would alter the 
layout of the Cottingley scheme to try and balance the arguments on housing 
types and on density.8 The new layout involved two 25-storey blocks, judged 
slightly more acceptable to tenants than medium-rise flats, but this change 
aroused the puzzlement of the MHLG regional office, who suggested dropping 
the scheme density ‘in view of earlier information that there are some 1300 
dwellings in tall blocks still to be built which are not being proceeded with at the 
moment because of lack of demand.’9 These contradictions did not help in the 
planning of housing at this period. The Ministry still wanted a high rate of 
housing provision, just cheaper than before, the City Architect and City Engineer 
aimed to comply with planning orthodoxy and professional standards, while the 
Director of Housing demanded housing that his clients found acceptable to live 
in. The Town Clerk set out some of these frustrations late in 1967, complaining 
that it was ‘becoming increasingly difficult to obtain fixed price tenders within 
the yardstick unless the schemes are designed to a minimum level of environment 
on easy sites’ and argued that if they acknowledged ‘consumer choice’ and ruled 
out three to four storey dwellings, ‘this effectively rules out development at a 
range of densities from approximately 75 to 120 (persons per acre) as the MHLG 
do not consider that multi-storey dwellings should be provided at these 
densities.’10 Cities responded to this situation in different ways. The scepticism of 
some politicians and officers in Leeds about medium-rise flats impeded the use of 
deck-access projects, while this type of housing played a major part in 
Manchester’s belated public-housing drive in the late 1960s and 1970s. 
Birmingham, a heavy user of tall point blocks, curtailed its housing programme 
dramatically.11 
 
Through the 1970s it was still clear that there was a well-developed prioritisation 
by tenants of some areas over others, and this was because of the advantages of 
the locale as well as those of the type of residence available. Lincoln Green, an 
area of many tower blocks and maisonettes, was still popular as late as 1975, 
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mainly due to its proximity to the city centre.12 The proposed Stoney Rock Lane 
development also received a lot of interest before clearance of the area had even 
taken place.13 Housing officers were surprised that much of the demand for 
Stoney Rock Lane houses came from tenants wishing to transfer from the 
adjacent Lincoln Green and Ebor Gardens estates, ‘no doubt seeking more 
modern or up-to-date dwellings.’14 Gipton, however, suffered diminishing 
demand, a factor that was attributed to its many pre-war houses and declining 
reputation.15 There was always something of a complex relationship between 
location and the modernity of housing when it came to popularity. In 1975 Leeds’ 
Housing Director Norman Kellett had produced a report which said that it was 
‘obvious people were more anxious to be housed near the Leeds Inner Ring Road 
than towards the outlying areas.’16 Less than a year earlier, however, Housing 
Committee Chairman Kevin Gould had claimed of the Long Causeway scheme in 
Adel that ‘I think we would be able to fill the places there five times over.’17 
Given that Adel was a long way from the centre of Leeds and quite remote, the 
attraction must have been the lure of living in new dwellings among some of the 
most expensive suburban private housing in the city. Within some sought-after 
areas there was evidence that tenants had become more selective, and on 
Moortown Estate this was put down to the existence of a number of 1950s houses 
that retained their original features, such as back-to-back ranges and deep glazed 
sinks with wooden draining boards. It was commented that ‘tenants who 
obviously expect more modern amenities are beginning to look askance at fittings 
of this kind.’18  
 
By the end of the 1970s there were numerous comments on the popularity of 
various areas and types of housing, which came to have an increasing effect on 
the Housing Department. All-electric houses in Belle Isle were unpopular due to 
high electricity costs, and some people were accepting tenancies in one part of 
Belle Isle then requesting transfers to other areas of the estate. The South Leeds 
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Housing Office attributed this phenomenon to ‘low environmental standards’.19 
At a time when many local Housing Consultative Committee meetings were 
poorly attended or cancelled, this suggests that tenants generally eschewed co-
operating directly with the housing authorities, and preferred to pursue their 
individual needs by exploiting whatever advantages they could find in the 
procedures of the housing bureaucracy. The council faced increasing problems 
with its management of maisonettes, both in re-letting and with the standards 
maintained by tenants, even in the previously popular Lincoln Green area.20 
When defective roofs were discovered in three-bedroom flats in Middleton, it was 
argued that the unpopularity of that type of dwelling could mean that demolition 
and redevelopment was more sensible than repair.21 By June 1979 the North West 
Leeds area office was bemoaning the ‘unsettling effect’ that new traditionally-
built terraced and semi-detached houses were having on high-rise and maisonette 
tenants, especially when they were built in close proximity to each other.22 At this 
point Leeds was in the relatively novel situation of having a housing waiting list 
was high and growing, but many estates and types of dwelling that were 
becoming so unpopular that they could not be filled. This could well be 
interpreted as evidence that the kind of paternalistic approach that might have 
satisfied needs in the immediate post-war period was becoming redundant in the 
face of a citizenry less willing to accept expert judgment or bureaucratic 
procedures.   
 
 
There had never been much opportunity for popular influence on the aesthetic 
aspects of public housing, and style was left to architects to decide, with some 
input from the leading council politicians. Multi-storey flats were the most 
symbolic example of the modern style of housing provided, but despite their 
demise many of the techniques and materials used in constructing council 
housing stayed the same. There are some signs that attitudes to the type of 
housing provided were at least being expressed more openly.  Chapeltown, with 
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its more politically militant local associations, saw some criticism of new 
housing. The housing provided in Chapeltown was more of a traditional style, 
with small infill schemes rather than the mass inner-city and suburban projects in 
other parts of Leeds. Tenants at Leopold Street in 1974 were pleased with their 
new homes, but disappointed that the gardens had not been grassed, and that the 
rents were higher. A Cowper Street resident complained about the condensation 
in her new house, while others said that the houses were noisy or not big enough. 
Tellingly, references were also made to ‘cracking up’ of houses and flats in 
Seacroft and Hunslet, demonstrating that the reputation of council housing had 
been tarnished, and that people were much more sceptical about the homes that 
were being provided.23 In meetings with council officials to discuss the 
Chapeltown Local Plan, the Residents’ Liaison Committee commented that the 
new housing looked awful, with a narrow frontage, and questioned why Victorian 
terraced houses had been knocked down and replaced by ‘those Wimpey houses 
going up in the Woodhouse area.’24  
 
More revealing were the council’s responses to the residents’ concerns. In 1974 
when the Residents’ Liaison Committee expressed their exasperation at the lack 
of consultation about the sort of housing being built, the council officials adopted 
a very defensive posture. They claimed that the requirement for central 
government approval meant that they were told to build certain things because 
they were more economic, and that they preferred to build semi-detached houses 
‘but there is not enough money for this.’25 It was stressed that local residents 
could see the sort of house types that were going to be built, but the officials 
cautioned them that ‘you must accept guidance from us on what is practicable to 
be built.’26 They also claimed that they preferred to build traditionally with bricks 
and mortar, but there was not the labour available to produce sufficient numbers. 
Thus it was judged necessary to resort to ‘systems’ building. It was admitted that 
the ‘type of building is such that before it is finished it looks horrible, but they 
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look better when completed.’27 This type of grudging defence of council 
construction policy shows just how much confidence had ebbed in the local 
authority’s ability to transform residential environments for the better. Numbers 
and finance had always been important, but there had previously been a sense that 
the housing provided was a great improvement for residents. Here it seemed that 
paternalism had merely diminished into preparing a culture of low expectation. 
 
One of the problems that the council did face was that popular perceptions of 
public housing were mixed, and occasionally based on misleading impressions. 
One piece of evidence from the late 1970s helps to demonstrate this. A local 
community association in Hunslet interviewed a sample of residents of the 
Woodhouse Hill clearance area, generally unimproved back-to-backs, and also 
the new Rocheford Estate, pedestrianised with short terraces of houses and flats, 
completed in 1976.28 In Woodhouse Hill the residents were almost exactly split 
between those who wanted to stay in their homes, and those who wished to be 
rehoused. 62% of interviewees saw higher rent payments as being the major 
disadvantage of council housing, but, while many were honest enough to admit 
that they lacked the direct experience to comment on whether new housing 
provided ‘value for money’, they were overwhelmingly adamant that central 
heating was not good value for money. The interviewers pointed out that this 
stance was probably due to recent media coverage of high fuel bills, particularly 
at nearby Hunslet Grange. Woodhouse Hill residents also disliked the cramped 
feel of the new estate, lack of access, vandalism and the neglect of common 
areas. The survey did also show that those who liked the new estate gave the 
reason that it allowed for privacy, while those who disapproved mentioned the 
lack of privacy. Differing perceptions such as this made the job of the council as 
a mass housing provider even more difficult. 
 
Tenants in the modern Rochefords, the first scheme in Leeds to be ‘pre-
allocated’, had also been split fifty-fifty as to whether they had wanted to be 
rehoused, but 72% were now pleased that they had been rehoused. This 
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satisfaction was tempered by a qualification regarding rent levels and the fear of 
them rising in the near future. In contrast to the Woodhouse Hill residents, 80% 
of Rocheford tenants described the central heating as good value for money, and 
most felt their fuel bills to be about the same as they were in their previous back-
to-backs. This could well be because the Rochefords were equipped with gas 
boilers and radiators, unlike the electric ducted-air systems found at Hunslet 
Grange. Where problems were described, they were mainly due to design. Some 
tenants disliked having their living rooms adjoining the garden, as it was felt to 
be dirtier and less practical. The close proximity of houses and lack of privacy 
was disapproved of, as were the public gardens, which were not properly 
maintained. Pedestrianisation led to ‘wind traps’ where rubbish accumulated, and 
the lack of play spaces led to young people congregating outside houses. In 
general, the interviewers said that people were pleased with their house itself, but 
not the layout of the whole estate, while allowing that generalising from their 
findings might be difficult as satisfaction in the Rochefords might have been due 
to the pre-allocation scheme, and evaluating the scheme after a year might be too 
short a time. They also warned that ‘by the nature of their layout a continued 
good environment on estates similar to the Rochefords necessitates a commitment 
by the council to regular expenditure to provide good maintenance of garden 
areas, path cleaning, etc.’29 
 
Pre-allocation in Hunslet, assigning clearance tenants a specific house in the 
building layout before construction had started, proved to be a minor success for 
the council, and tenants in the Rochefords publicly praised the new scheme, 
particularly the ending of uncertainty and the ability to mentally take possession 
of a house and watch it being constructed.30 With the pre-allocation system 
residents were involved not only in the allocation of new homes, but also with the 
colour of outside doors, the types of internal finish, kitchen work surfaces, and 
fencing.31 At the Sussex Avenue scheme in Hunslet there was a slight problem 
with demand for certain types of house, but this proved to be dealt with 
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satisfactorily.32 The popularity of pre-allocation with the public was shown when 
residents in Woodhouse Hill Street clearance area formed a group to press for 
pre-allocation.33 Where the difficulty lay was in the council’s capacity to provide 
pre-allocation as an option. Even after the success of the early schemes, the 
Housing Department declared that they could not be applied universally, and 
instead should be ‘tailored to meet particular situations where there is a strong 
and long established community with a local desire for its retention in a new 
environment.’34 In South Leeds four schemes were progressing simultaneously, 
and it was felt that ‘it would be an advantage in future to restrict such schemes to 
one per area to ensure they are given the individual attention they deserve.’35 At 
the Royal Road pre-allocation scheme there were also problems due to delays in 
completion by the contractor, and the Housing Office felt that in future schemes 
should be carried out under the council’s Architect’s Department rather than 
using independent architects, ‘because this arrangement tends to be somewhat 
cumbersome and can lead to problems of communication.’36 As with the concept 
of Gradual Renewal, pre-allocation offered a more sensitive approach and greater 
public involvement, but its success was hampered by the inability to fit it into 
established bureaucratic procedures, and the extra financial and organisational 
resources required at a time of increasing restrictions.  
  
At Holt Park there was an interesting project that typified in many ways the 
changing attitudes to planning in the 1970s. A new ‘village’ was planned on the 
outskirts of Leeds that would incorporate council housing, a private estate, an 
area run by a housing association, and community facilities at its centre, which 
were intended to be used by both schools and the wider community. The council 
hailed the plan as a ‘complete physical framework for the development of a 
community within the boundaries of a major city.’37 The roots of Holt Park lay in 
the desire to develop the area residentially by both Norman Ashton builders, who 
had acquired an option to purchase the land in 1959, and Leeds City Council, 
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who had indicated their own interest in the land. In 1964 an agreement was made 
for shared development of the area.38  Such an arrangement, sharing land with 
private developers while seeking to provide an integrated development, was quite 
unusual, but helps to demonstrate a microcosm of the kind of attitudes that 
planners held with regard to the wider city. As such, Holt Park was critiqued in 
an article by Alison Ravetz in 1979.39 She pointed out that the three housing 
types were ‘sharply distinguished from one another by their building forms and 
that they are segregated to such an extent that the council and the ‘spec’ estates 
are each entered by their own approach roads.’40 760 council houses were 
included at Holt Park, and were described by Ravetz as instantly recognisable as 
such. The layout followed the popular plan of the 1970s by which houses were 
organised in semi-detached form or as short rows shaped into culs-de sac leading 
to garage courts, and linked by a maze of pedestrian pathways. 
 
One of the leading features of the council sector was a district heating scheme. 
Unlike Hunslet Grange, ducted air central heating and hot water was supplied by 
a central gas-fired boiler plant. Through dispensing with individual appliances 
and separate flues this arrangement was believed to contribute ‘to improving the 
cleanliness of the atmosphere which is essential towards retaining the rural 
character of the area.’41 Unfortunately the system did suffer problems. In 1976, 
after just two years, work took place to reduce heat losses within dwellings, but 
caused complaints about noise and vibration within the heating system, which led 
to a further ‘rebalancing exercise’.42 This was followed in 1978 by work on 
defective underground mains serving the district heating scheme.43 Ravetz also 
commented on these difficulties, adding that ‘the very deep dissatisfaction with 
the system here must be seen as part of the mounting problem of heating on 
council estates, where fuel or appliances are too expensive or not sufficiently 
subject to the users’ control.’44  
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Ravetz commented that the private housing at Holt Park was generally smaller in 
area than the council homes, and no less monotonous in style. This lack of 
exclusive physical features was ‘compensated’ by heightened privacy and 
different patterns of access and roads that contributed to maintaining a distinct 
appearance.45 These differences were jealously guarded by the developers, who 
had negotiated the council away from the original permission that had involved 
building in ‘Radburn’ style with full pedestrian segregation, in favour of a ‘semi-
segregated’ estate which involved large parts of the layout taking a ‘traditional’ 
format.46 When the Holt Park proposals were included in the Development Plan 
Review, proposed densities for the private development were 15 dwellings per 
acre, compared with 20 per acre for the council sector. By 1970, however, the 
expectation for private development had been lowered to 10 per acre.47  The stark 
divisions between the different areas of Holt Park that were criticised by Ravetz, 
had been programmed into the development before commencement, rather than 
as a result of subsequent events. Residents in the nearby leafy suburb of Adel had 
not lodged a formal objection to the amendment to the Development Plan, but 
their ‘serious concerns’ about the proposals were taken into account by the 
council, who agreed that through traffic should be discouraged from and to Adel 
via Holt Park, that Holt Lane should retain a ‘country road character’, and that 
‘public facilities should be adequate to serve the new development and act as a 
supplement to existing areas.’48 It could well be argued that the common facilities 
provided were of real benefit to the council and housing association tenants at 
Holt Park, but the very existence of this social housing in the area had involved 
the council making some major concessions to the private builder and wealthier 
local residents. 
 
Leek Street Flats, the first phase of the Yorkshire Development Group’s flagship 
Hunslet Grange complex, was officially opened by Leeds’ Lord Mayor on 27th 
March 1968. It was a deck access scheme, similar to Sheffield’s Park Hill ‘Streets 
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in the Sky’, and was the first of the YDG’s Mark I housing schemes to be 
completed. The initial block consisted of 440 flats ranging from five to seven 
storeys high, with a shop and a pub, and the concept was outlined fully in the 
brochure that was produced for the opening ceremony.49 The system built nature 
of the project was outlined, and described the ‘dwelling’ as a ‘component’ 
‘capable of being built up into a wide variety of environments, yet is itself built 
up of standard factory-made units.’50 This was held to give flexibility due to the 
integration of a range of different dwelling sizes within one development. The 
decks were protected from the weather and were ‘a natural meeting place for 
young and old alike’, while the project offered high densities without building 
‘high’.51 Other benefits offered were internal space five per cent above the 
standards recommended by the Parker Morris Committee of 1961, automatic 
warm air heating units, double glazing, sound insulation, and finishes that had 
‘been chosen with a view both to freedom from maintenance and for their visual 
appearance and quality.’52 The blocks were grouped around public open space, 
with roads kept to the perimeter and pedestrian ways linking the flats to the 
proposed Hunslet District Centre. 
 
Design, amenities and layout of Hunslet Grange were all in accordance with the 
prevailing trends of the era, all provided by a radical new type of construction. 
Unfortunately, within a relatively short time the complex found itself with few 
friends. Early problems that were encountered were mainly due to the wider 
environment, and Hunslet Councillor Haughton (Labour) outlined the untidy 
surroundings and lack of services such as shops and play facilities at a council 
meeting in April 1971.53 Housing Chairman Irwin Bellow (Conservative) washed 
his hands of the issue, pointing out that the layout was done ‘long before we came 
to power.’54 The first signs of the major problems that were to plague Hunslet 
Grange were raised in May 1974 by local Liberal Councillor Pedder, who 
described the flats as ‘an effigy of imperial tyranny’, referred to the structural 
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deterioration of the complex and questioned whether damp was caused solely by 
condensation.55 Councillor Gould (Labour), Bellow’s replacement as Housing 
Chair, replied by saying that ‘Hunslet Grange is not a development I am proud 
of’, stating that ordinary high-rise flats were better, but pointed out measures the 
council had taken such as painting, deck-lighting and play areas as evidence of 
improvement.56 These exchanges set a trend for discussions of Hunslet Grange’s 
problems. Local people and Liberal councillors heavily criticised the aesthetic, 
structural and social problems of the flats, while council politicians put up little 
defence of the original design and concept of the complex, sought to justify their 
position in terms of remedial works they had performed, and attacked what they 
claimed were the more hyperbolic claims of Hunslet Grange’s opponents.   
 
A ‘part-remedial’ programme was carried out at Hunslet Grange in 1974, with the 
intention of combating condensation by improving insulation and ventilation,57 
but events really came to a head in 1976. At this time there was a concerted effort 
from a group of tenants and the local Liberal Party to have issues at the flats 
resolved. Hunslet Liberal councillors Dennis Pedder and Michael Taylor sent a 
letter to the Housing Director threatening legal action unless problems of damp, 
draughts and condensation were dealt with,58 and Ivan Lester, a Liberal council 
candidate, appealed to the Chief Health Officer to force the housing committee to 
improve conditions at Hunslet Grange.59 This was followed by the publication of 
a report by the Hunslet Grange Heating Action Group, formed in February 1976, 
outlining their grievances.60 In this they claimed to be the victims of a building 
experiment that left them suffering ‘deplorable’ living conditions as a result of 
the development’s structural inadequacies, and focused on high electricity bills, 
ineffective central heating, lack of repairs, damp and draughts. They also 
criticised the council for not fully accepting the depth of the problems or 
consulting the people who actually lived in the flats, and asserted that ‘the failure 
of the recently completed damp remedial programme shows the folly of carrying 
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out a programme of works without thoroughly investigating the problem and 
without attempting to implement a total solution.’61 The report did also cover 
other aspects of the flats, including the depressing grey concrete design, isolated 
young families on the complex’s upper floors, and the neglect of the flats’ 
surroundings.62 The HGHAG resented the fact that, as well as having to 
experience the ‘inadequacies’ of the estate, they were having to pay for them in 
the form of high electricity bills.63 The group resisted the call to have the flats 
demolished, but bemoaned the unwillingness of council officials and the Housing 
Chairman to discuss the failings, and demanded that there be a full analysis of the 
structure of the flats and an evaluation of possible solutions.64  These moves 
formed the preliminaries to a war of words between the council leadership and 
bureaucracy on one side, and the campaigners and opposition on the other.  
 
After the publication of the HGHAG report, the Labour housing spokesman 
George Mudie called on the Housing Committee to appoint private consultants to 
investigate the problems faced by tenants, but this was opposed by Housing 
Chairman Peter Sparling who said ‘he could see no point in employing outside 
consultants when we have competent officers of our own.’65 A string of people 
did come to produce reports of the flats, including independent experts who were 
not allowed to speak in front of the Housing Committee, and the West Yorkshire 
County Council Assistant Fire Officer and the Chief Structural Engineer, who 
discovered faults that posed a fire risk, but ‘no risk of a Ronan Point-type 
explosion.’66 The Yorkshire Evening Post editorialised that ‘by delaying a full 
and frank reply to these now serious charges the council is increasing the 
tension.’67 Rhetoric rose to new heights in autumn 1976, with the local Liberal 
councillors demanding compensation be paid to tenants of Hunslet Grange, and 
Councillor Taylor even going as far as to say that ‘one of the things that seems to 
be missed so very often is the social implications of this Gestapo-type building 
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with Gestapo-type conditions under which people have to live’.68 The language of 
Liberal councillors such as Pedder and Taylor undoubtedly revealed a view that 
regarded the tenants as the helpless victims of an all-powerful council, though the 
council’s inability to deal with the problems belied this in practice.  Eventually 
the Housing Committee accepted a report from the West Yorkshire County 
Structural Engineer that stated that the flats were stable and not subject to 
collapse, and made its own recommendations that use of LPG and paraffin 
heaters by residents be banned due to fire risks, and that a new programme of 
remedial works be commenced. The committee also accepted Councillor Mudie’s 
suggestion of a public display at the flats to show ‘that we have nothing to 
hide.’69  
 
This period in the history of Hunslet Grange provides ample evidence for Ellis’ 
assertion that ‘community action was driven as much by the refusal of the council 
to allow organised groups of tenants to actively participate in research and the 
formulation and implementation of policy as it was by material problems.’70 
Given that the council now seemed to have closed ranks to present the acceptable 
face of Hunslet Grange, but that many concerns remained unresolved, the 
controversy continued. With the high electricity costs such a major grievance, the 
prohibition of the alternative heating sources some tenants had used was unlikely 
to calm residents. The quality of remedial work at the flats was raised by a 
Labour councillor in the Technical Services Committee71 and by Liberal 
Councillor Lester at a council meeting in February 1977.72 The situation almost 
descended into farce when the HGHAG claimed that a piece of concrete lying 
near the flats had fallen from the structure, and Councillor Sparling retorted by 
stating that tests had proved it was not from the flats, and that reports had shown 
that materials used on the complex were ‘well in excess of the requirements of 
the present code of building practice.’73 Councillor Sparling also expressed the 
opinion that condensation problems were due to tenant usage and that work on 
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electrical installations would make an enormous difference.74 Nonetheless, 
problems continued.  In December 1977 tenants complained about water running 
down walls and from ceilings following heavy rain, an issue that was discovered 
to be due to asphalt cracking around a drainage system.75 Reports of rain 
penetration recurred in the following years76 and with all these issues, the adverse 
media coverage of the flats, and the decision of the Housing Department to 
exclude families with children from the deck flats, there was a large increase in 
the vacancy rate.77 
 
Councillor Lester had offered his opinion that the flats should be demolished 
‘sooner rather than later’, back in February 1977,78 and this continued to be a 
Liberal theme. Despite this, the tenants themselves were divided on the issue of 
demolition, and when a deputation from Hunslet Grange Tenants’ Association 
visited a council meeting in January 1979 to argue for reduced rents to 
compensate for their heating, condensation and social problems, their spokesman 
pointed out ‘that there were many tenants who are happy with the flats and, 
despite the problems, would like to stay there.’79 As Ellis has pointed out, most 
tenants were quite apathetic, and the flats’ problems led to a high turnover of 
tenants and an unstable population, which made organising tough.80 The Housing 
Department themselves had complained on a number of occasions that remedial 
work had been held up by the obstruction posed by tenants who would not allow 
access to their flats because they were not experiencing problems directly.81 This 
was where the council’s position was difficult. The flats were relatively modern, 
housed a large number of people, and had been a flagship project of its time. As 
the HGHAG had pointed out, piecemeal rectification of problems at such a large, 
interconnected complex was virtually impossible, but leading councillors and 
officials were understandably unwilling to condemn such a development, both on 
grounds of credibility and financial and procedural practicality. Where 
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representatives of the council did make matters worse was in their defensiveness 
and inability to take residents’ concerns seriously, which only served to add to 
suspicion. The vestiges of paternalism were still there, in terms of the repetition 
that experts knew better than the tenants themselves, and the idea that problems 
such as condensation could easily be rectified if the tenants did things ‘properly’. 
As the tenant campaigns and media coverage demonstrated, though, there was an 
increasing lack of credibility in the belief that the council could be trusted. 
 
Instances in Chapeltown and Hunslet do show that the council was struggling to 
cope with a slippage in its reputation, caused mostly by failings in existing post-
war housing and the way these were conceived by local people. Apart from the 
actual appearance of houses and estates, which people could see for themselves, 
the way problems had been filtered by the local media, extended by rumour, and 
incompetently dealt with by many council politicians and bureaucrats, meant that 
trust was decreasing in the council’s competence in housing provision. This was 
not a good time for this image to take root. Finance had always affected housing 
policy in terms of subsidies and loan sanction, but in the mid-1970s public 
spending cuts led to wide restrictions in local authority expenditure. Thus the 
council lacked the ability to keep high standards of cleanliness and maintenance 
in public areas, a problem that was exacerbated by the design and layout of many 
council estates.  As the Hunslet survey pointed out, ‘without this the benefits of 
the new houses are lessened and there is a real danger that tenants who initially 
felt happy with the estate become demoralised.’82 The Housing Department 
admitted that grassed areas were poorly maintained, and ‘grass and weeds are left 
to grow in profusion along pedestrian ways and drying areas etc.’83 In the 
Raynville estate at Bramley, the Tenants’ Association organised a sponsored 
clean-up to deal with untidiness,84 but the danger was that a slippage in standards 
from the council led to a drop in cleanliness from the public. Coupled with 
increases in vandalism recorded by the Housing Department at this period, 
especially towards garage blocks, attitudes were changing towards the layout of 
estates. At the new Long Causeway estate in leafy Adel , individual tenants 
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requested to erect fencing round the open grassed areas, and the local Housing 
Manager commented on ‘a general dislike of open plan estates; people now 
preferring to have their own garden, usually of not too large proportions.’85 At 
Meanwood in 1974 tenants demanded their garden fences back after they had 
been removed as part of an ‘experiment’, only to be told that it could not be done 
immediately due to financial restrictions.86 The popularity of planned houses at 
Stourton was held to confirm ‘the view that most people prefer semi-detached 
dwellings of traditional design with private garden areas.’87 
 
The issues with maintenance and cleanliness had been aggravated by the 
necessity to spend large sums of money on repairing faults to post-war council 
housing. In 1976 it was announced that repair work would cost more than £6.5 
million in the next five years, and 3300 houses and 29 tower blocks built after 
1960 were discovered to have defects. 1427 of the houses involved were at 
Whinmoor, all of which were under ten years old, and the main work was 
replacing timber weatherboards with brick to prevent damp.88 With money short, 
the council sought to recoup some of its losses by claiming that the National 
Building Agency, created by the government in 1965 to compare and examine 
new building methods, had given poor advice. Peter Sparling claimed that the 
‘general introduction of industrialised systems followed Government pressure in 
1965, including a Ministry circular urging their use.’89 It was undoubtedly true 
that central government had pushed forward the cause of industrialised building 
and recommended the use of some poor quality systems. The problem for Leeds’ 
claims was that the council had hardly been reluctant about the use of 
industrialised systems and had indeed been instrumental in setting up the 
Yorkshire Development Group to plan and develop industrialised building as 
early as 1962. Also, the 29 defective tower blocks in the programme were all 
built between 1958 and 1966, before the National Building Agency could have 
had any influence. This unseemly bickering about who was to blame for these 
problems merely underlines the crisis of public housing in this period. This was 
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also reflected in the Housing Committee’s decision in September 1977 to allow 
private contractors to compete with the City Architect’s Department in designing 
council houses, as ‘councillors from all three parties had told the Housing 
Committee that they did not believe that Leeds was getting value for money with 
its council housing.’90 This provides more evidence of the breakdown in 
confidence between the various components of the public housing system, and 
was compounded by the fact that representatives from the City Architect’s 
Department were reprimanded in the following January for not carrying out 
Housing Committee instructions on this matter.91 Despite all the unfavourable 
publicity and undoubted problems with some types of dwelling, the declining 
image of public housing was often belied by reality in this era. In 1974 it was 
announced that new council houses were to be fitted with heating, ventilation and 
insulation systems which would bring standards above those of the Parker-Morris 
Report. The increased cost was to be £40 per house, though proposals to fit 
double-glazing were rejected on grounds of expense.92 Later that year the council 
bought 50 new houses in Morley because builders could not sell them privately. 
Kevin Gould added that the homes did not have as high a level of heating, 
ventilation and storage standards as council houses, but did admit that the houses 
looked better from the outside.93 This demonstrated one of the problems that 
bedevilled public housing at this time. Even when it was of high standard, council 
housing was stigmatised by appearance and, in a period of financial strain, 
exciting design and architecture often had to be sacrificed to meet the basic 
requirements.   
 
The history of Leeds’ housing in the 1970s was also marked by the final demise 
of Quarry Hill Flats. Unlike Hunslet Grange, the structural problems at Quarry 
Hill had been dealt with fairly effectively in the early 1960s, even if the work was 
only intended to be a temporary expedient. While the remedial work took place 
the opportunity was taken to improve some of the communal areas of the 
complex, and as late as 1972 the Director of Housing, S.I. Benson, said that the 
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council was considering the question of improving them internally.94 
Nevertheless, the future of Quarry Hill was to be limited, though the coup-de-
grace came at least partly due to the road proposals that were affecting that part 
of Leeds at the time. In November 1973 Housing Chairman Kevin Gould 
announced that demolition of Quarry Hill Flats and transfer of the tenants would 
be phased over five years. He said the decision had been taken because the 938 
flats all lacked modern interiors, that the refuse disposal system had difficulties, 
and because the planned North-East Urban Motorway would require the 
clearance of a section of the flats anyway. He added that ‘would we not question 
that they equal the civilised living accommodation that we would expect for our 
people today?’95 
     
Some of the tenants of the flats might have questioned Gould’s assertion, as 
Alison Ravetz had discovered in her research that ‘scarcely any tenants criticised 
the flats themselves’, and because ‘originally they were far in advance of their 
time there was still a feeling of modernity about them.’96 Despite this, Ravetz has 
suggested that the difficulties with and ultimate demise of the flats was down to 
their nature as a fully planned environment designed, constructed and 
administered on a grand scale. She stated that ‘the model dwellings are all of one 
time, structure and style. Conceived as a unity, they seem to demand to be 
renewed or removed as a unity, and in the latter case the dispersal of population 
and redevelopment must begin all over again.’97 Thus the nature of environments 
such as Quarry Hill Flats made the resolution of problems much more difficult 
than they would have been in estates that developed in a more piecemeal fashion 
over a longer period and in the form of discrete dwellings. These facets of Quarry 
Hill were to be repeated in many cases during the post-war era, as modern styles 
and techniques were rushed into action. It was highly symbolic of some of the 
features of this era that, as the last touches were applied to the demolition of 
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Quarry Hill Flats in 1978, Hunslet Grange Flats were approaching their final 
crisis.  
 
The changing nature of housing and land use policy was displayed in discussions 
over the future use of the Quarry Hill site. One of the benefits of the flats 
complex had been its close proximity to the amenities of the city centre and 
Michael Meadowcroft, while giving his opinion that ‘modern concepts’ were 
against the size and vastness of a scheme like Quarry Hill Flats and that the 
 
 
Quarry Hill Flats, June 1967. This shows the flats after the remedial work of the early 1960s. 
(Leeds Library and Information Service, www.leodis.net) 
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council had not invested enough resources to make it workable, expressed his 
preference in 1973 that the site should be developed for residential and communal 
rather than commercial use.98 Nearly four years later he attacked the lack of 
thought over future use of the site and described it as ‘an ideal site for mixed 
housing development.’99 He was backed by Labour’s Councillor King, who 
described the current proposals to use it as a temporary car park as a waste of 
public funds.100 Council leader Irwin Bellow criticised Labour in turn for not 
considering the site when they made the decision to demolish the flats, added that 
he felt the site was only practical if developed as high-rise, and that ‘we as a party 
are set against building high rise accommodation as such.’101 Meadowcroft 
responded in January 1978 by stating that, on the Quarry Hill site, ‘it is certainly 
not true that you cannot have some kind of multi-storey development for 
professional people, for young, single people, for young married couples, and this 
is being done successfully not just by local authorities but by private developers 
as well.’102 There were several ironies in this little episode. Acquiring land for 
housing had been a difficult task for councils in the post-war era, Leeds included. 
Here there was a large tract of council-owned land that had been in residential 
use, but that the present council refused to utilise for housing. Even allowing for 
the trends away from living in city centres, the decision seemed a strange ‘volte-
face’. Secondly, the leading figure in the party that had done so much to preserve 
‘old’ residential Leeds from the bulldozers, and had a distinctly conservative 
attitude to redevelopment, was embracing the stereotypical symbol of the 
modernist built environment, as well as showing a prescient anticipation of 
twenty-first century Leeds. The late 1970s was definitely a transitional time in the 
politics of the residential built environment.  
  
After 1967 the environment in which local authorities operated their housing 
policy became much more difficult. Financial restrictions led to much greater 
scrutiny from central government, but no relaxation in the expectations placed 
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upon local councils. Tenants were reacting to their experience of public housing 
in ways that defied the objectives of many planners and politicians, and frustrated 
the smooth running of the usual administrative procedures. One of the problems 
was that planning ‘orthodoxy’ took quite a long time to adjust to these more 
adverse circumstances. It took a while for Leeds to realise that the changes in the 
context of housing policy had limited the power of the City Architect and City 
Engineer to reshape the city according to their professional assumptions. 
Gradually more influence was focused on the management of existing housing 
and the participation of Leeds’ council housing department in the formulation of 
proposals for new construction. This continued a trend that had been developing 
in Leeds since the early 1960s, but while the attitude of the Housing Department 
was based on self-interest in easing its difficulties with housing allocation, it was 
farsighted in that it anticipated many of the issues that were to arise with council 
housing. In stopping the use of further deck-access blocks in areas such as 
Cottingley and Hunslet Hall the Housing Department at least prevented some of 
the difficulties with multi-storey and flats developments it faced in other estates. 
Where the department was limited was that it too had ingrained procedures that 
were not always easy to adapt, and it was also heavily dependent on resources to 
carry out its tasks effectively. Even where successful policies had evolved, such 
as pre-allocation, they were unable to be rolled out across the city.  
 
The accumulation of many dwellings which were unpopular, environments that 
were either poorly designed or needed constant maintenance, and housing that 
required large sums of money spent to make it fit for habitation, made the job a 
very difficult one for the council’s political and bureaucratic leadership in the 
1970s, and one that was increased in scale by the decreasing funds they had to 
deal with it. Yet what made matters worse was the fact that the response of the 
council was in many ways to seek to defend its position and stick to the tried-and-
tested ways, rather than to adapt to the changing circumstances. When it suited, 
as in Chapeltown, the council was willing to admit that its power was limited, but 
where it felt that its role and expertise were coming under challenge, as at 
Hunslet Grange, the response was one of denial and doing as much as possible to 
belittle the tenants capacity to influence their surroundings. The irony was that 
this did much to diminish the council’s credibility and encouraged the public to 
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act in less direct ways. Ultimately, a more individual approach by tenants and 
residents towards securing desirable houses and living environments might have 
worked for some and certainly succeeded in motivating the council bureaucracy 
to question its policy. At the same time, however, the problems of providing 
appropriate housing and estates for those without the resources to enter the 
private market were collective ones, and the inability to find a way of dealing 
with these issues politically undoubtedly led to a deterioration in the reputation of 
council housing and a worsening in the living conditions of many people.     
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Chapter Seven: Residential Land: Acquisition, Designation and 
Disposal 
 
Given the extensive need for land that was inherent in mass housing provision, it 
was inevitable that land-use planning would play an important part in the 
development of residential Leeds. It provides an excellent example of how the 
post-war system gave a substantial degree of authority to the local planning 
bureaucracy, while also hemming them in with interference and supervision from 
Whitehall, and involved an increasing reluctance to challenge important interests. 
As land was relatively scarce in or near cities, there were competing demands for 
its acquisition and use. Development Plans were intended to provide a strict 
framework within which to contain and reconcile these demands, but the long-
term nature of planning and the relative fallibility of forecasting future socio-
economic trends meant that implementation of the plan could also lead to 
conflict.1 Quite a lot of this conflict effectively took place behind closed doors 
and was the product of rivalries within the bureaucracy, state and local agencies. 
Central government had recognised a need for extensive planning controls to 
make sure that scarce land was used in the most efficient manner, but while 
housing was a high priority, agricultural land was also a vital source of food, and 
planning orthodoxy held that the ‘sprawl’ of large cities into the surrounding 
countryside was an irrational social evil.2 Builders and property developers were 
to frequently bemoan the ‘hoarding’ of land by Leeds’ council, while Labour 
councillors in their turn often criticised the ‘anti-social’ tendencies of land 
speculation and the limited provision within private residential developments for 
the poor, the old or the disabled.  
 
The production of development plans depended on technocratic estimates of 
future need and, allied to the relative inflexibility of the plan, this limited the 
scope for public participation. When the wider community did become involved 
in land-use planning issues it tended to be very late in the day, when action was 
imminent and the chances of successful intervention were reduced. These factors 
                                                          
1 Michael J. Croft, ‘Urban Form and Structure’ in Gordon Cherry (ed.) Urban Planning Problems 
(L. Hill, London, 1974) pp.23-24 
2 Glendinning and Muthesius, Tower Block, p.155 
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also affected party politics, though there was to be some dispute on the amount of 
stress that was to be put on public and private land-use, Conservatives seeking a 
greater role for private enterprise and Labour arguing that, given the relative lack 
of availability of land, a significant amount should remain in local authority 
ownership in order to avoid the market squeezing out those in need.  
 
The philosophy behind the land-use planning system rarely came under question 
during this period, but while the ‘rules’ of the system were observed, there was 
enough certainty for the establishment of entrenched interests, and a degree of 
space for the articulation of conflict. The issue of land availability, designation 
and disposal was one in which the local authority had less initiative, and not as 
much of an active role, as it possessed in relation to slum clearance or 
housebuilding. As a consequence of this, the council often played more of a 
balancing role, reconciling different interests and trying to ensure that land use 
complied with legislation and government policy. While the council still held an 
interest in the acquisition of land for its housing programmes, there was more 
scope for other groups to assert themselves. Most significant among these groups 
were to be private property interests that often had conflicting aims. Developers 
and builders sought access to desirable suburban and greenfield sites, while 
homeowners and some rural landowners sought to protect themselves against 
both a drop in the value of their homes and what they regarded as a threat to their 
local environment. While developers and builders tended to possess greater 
economic leverage, the position of homeowners received a political boost through 
the establishment of Green Belts and the relatively conservative nature of the 
development plan system. This tendency towards the status quo worked against 
developers on a case-by-case basis, but ironically also benefitted them 
collectively at times by raising the value of land. By the 1970s the interests of 
private property had strengthened vis-à-vis the local authority as the economic 
situation deteriorated, the price of land increased, and the demands for council 
building subsided.3     
 
                                                          
3 Short, Housing in Britain: The Post-war Experience p.77; McKay and Scott, The Politics of 
Urban Change p.129; Dunleavy, Urban Political Analysis, pp.91-94 
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Leeds had been very quick to respond to the Scott Report on land utilisation in 
rural areas, published in 1942, and outlined its own Green Belt in 1944, but for 
large cities with pressing needs for the housing of growing populations, some 
expansion was needed. This was acknowledged in Leeds’ first Development Plan 
of 1951 which announced the intention to negotiate with the West Riding County 
Council to house Leeds’ ‘overspill’ population in land at Barwick-in-Elmet and at 
Rothwell.4 This policy was in line with planning orthodoxy of the time and 
associated with influential figures such as Patrick Abercrombie and Frederic 
Osborn. Osborn was strongly against the spread of cities, criticising the lack of 
private living-space along with ‘the increasing burden of suburban journeys, the 
cutting-off of millions of townspeople from access to the countryside, and the 
disintegration of local community life.’5 At this time there was an uneasy debate 
between ‘Garden City’ advocates of low density development and Modernists 
who believed in high-rise and inner city concentration. Both sides believed that 
the restriction of urban boundaries was essential for aesthetic and practical 
reasons, to protect the countryside and prevent ‘ugly’ urban sprawl and ribbon 
development, but as there was an equally strong belief on the part of ‘anti-urban’ 
planners and civil servants that high population densities in cities should be 
avoided where possible, the necessity arose for housing excess urban populations 
in ‘satellite towns’. Glendinning and Muthesius have argued that Osborn believed 
‘existing municipalities were archaic irrelevancies whose potential opposition to 
reform should simply be disregarded; and that the assumed universal preference 
for cottages over flats could be used to justify the enforced displacement of large 
segments of the urban population.’6 There was the potential for a great deal of 
conflict on this issue between planners (particularly at a national or regional 
level) and politicians.  
 
In a report of 1954 the need for ‘overspill’ to accommodate an estimated 34,755 
people by 1971 was reiterated, but now the favoured area for this was land at 
Whinmoor belonging to Tadcaster Rural District, within the West Riding 
                                                          
4 City and County Borough of Leeds, Town and Country Planning Act 1947: Development Plan- 
Written Statement (March 1951) p.3  
5 F.J. Osborn, Green-Belt Cities, (London, Faber, 1946) p.13 
6 Glendinning and Muthesius, Tower Block p.158 
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planning authority. Leeds City Council had already made a provisional agreement 
with the West Riding County Council to accommodate overspill on Tadcaster 
land, and other desirable features of this area included the fact that development 
could be carried out without major drainage works, and it provided a natural 
extension to the Seacroft estate.7 To develop this land Leeds needed to gain 
planning permission from the Ministry of Housing and Local Government, which 
was not necessarily a straightforward task given the aims of the post-war 
planning settlement and the opposition of property holders and landed interests. 
The plans were opposed at a public inquiry by the Wellington Hill Residents’ 
Association, Colonel Lane Fox of Bramham Park, who was a large local 
landowner, and representatives for the National Farmers’ Union. The residents 
called on the judgement of an estate agent who estimated that there would be a 
total loss of £150,000 in the value of private houses in the Wellington Hill area, 
while Colonel Lane Fox was opposed to ‘urban sprawl’ and the erosion of the 
Green Belt. A Mr Chapman ‘suggested that there was a need for a reinvestigation 
of all the building land in Leeds to see what density it would carry and until that 
investigation was made it was not right to take land outside the city.’8 The 
Minister effectively came to a compromise and, while disallowing a third of the 
area that the council had sought planning permission for, he was satisfied that the 
rest of the land was needed to ‘avoid the risk of slowing down the housing 
programme when sites at present earmarked had all been used.’9 Some 
agricultural land had been preserved, and the judgement was relatively well 
accepted by the objectors, the chair of Wellington Hill Residents Association 
saying that ‘we have at least preserved the rural amenities of Wellington Hill to 
some degree.’10 Later in 1956 the council recognised that the Minister for 
Housing and Local Government ‘supports the Green Belt provision in the City as 
a whole and that he would be unlikely to favour the use of any extensive areas of 
the Green Belt for housing.’11 This example of the planning process at Whinmoor 
helps to illustrate many of the factors that faced the council when trying to make 
                                                          
7 Leeds, WYAS, Reports on Housing Improvement 1956-65. LLD1/2/817352 (Report on ‘Land 
for Housing’, (1954)) 
8 YP, 24/09/1955 
9 YP, 01/03/1956 
10 Ibid. 
11 Leeds, WYAS, Reports on Housing Improvement 1956-65. LLD1/2/817352 ‘Review of Land 
for Housing’, 14/12/1956. 
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best use of land for residential purposes. At this time they were usually able to 
make a good case when it came to applying for permission to develop, but there 
were a range of property interests against them, and Green Belts and legislation 
that discriminated against development on the fringe of the city. 
 
Issues relating to building plans and planning permission in suburban Leeds were 
to show the council aiming at two conflicting objectives. With land scarce there 
was a need to take advantage of favourable sites, but the council also wanted to 
preserve areas of the Green Belt and public open space within the city. These 
issues often put the council in a situation where interest groups dragged it into 
different positions, and where it could be taken to task for hypocrisy and self-
interest. Property interests were directly opposed in many instances, with 
homeowners reacting badly to the ambitions of developers and builders. In the 
majority of instances the council would uphold the Green Belt and satisfy the 
demands of homeowners, but when the council sought to instigate its own 
building programmes in the suburbs it was to incite the worst fears of those in 
private housing. A prime example of this came at West Park. 
 
In 1956 a local inquiry had to be held due to the council’s intention to build an 
estate on land at Butcher Hill which had been originally zoned as a ‘playing 
area’. 150 residents attended a meeting to organise their opposition to this at the 
inquiry.12 They were backed by a valuer, J.F. Lewis, who described the proposals 
as ‘catastrophic’ and told the inquiry that ‘West Park has been developed 
carefully for 40 years to ensure that only the best type of residences were put 
up….Houses at the west end, if the estate is built, will depreciate by at least 25 
per cent.’13 Some contributions and claims were even more hyperbolic than this. 
Leeds’ Chief Assistant Planning Officer, William Sleight, agreed that the area 
was a desirable residential district, but was forced to add, rather surreally, that ‘it 
was a matter of opinion whether fried fish and chip shops would spoil a 
neighbourhood.’14 The last word was effectively to go to the Deputy Town Clerk, 
J.R. Haslegrave. He said that, although the land had been zoned as public open 
                                                          
12 YEP, 05/07/1956 
13 YEP, 11/07/1956 
14 Ibid. 
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space, there was a pressing need for residential land and the area could be 
developed in conjunction with adjoining land that had been earmarked for public 
housing.15  
 
In the same year, another inquiry was held after an appeal from a landowner at 
Bramhope who wanted to build houses on a site which had once been zoned for 
housing, but which was now in the Green Belt. He argued that it was poor quality 
agricultural land, that the MHLG wanted Leeds to use its land more intensively 
for housing, and that the development plan was not sacrosanct. In this instance 
residents who argued that the proposals would lower the value of their houses 
were on the same side as Haslegrave, who claimed that it represented a serious 
encroachment on the Green Belt.16 Leeds’ planning bureaucracy was to take a 
relatively strict line on the status of the Green Belt, possibly reflecting planning 
orthodoxy on the undesirability of urban growth and a need to pre-empt the 
desires of Whitehall, reflected in the Minister Duncan Sandys’ circular 42/55 on 
Green Belts in 1955.17 The seriousness paid to this was perhaps demonstrated 
when the council was praised by the Leeds and Lower Dales branch of the 
Council for the Preservation of Rural England for its use of ‘varied and subdued’ 
colours on its housing estates that adjoined the Green Belt, an issue for which 
private developers received criticism.18 When it came to development, the council 
showed its determination by refusing permission to proposals at Shadwell and 
Bramley that wanted to build on the Green Belt. Both had their appeals rejected. 
At Shadwell the developer claimed that the land possessed ‘no aesthetic qualities’ 
and was ideal for building19, while at Bramley the builder, Cline and Sons, said 
that the land had only been included in the Green Belt in the previous year, that it 
represented ‘reasonable infilling’ between two existing sets of houses, and that 
there was a considerable demand for the type of bungalow they proposed to erect. 
The council responded by acknowledging the area’s ‘rather mixed character’, but 
                                                          
15 Ibid. 
16 YP, 15/11/1956 
17 Ward, Planning and Urban Change, p163 
18 YP, 07/12/1957 
19 YEP, 17/06/1958 
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asserted that they had to do their best ‘to preserve the fields which lay between 
existing housing developments.’20   
 
Given that the general context of land scarcity was combined with the extra 
constraint of the Green Belt and the competition of public housebuilding 
schemes, it was inevitable that there would be some tension between the council 
and private developers. In 1960 Leeds and District Property Owners’ and 
Ratepayers’ Association voiced their concern about the amount of land that was 
used for public housing, fearing that there would be no suitable land available for 
private builders.21 In that year the Manor House estate in Moortown was sold at 
auction, at 960 acres the last large undeveloped site in Leeds zoned for private 
building.22 A few years later estate agents claimed that the council was not 
developing land that it had cleared quickly enough, and that there were parts of 
the Green Belt that could be developed without detriment.23 The issue of cleared 
land was raised when the Lands Tribunal heard a complaint from two landowners 
about the level of compensation they would receive for compulsorily-purchased 
land in the Camp Road area, a chartered surveyor arguing on their behalf that the 
compensation paid in clearance areas was lower than that prior to World War 
Two. Leeds’ counsel stated that the land was heavily blighted and there was no 
evidence of private demand to develop the land residentially.24 The District 
Valuer, D.G. Ford, confirmed that ‘it was common knowledge that builders did 
not like to build on cleared sites.’25 Karl Cohen enlarged upon this in a letter he 
wrote to the Yorkshire Evening Post in 1967 in response to suggestions that the 
council was ‘hogging’ building land. He claimed that he had invited private 
builders to redevelop slum-clearance land and had assured them of long leases, 
but had not received a single enquiry. He added that the council normally built to 
a higher density than private builders and that many corporation estates had been 
built on land that had ‘remained fallow for many years’ and had thus apparently 
                                                          
20 YEP, 18/11/1959 
21 YP, 27/02/1960 
22 YEP, 01/09/1960 
23 YEP, 15/08/1963 
24 YEP, 23/10/1963 
25 YEP, 24/10/1963 
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not been attractive for private building.26 This attitude did mean that the pressure 
was increased on areas of suburban land which private developers looked on 
more desirably. Sand Moor Golf Club in leafy Alwoodley planned to sell off four 
holes and its clubhouse for building if the council agreed to re-designate the 
land.27 This plan was rejected until the main drainage facilities were improved, 
but the council agreed to rezone the land for residential purposes in the 
forthcoming development plan review, against the opposition of local residents, 
the Council for the Preservation of Rural England and the neighbouring golf 
clubs at Moortown and Moor Allerton.28   
 
Acquiring more land for residential needs and utilising it more intensively were 
aims that were generally accepted by Leeds’ politicians and administrators. How 
land in the city was to be developed was a different matter, and one that showed 
clear evidence of the traditional party political differences. In July 1963 there was 
a debate within the council chamber over the status of land adjoining the Green 
Belt at Adel.29 The council had refused permission for private multi-storey flats 
on the grounds that it should remain as public open space, as part of the land was 
zoned as such. The landowner objected to the Ministry of Housing and Local 
Government and won his appeal, after which the council compulsorily purchased 
the land but allowed the landowner to lease back some of the land for seven years 
at a negligible rent. The council then announced its intention to build on the site. 
This affair roused the anger of Conservative councillors. Councillor Marshall 
attacked the council for its about-face on the designation of the land, criticised the 
cost of its acquisition and questioned the previous decisions to deny private 
development of the site.30 Alderman Hargrave generalised from this case to add 
that ‘it would seem that there is a stultification of most, if not all, of the available 
land in this city for the purpose of private development’, and he stated that it 
should be borne in mind that ‘where private development can legitimately and 
properly take place, by the approval either of this Council or of the Minister, then 
                                                          
26 Leeds, WYAS, Councillor Cohen: Press Statements and Notes, 1959-67. LLD1/2/834129 
(Letter to YEP, 27/04/1967) 
27 YEP, 23/08/1963 
28 YEP, 04/12/1963 
29 Leeds City Council, Agenda and Verbatim Reports, July 1963, pp. 40-47 
30 Ibid, p.45 
179 
 
no charge falls upon the Corporation in consequence of that permission being 
given or of that development taking place.’31 The argument that the local 
authority would save money by allowing freer rein to private enterprise to acquire 
and develop land was to be made frequently by Conservative councillors. Karl 
Cohen defended the council’s actions by insinuating that the financial argument 
was not the whole story and that Conservatives were ‘more concerned with how 
dare we go to Adel, and how dare we go to Shadwell, and build! What impudence 
it is on our part to put ordinary working-class homes in those very delectable 
parts of the city!’32 On a more practical level he argued that it was the Minister’s 
decision that the site should be residential, and that even if the council had 
wanted to preserve it as open space they would have been required to pay a 
higher price for ‘residential’ land even if they did nothing with it.33 
  
These difficulties with the availability of land were to impact upon the council’s 
housebuilding programme. In 1958 the Housing Committee declared that ‘apart 
from the land recently included in the city boundary, there are no more large 
areas available for development. For this reason the present construction policy 
reveals a definite trend towards multi-storey dwellings in ‘point’ or ‘slab’ blocks 
and the redevelopment of the central cleared areas.’34 Two years later they 
declared that any sites proposed for development would need to be thoroughly 
investigated because it was presumed that any vacant land within the city must 
have some kind of ‘disability’ or another good reason why it was not already built 
upon.35 In 1960 the committee proposed an increase in housing densities in 
response to land shortages, and declared that they were also considering an 
approach to private builders to construct at higher densities. 36 By the early 1960s 
the limited sources of available land were continuing to try the council, and 
Labour’s Housing Committee Chairman Karl Cohen in particular. In June 1964 
he said that ‘whilst nobody can contemplate a whole series of multi-storey flats 
and nothing else, our advisers, the City Architect and City Engineer, will have to 
                                                          
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid, p.46 
33 Ibid, pp.46-47 
34 LCC, Reports of Committees, 1957-58, Housing Committee. The land recently included within 
the city’s boundaries was at Whinmoor. 
35 LCC, Reports of Committees, 1959-60. Housing Committee. 
36 Yorkshire Evening Post, 24th March 1960 
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tell us how best we can utilise the land so as to provide the biggest density 
possible.’37 This problem was felt particularly acutely by Cohen at this time as he 
was having doubts about the desirability of further high-rise housing. At the 
discussions of the Sub-Town Planning and Improvements Committee on the 
Development Plan Review, he asked ‘if they had been too rigid with the Green 
Belt, was it to continue or were they to consider with the West Riding a new 
Green Belt?’38 He added that he wanted a more fluid Green Belt to enable 
building to go on at a lesser density, and later stated that the amount of open 
space allocated in the Development plan was far greater than that of any other 
town. This was despite his recognition that it would be a struggle to persuade the 
Ministry as to the need for an extension of Leeds’ boundaries. The rest of the 
committee, who shared the arguments of the City Architect and City Engineer 
that high density development could be desirable, accepted that the Green Belt 
should remain much the same.39  
 
As a result of these types of discussion and the general acceptance of the 
principles of the post-1947 settlement, Leeds’ Development Plan Review 
involved few radical departures in the field of land use. Population had risen 
slightly rather than declined as expected during the 1949-1961 period40, and 
residential development had increased by 2289 acres, ‘a considerably higher rate 
than the expected increase of 34% for the total plan period from 1949-71’41 As a 
result, it was stated that ‘the Corporation have established higher residential 
densities than those advocated in the original Written Analysis in order to obtain 
maximum use of urban land, an increasingly scarce resource.’42 To cope with the 
unexpected rise in population, the council had allocated 2537 acres of vacant land 
for housing, of which 1690 acres were owned, or likely to be purchased, by the 
council. The major poles of residential development were to be Holt Park, 
Whinmoor and Colton.43 At the time much of this new development was 
                                                          
37 LCC, Agenda and Verbatim Reports, June 1964, p.32 
38 Leeds, WYAS, Sub-Town Planning and Improvements Development Review Committee, 
1965-69. LLD1/2/834518. (Minutes of meeting, 29/10/1965) 
39 Ibid. 
40 City of Leeds,  First Review of City Development Plan: Written Analysis (1968) p.12 
41 Ibid, p.6 
42 Ibid, p.45 
43 Ibid, p.44 
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anticipated to be council-led, with few large-scale private developments 
envisaged. 
 
Many of the arguments relating to land-use planning in Leeds surfaced in the 
objections to the Development Plan Review and the public inquiry that followed 
in 1969. Most of the objections focused on the revisions that had been made to 
Leeds’ Green Belt, and covered both general arguments and specific objections to 
the Green Belt provisions in certain areas of Leeds. Developers and builders 
attacked the restrictive nature of the revisions, in particular the ‘extreme shortage 
of land for development within the city’ and the fact that most of the land that had 
been allocated was earmarked for council housing and very little remained for 
private housing.44 They also contended that the Green Belt was too tightly 
defined and that there were parcels of land that were surrounded or closely 
connected to existing built up areas that made no real contribution to the Green 
Belt.45 One particular objection against Green Belt provision adjoining the 
eastern boundary of Leeds at Whinmoor used the argument that this area ‘must be 
considered the natural future area for expansion of the city’ and added that the 
land was very close to the new Seacroft District Centre ‘and there is considerable 
doubt if the centre can become a viable economic proposition without the 
addition of extensive residential areas to the east not now allocated in the Review 
Plan.’46 In this case the objection was denied, but the inspector did decide that a 
smaller piece of land at Wortley should be removed from the Green Belt as it did 
not appear as part of the open country.47 This illustrates both the determination of 
planners to maintain the Green Belt as much as possible, but also that their hold 
on the decisions of where and when to extend the boundaries of the city were 
coming under question from some frustrated business interests. 
 
The most significant issue decided at the inquiry was the West Riding County 
Council’s objection to Leeds’ decision to allocate residential land at Colton. The 
West Riding’s case was based on a potential blurring of urban boundaries 
                                                          
44 City of Leeds, Development Plan-First Quinquennial Review: Report of a Public Local Inquiry 
into Objections and Representations (1969) p.8  
45 Ibid. 
46 Ibid, p.14 
47 Ibid, p.10 
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between Leeds and the settlements of Garforth and Swillington, the need to 
protect the house and grounds of Temple Newsam, the attractiveness of the 
existing Colton village, but most interestingly, that Leeds’ estimate of its 1981 
population was excessive and that the West Riding had left land around villages 
to the north and east of Leeds unallocated ‘specifically to cater for people who 
wish to move out of the city to the villages.’48 Leeds was unlikely to find the loss 
of residents to outlying villages to be a desirable state of affairs, but argued that 
the Colton area would provide a ‘cohesive and logical addition to Leeds’ where 
4500 dwellings could be built in an attractive residential environment ‘within 
reasonable proximity of the City Centre.’49 The inspector dismissed the objection 
and agreed that ‘Colton is the logical area for any extension of the city.’50 He also 
approved the general orientation of the Green Belt, despite concluding that 
Leeds’ population forecasts ‘may well err slightly on the high side’.51 Both Leeds 
and the West Riding based their estimates on population figures and previous 
trends that had been set down by the Registrar-General, but there were significant 
differences in their future expectations. In establishing his own ‘independent’ 
forecast, the inspector basically split the difference between the disputed 
numbers.52 This dispute over population demonstrates one of the most obvious 
difficulties of the planning process. Despite the technical knowledge involved in 
plan preparation, there were no accurate methods of anticipating population 
growth and the consequent demands for land. The post-war increase in birth rate 
had already upset forecasts for growth in Leeds’ first Development Plan, and 
other factors such as local economic growth, house prices and family structure 
could all affect demand for land and accommodation. In addition to this, it could 
also be argued that political decisions on issues such as the Green Belt affected 
the provision of land and housing in ways that rendered claims about rational and 
‘scientific’ planning untenable.  
 
Arguments within the council about the most desirable way of developing land 
were to become more frequent after the Conservatives won control of the council 
                                                          
48 Ibid, pp.17-19 
49 Ibid, pp.19-21 
50 Ibid, pp.21-23 
51 Ibid, p.8 
52 Ibid, pp.21-23 
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in the late 1960s. When Alderman King (Labour) raised the issue of the sale of 
council-owned land in July 1968, the new Conservative Housing Chair, 
Alderman Bellow, responded by saying that ‘I submit that the time has come to 
end this worshipping at the shrine of municipal ownership. The hogging of land is 
a restrictive factor in the development of this City, and I know how the Socialists 
would cry out if building was being stultified and the hogging was been done by 
the private sector.’53 The Conservatives put forward the point of view that the 
council could not possibly develop in the short term all the vacant land in the city, 
and the best way of ensuring that building was to take place was to let private 
enterprise do this at its own expense. In reply to Labour protests that scarce land 
needed to be dealt with carefully, Alderman Bellow stated that if the council held 
down the supply of land, then the private sector could not build the thousands of 
houses called for in the City Development Plan, and that on certain of the sites 
that had been put up for sale ‘only one single house, or at most two houses, are to 
be built. It is just not sensible or practicable that we, as an authority, should build 
individual dwellings....So what is the alternative—to go on letting these small 
sites stand idle and derelict forever?’54 The direct financial gain to the council 
that land sales offered was also given as a justification.55 Conservative release of 
council land was also backed up by business fears of land shortages, and it was 
reported that the building trade forecast, with no pun intended, that house prices 
could go ‘through the roof’.56 The council’s own report into land availability had 
been very pessimistic and had recommended that ‘certain areas of council-owned 
land allocated for public housing should be made available for private building.’57 
Conservative inclinations toward private enterprise were important here, but there 
was also a determination from the Conservative council leaders Frank Marshall 
and Irwin Bellow to demonstrate ‘businesslike’ administration and financial 
stringency was a central part of this. As such, allowing publicly owned land to 
stand disused was inefficient, especially when it could be a source of revenue to 
the local authority. 
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This was countered on Labour’s side where there was a clear belief in the 
desirability of municipal ownership of land, both from the point of view that they 
did not trust private development to use scarce land ‘efficiently’, but also because 
they held that it would not provide for the varied needs of the whole community. 
The emphasis was on balanced development and satisfaction of social needs, a 
central plank of the Town Planning ideas of the 1940s and 1950s, but one that 
had become less influential in the ‘mixed economy’ as state planning came to be 
seen more as a way of servicing capitalist growth.58 In 1970 Karl Cohen argued 
that ‘you can sell this land, but they will not be building one-bedroomed 
bungalows for people who need them, and they will not be building the 
accommodation that your handicapped people need.’59 By the mid-1970s it was 
feared that land sales were having a direct effect on the council housebuilding 
programme, and Labour questioned the Tory position that land in the hands of 
private developers would be built on more quickly than council-owned land that 
was suffering due to the fact that council housebuilding was under the influence 
of spending cuts. 60 Councillors continued to argue that the private sector was not 
catering for all needs, including those who could not obtain mortgages, and that 
the land sold to the private sector was not producing the building rates that the 
Conservative leadership had promised. Councillor Vollans (Labour) pointed to 
the figure that private housebuilding had ‘dropped in commencement rate from 
2800 in 1974/75 to an estimated total for 1978/79 of 1330. And this is from the 
people who were going to supply the needs of Leeds in the housing field.’61  
 
After the Conservative achievement of a majority on the council in 1967, the sale 
of council housing was to be coupled with the disposal of council-owned land, 
with many similar arguments taking place. Leeds’ Conservatives, in common 
with their colleagues in many other councils, had proposed the policy of council 
house sales going into the 1967 municipal elections, and acted quickly to enact it. 
After sales were halted by Labour in 1972, they were to be resumed by the 
Conservative minority administration, with Liberal support, in 1975. There were 
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to be a number of conditions placed on, and benefits offered to, those acquiring 
council houses, such as discounts for tenants who had been in their property for 
more than a certain length of time and the council being offered first refusal on 
buying the property back if it was to be sold on after purchase. Sales were also to 
be restricted to self-contained properties; flats and maisonettes were excluded, as 
were houses that shared large communal areas. This ‘small-print’ could also 
cause some controversy. 
 
The arguments that took place around the issue of council house sales were a 
mixture of principle and practicality, and were employed interchangeably by both 
sides. Noticeably, however, the Labour position shifted significantly away from 
an ideological approach by the later 1970s, perhaps in awareness that they did not 
want to be seen as anti-owner occupier, or in favour of strict controls on tenants. 
In 1967 Labour’s Councillor Donohoe had complained that conditions of tenancy 
would not apply to people who had bought council houses, even though they 
would be living next door to council tenants.62 This provided an open goal to the 
Conservative Housing Chairman, Irwin Bellow. He took the opportunity to 
declare that ‘…let houses be painted individual colours as individuals desire. Let 
the doors and facades be different. Why should there have to be uniformity, 
which only leads to drabness.’63 Given that they found themselves unable to 
make better arguments in favour of the principle of public housing, Labour 
focused heavily on the more technical flaws of the policy. 
 
Criticisms of the policy of council house sales thus tended to collect around 
several areas. The first was the loss of council assets. Conservative councillors 
liked to point out the funds that accrued to the council from the sale of housing, 
but Labour claimed that there would also be financial problems. Alderman King 
asserted that there would be difficulties created by distortions to the ‘pooling’ of 
rents between older houses, where the original loans had been paid off, and newer 
properties which required more finance for loan payments.64 Karl Cohen added 
that many of the older houses that would be sold had to be replaced by new 
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houses built on more expensive sites, incurring higher charges.65 This position 
also affected attitudes to the conditions placed on potential council house buyers. 
When a decisive election victory in 1976 allowed a majority Conservative 
administration to alter the buy-back clauses and make a discount of 20% 
available to tenants who had been in their property for three years, the Liberals 
declared that the discount amounted to ‘giving them away.’66  Linked to the 
disposal of public assets was the loss of rental stock, an argument used by Labour 
councillors and residents in the Hunslet Carr area, who protested against plans to 
sell houses due to a fear that it would lead to a reduction in the availability of 
low-rent, pre-war council houses.67 Councillor Bellow claimed that the only thing 
that changed was the ownership, ‘and whether the occupier is there as the owner 
or the tenant does not affect the housing waiting list.’68  
 
A sign that the issue of council house sales lacked an ideological edge came in 
the fact that one of the major criticisms raised by the opposition was that the 
policy was not a success in its own terms. Alderman King said in July 1968 that 
only 88 houses had actually been sold, while the 1391 enquiries that had been 
dealt with represented a waste of administrator’s time.69 He followed this line up 
in 1970, stating that only 306 houses from a total of 60,000 had been sold since 
the policy was introduced. Similar questions were raised about this when council 
house sales resumed in the mid-1970s. Labour housing spokesman George Mudie 
admitted that he was not opposed to long-standing tenants buying their homes, 
but he did point out that in the first thirteen months since the reinstatement of the 
policy just 103 houses had been sold, despite Housing Chair Peter Sparling 
countering that there had been 3016 applications.70 From 1975 to March 1979 
2384 council house sales had been completed, though the fact that 2154 had come 
about with council mortgage finance suggests that the boost to the council’s 
income was not an immediate one.71 Nevertheless, the significance of the sale of 
council housing on the wider housing policy of the local authority was quite 
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limited. The numbers involved were still relatively small, and the housing 
department did not remark that any problems had been caused regarding the 
management of its housing stock or the waiting list. There were relatively few 
contradictory voices against Councillor Bellow’s sentiment when he boasted that 
‘…there can surely be no finer way to do away with class barriers, than by people 
living alongside one another in rented and owner-occupied accommodation.’72 
Most opposition focused on threats that the policy might cause to the interests 
and administration of the council as a corporate body, rather than having a basis 
in the articulation of principles of collectivism or social solidarity. This did 
nothing to assuage the feelings that were developing in many residents regarding 
the legitimacy of council ‘paternalism’. Having said that, the problems that 
council house sales caused in the 1980s with the stigmatisation of public housing 
and its evolution into a ‘residual’ form of tenure for the disadvantaged and 
‘problem families’ did not appear to be foreseen in this earlier period.     
  
 
An example of Council land and development policy in the 1970s came at 
Colton, where many of the issues seen at Whinmoor in the 1950s were repeated, 
but new dividing lines appeared as well. Leeds Council had purchased land at 
Colton from the Temple Newsam estate with the intention of developing the land 
for housing. The land was originally intended to be used to rehouse 15,000 slum 
clearance tenants, but this was to be changed by a planning study group that 
considered the alternatives for development.73 This provided an interesting 
insight on the contemporary orientation of social planning within the council. It 
was ‘strongly suggested’ that a ‘balanced’ social composition should be achieved 
at Colton through a ‘mixture of tenures and house prices or rent levels and a joint 
contribution by the three development agencies—Corporation, private builders 
and voluntary housing agencies.’74 This mix would require a reduction in the 
population target from 15,000 to 12,000 due to differing densities. The planners 
felt that it would be useful to include ‘A’ group (private) housing in the first 
phase ‘in order to help attract the developers of such accommodation to 
                                                          
72 LCC, Agenda and Verbatim Reports, August 1967, p.117 
73 LCC, Colton: An Approach to Planning and Development (1972) 
74 Ibid, p.2 
188 
 
Colton’.75 This type of housing was also judged to fit in well with the 
environment of the neighbouring Halton Ward, and ‘underlines the feasibility of 
providing for this group at Colton in large measure.’76  
 
They also considered the desirability of ‘avoiding a close social mixture’ and 
decided that the social basis of planning at Colton should be ‘class heterogeneity 
(or social mixture) on a wide area basis but social homogeneity (or uniformity) 
on a local or neighbourhood basis, such an approach being reflected in housing 
tenure and price differences.’77 The balance of tenure was to be 51.7 per cent 
owner-occupation, 15.9 per cent housing association rental, and 31.3 per cent 
council rented.78 This approach was described as the ‘very opposite’ of social 
engineering and ‘based on the viewpoint that though physical and social planning 
should to some extent reflect and allow for the prevailing structure of society and 
the apparent aspirations and needs of each individual group, it should also contain 
an element of flexibility so that it does not act as a straitjacket, restricting social 
mobility and change in the future.’79 This document encapsulated the essential 
conservatism of planning, and its essence as a tool for enabling technical and 
economic change while effectively preserving the existing social hierarchy.  
 
Despite the moderate tone of these planning proposals, when the council formally 
announced its plans in 1975 the Colton Preservation Society was formed by 
residents of the old village of Colton, and the local Conservative councillors 
representing Halton gave backing to their arguments. In a deputation to the 
council, the Colton Preservation Society argued that the plans would take out 
over 400 acres of valuable agricultural land, that there were significant dangers of 
subsidence, that the local road system was already at saturation point, and that 
there were significant amounts of derelict land in Leeds that should be used.80 
The local councillors basically agreed with the opinion that there was available 
land elsewhere. Councillor Hyde (Conservative) criticised the intention ‘to 
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swamp the only genuine country village left within the old City boundaries with 
6000 plus council houses.’81 His colleague Councillor Dodgson suggested ‘that 
there are many areas of land of varying sizes which may be inconvenient from a 
housing and planning aspect but could well consume the demand for these 6000 
dwellings.’82 Councillors from the Labour group, then in control, pointed out both 
the ‘nimbyism’ in the arguments and the fact that there had been longstanding 
public intentions to develop the area that had not raised any concerns in the past. 
Councillor Prichard pondered that ‘...it seems to me rather a curious phenomenon 
that every time Council development is proposed in what is considered a good 
residential area members of the Conservative Party opposite suddenly get 
concerned about the fate of those who might live there.’83 He added that land at 
Colton had been firmly earmarked for housing from 1964, and Councillor King 
(Labour) elaborated by stating that there had been no objection to the council 
buying the land.84 Councillor Prichard also provided the interesting observation 
that while the council should consult people fully on its plans, there was also a 
duty on people to take an interest in council developments when they were given 
the opportunity, and he stated that ‘if, in fact, people are going to pay no attention 
until the development is actually scheduled to begin, it makes a mockery of 
participation.’85 This point of view could have been carried into other areas of 
council housing and planning policy. Land-use planning in particular was an area 
where popular pressures bore least on those drafting policies and the public had 
little input into the process as it was ongoing, but considerable outcry could be 
caused when proposals came to take a more concrete form. This was probably as 
much to do with the long-range nature of development plans and the technical 
side of forecasting than any deliberate attempt to pursue an elitist agenda. 
 
Despite the opposition of the local Conservative councillors to developments at 
Colton, when the Conservative group resumed control of the council in 1976 it 
was forced to recognise the importance of the land there to future housing 
provision in the city. What it could do, though, was to sell sections of land at 
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Colton to the private sector, and reduce the amount of land there devoted to 
housing. Labour attacked these proposals, Councillor Mudie arguing ‘why spend 
£2.5 million on land and then decide to use only part of it for the development of 
housing?’86 Councillor Miller (Labour) criticised the inconsistency in the 
proposals between public and private housing densities, and said that this 
represented a waste of residential land.87 On the Conservative side, these new 
plans were heartily welcomed. The Planning Chair, Councillor Hudson, said that 
the site was ‘adjacent to Templenewsam (sic) and I think that to cram as many 
houses on that site as possible would be an absolute disaster, both 
environmentally and for the people concerned.’88 Tellingly, the local councillors 
who had opposed Labour’s previous plans were now assuaged. Councillor 
Dodgson stated that ‘the last thing that I feel we want to see is a vast Corporation 
housing estate, the like of which we notice at Whinmoor, at Seacroft, and so 
on.’89 His colleague Councillor Hyde added that East Leeds had the highest 
proportion of council housing in Leeds, and seemed almost disappointed that the 
development 80/20 in favour of private housing at Colton would only partly 
redress the balance.90 These opinions represented a strong prejudice against 
public housing, especially close to their own areas, and were to be reflected a lot 
in Conservative housing policy at the end of the 1970s. By the time a firm local 
plan was finally drawn up, in December 1978, the land at Colton was to provide  
housing for only 7,000 people ‘at current densities’ that reflected the 
preponderance of private housing.91 Even this failed to satisfy the Colton 
Preservation Society, whose chairman P. Shires wanted the council to use an 
alternative site in the vicinity of Temple Newsam Golf Course, a proposal that 
was rejected by the council for environmental reasons and because of a ‘probable 
reduced contribution to city housing programmes.’92 Thus despite this willing 
acceptance that the era of suburban council estates was over, the planners still had 
some difficulty in applying their social prescriptions against certain private 
property interests. 
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In theory the land-use planning system created by the Town and Country 
Planning Act of 1947 should have led to the omnipotence of planners when it 
came to development and utilisation of residential land. They were given the 
primary role in designating land usage and function through the production of 
development plans, and provided most of the information and forecasting 
necessary for the analysis that formed the basis of those plans. In the actual 
operation of land-use planning it proved more difficult for technocrats to control 
the system. The framework in which planners operated was effectively devised in 
Whitehall, and many decisions made in Leeds were subject to approval from, or 
appeal to, the Minister. This was one major factor reducing the autonomy of 
planners in Leeds. Through the period the planning bureaucracy also had to deal 
with the growing strength of private business and commercial interests. In the 
immediate post-war period state direction was much more prevalent, but planning 
controls later performed much more of a negative role. Private developers 
showed greater determination to stake their claim to scarce land by the later 
1960s, and in a situation where funds for public housebuilding were diminishing, 
business aspired to a bigger role. In Leeds they were assisted by their natural 
allies, the Conservative Party, who sold off much council-owned land and 
changed the parameters of local authority proposals in favour of private 
development, as at Colton. Land-use planning had a major knock-on effect on 
public housing construction with the effects of land scarcity, Green Belts and 
housing density stipulations leading to certain forms of building. Dunleavy has 
stated that ‘greater equality in housing conditions was to be achieved with 
inadequate funding, without any substantial diversion of land from rural to urban 
use, and without any significant equalization of densities across metropolitan 
areas’93, and he linked these factors to the development of high-rise housing. In 
these types of issues there was a great deal of common ground between national 
and local planners and many suburban owner-occupiers. The efforts of some local 
politicians such as Karl Cohen to try and get a more even spread of housing 
densities across the city was to be generally unsuccessful, even when they were 
able to insert council housing into the suburbs. 
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Land sales were defended by the Conservatives from the point of view that they 
boosted council revenues, but there were wider ideological and political grounds 
for their support of private enterprise. The party was strongly inclined toward the 
growth of owner-occupation, while Conservative councillors were much happier 
to see more affluent homeowners in their areas rather than the expansion of 
council housing. In many ways Leeds’ Conservatives benefitted from the post-
war planning settlement. The stringent conditions placed on land use, plus the 
establishment of Green Belts, helped to protect the interests of their constituency 
of suburban residents, while the role of private enterprise in residentially zoned 
land could be extended when they had control of the Town Hall. Labour’s 
position was based on the idea of planning for the wider community and using 
land to provide housing for those who were unable to secure it through the 
market. Development of local authority land for council housing both in the inner 
city and on the outskirts at Seacroft and Whinmoor played a leading role until the 
late 1960s. After this, the worsening financial situation undermined Labour 
policy. While they continued to oppose land sales on principled grounds and 
criticised the patchy rates of private housebuilding, they were unable to propose 
concrete alternative uses for vacant land, which might remain empty or derelict 
for an indeterminate period without council funds to develop it. Thus while the 
disposal and ownership of land was still something of a stage for dispute and 
negotiation, much of land-use planning remained marginal to conventional local 
politics.  
 
The public proved to be even more peripheral to development planning. While 
development plans were passed on for consultation and open to objection before 
they were referred to the Ministry for approval, there was little room for the 
public to influence how plans were drawn up, and consultation had no real 
institutional role. As a result groups of residents or smaller land-owners tended to 
react to events as planning proposals came up, and while they were protected 
sometimes by Green Belts and the appeals process, they were often relatively 
powerless, particularly when the local authority had the backing of big business 
interests. The framework of land-use planning helped to replicate many of the 
features typical in other areas of local urban policy. While there was little popular 
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involvement and most of the planning process was executed by professional 
planners, local property interests could still be defended through the application 
of regulations such as the Green Belt, or safeguarded through judicious protest.  
Where national legislation and supervision favoured the local authority then 
protest from any source could be fruitless, but central government and economic 
constraints also provided some clear boundaries to local initiative, a feature that 
was to increase towards the end of the period.            
 
Land-use was to be the field of urban politics and planning that saw the greatest 
level of continuity in the post-war settlement. This seems to be quite a strange 
statement when you compare it with the pace of change in other areas such as 
slum clearance, public house-building, inner-city redevelopment and road-
building, all of which involved a major overhaul of the urban environment. What 
land-use planning did mark was the preservation of a certain equilibrium between 
the interests of certain groups within the system while also allowing the 
facilitation of certain essential social needs. The nature of the planning process 
was often very conservative. Such facets as a rigid development plan and Green 
Belts imparted quite a negative flavour to planning, while the designation of land 
to private concerns in house-building, retail and commercial development did not 
necessarily achieve the fulfilment of the local authority’s vision for these areas. 
The conservative tendencies of the planning system, when coupled with the 
council’s diminished financial resources, meant that many of Leeds’ collective 
aims were frustrated. As a result, from the late 1960s there was a greater 
orientation towards private enterprise in land sales and allocations for house-
building coupled with the encouragement of individual aspiration with the 
beginning of council house sales. The satisfaction of some interests was 
accompanied by the weakening of a broader social control over land use.     
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Chapter Eight: Public Facilities in Residential Leeds: Shopping, 
Roads and Industry. 
 
 
Seacroft Town Centre, c.1967. (Leeds Library and Information Service, www.leodis.net) 
Very few residential areas are composed exclusively of houses. In a city like 
Leeds, predominantly developed in the Victorian age, tracts of housing of various 
‘classes’ were intermixed with industry of various types, numerous shops and 
pubs, churches and chapels and the odd park. This pattern survived largely intact 
into the post-1945 era, but was to be challenged by the planning and political 
orthodoxies of the time. The dirt and inconvenience of industry was judged to be 
incompatible with areas of housing, people needed improved access to recreation 
and open space, people and vehicles had to be segregated to provide safety and 
increase the speed of travel, and shops and public facilities should be 
concentrated together to give the benefits of convenience and ease of access. 
These factors heavily influenced the creation of city development plans and the 
zoned city maps that accompanied them.1 Land use was to be increasingly 
segregated, both in dividing areas of housing from other functions such as 
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industry and business, and also in earmarking enclaves within residential areas 
where retail, recreation and education were permitted. Leeds’ first development 
plan envisaged the redevelopment of 13,192 dwellings for non-residential use, 
covering 691 acres and involving the transfer of 35,363 people.2 In areas that 
were redeveloped for new housing at least some of the inhabitants could expect to 
remain in the district where they had lived previously, but in other places long-
established settlements were to effectively be wiped from the map.  
 
Many of the problems involved in the planning of non-residential functions into 
housing areas were to mirror those found in the direct provision of homes. 
Control over the development plan and the use of land was not necessarily 
paralleled by control over the political, financial, economic and social forces that 
had to be employed and countered when putting the transformation of urban 
Leeds into practice. Prospective roadbuilding projects were to prove a massive 
source of planning blight; shopping centres took a long time to be developed, but 
often struggled to fulfil their intended roles; while the complete separation of 
housing and industry left workers further from their places of employment and 
sometimes took businesses away from their best customers. As with attempts to 
forecast the kind of housing conditions that would be desirable or just acceptable 
to the public, estimates of the road network or retail environment of the future 
were to be very difficult to anticipate. Nevertheless, a city keen to keep up with 
the pace of ‘modernisation’ felt these decisions had to be made.     
 
In areas of older housing one of the most noticeable features was the corner shop. 
Smaller retail units were ubiquitous and part of the fabric of high-density 
neighbourhoods. Post-war planning policy often saw the mixing of retail into 
residential areas as inefficient both for the businesses themselves, who were stuck 
in old-fashioned premises with little room for expansion, and for residents, who 
had to put up with the inconvenience of delivery vehicles as well as the need to 
traipse across their local environs to meet their consumer needs.3 As a result, a 
much greater degree of centralisation was introduced into the provision of shops 
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and services when new residential developments were planned. Groups of local 
shops were built, but most attention went into the development of local and 
district centres where an adequate range of shops would be found on the same 
site, room would be offered for larger, more modern stores, parking was provided 
for the increase in cars, and other functions such as libraries, cinemas and offices 
would share space with shops. By the 1960s it was hoped to extend these centres 
into older, established residential areas of the city, often affecting housing 
directly through the demolition of dwellings to provide a site. The reality could 
be more difficult though. In new estates the provision of new shops often lagged 
some years behind the building of new houses, causing some discomfort and 
much extra travel. Shops in older areas had usually developed in a more 
evolutionary manner, while the modern centres were built in a ‘once-and-for-all’ 
way, involving often speculative forecasts about local needs and shopping trends. 
It has been argued that ‘one result of the involvement of local government in 
shopping centre development generally has been the building of centres in 
response to the needs for a centre rather than as an opportunity to make a profit in 
the development process.’4 Greenhalgh has argued that many ‘neighbourhood’ 
shopping areas were built with the goal of promoting an ideal sense of 
community rather than with the aim of satisfying the retail needs of local people. 
He convincingly argues that ‘inherently spatial constructions of community and 
sociability in the designs for retail facilities on postwar housing estates were 
challenged and undermined by patterns of consumption, the strength of retail 
capitalism and the efficacy of individual choice.’5 As a result, the plans did not 
always co-ordinate action very well between the local authority, property 
developers and builders, and businesses themselves. There was often a substantial 
overlap and competition between different centres, while some businesses in 
established shopping areas understandably resented the arrival of newer shops 
and centres.  
 
One of Leeds City Council’s biggest post-war projects was the development of a 
‘Civic Centre’ at Seacroft. The first council housing in Seacroft had been built 
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before the Second World War, but the construction of houses was accelerated in 
the post-war period when it became one of the main growth areas for new estates. 
This created a need for shopping, commercial and other public facilities to cater 
for the rising population. By the late 1950s lack of these facilities was leading to 
newspaper articles and many complaints from residents.6 A site for the Civic 
Centre had been included in the planning of the Seacroft estates but, although 
plans for the centre had been drawn up by 19607, it was to take until 1963 for the 
council’s chosen builder, Costains, to begin the development of the complex.8 
Seacroft Centre was officially opened by Queen Elizabeth II on 22nd October 
1965, and was hailed by the Yorkshire Post as ‘the largest municipal project of its 
kind to be built in a city suburb in Britain….the hub of a surrounding population 
expected to reach 85,000 within the next few years.’9 Its sister newspaper was 
even more carried away, stating that ‘thanks to a fruitful collaboration between 
Leeds Corporation and a group of forward-looking architects, Seacroft now wears 
a special air of modernism. Its heart visibly expresses a new and exhilarating 
age.’10 Unfortunately for the council, this level of excitement was not to be 
maintained for very long. The council had made the decision to leave the 
administration of the complex to the Housing Department, a task that was to 
prove difficult from the outset. The council’s administrators were naturally 
concerned with the general viability of the centre, but this required keeping a 
wide range of private businesses happy, including high street and local shops, 
offices, cafes and even a bowling alley. As early as 8th September 1965 there 
were complaints from the ‘Big 3’ stores about the fact that the centre was not 
fully occupied. The council offered to give rent relief until 1st January 1966, but 
the big stores protested that this would only be ground rent for them and other 
traders rented the premises as well. When the Town Clerk pointed out that the 
larger shops would stand to gain from other shops being open sooner, they would 
not accept this and argued that smaller shops gained more from the bigger ones 
being open.11 
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This discontent did not abate, and in February 1966 Leeds Co-operative, Thrift 
Stores and Wiltex by Wilson wrote to the council voicing their concerns at the 
‘unsatisfactory and probably deteriorating situation at the Seacroft Town Centre’. 
They criticised delays in the completion of construction work and pressures for 
the main stores to open before at least 75% of the units were ready, the fact that 
the scaffolding surrounding the incomplete Woolworths was deterring trade, and 
that access to and within the centre ‘leaves a great deal to be desired’.12 The 
Seacroft Centre Traders Association also begged for an extension of the rent 
concession.13 The Director of Housing, on his part, questioned whether the traders 
themselves were creating bad publicity by complaining so much about the 
centre.14 On the council’s side, they made an attempt to achieve some positive 
news by trying to persuade the successful Leeds United team to come to a civic 
reception at the centre to coincide with the opening of some shops. 
 
Seacroft Civic Centre, 1967. (Leeds Library and Information Service, www.leodis.net) 
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Unfortunately, manager Don Revie thanked them for the offer but said that the 
event was after the end of the season and players would be on holiday. This does 
provide some evidence of the level of desperation that was shrouding the centre’s 
fortunes at this time. This appeared to have influenced the Seacroft Parish 
Magazine, which featured a front cover with the headline ‘For God’s Sake Shop 
at Seacroft Centre’. In this case the Seacroft shopkeepers felt the publicity was 
unhelpful, and the magazine’s editor himself was rather scathing about the 
appearance of the centre, describing it as having ‘all the clichés of 1963’15. 
These problems at Seacroft were to lead to political controversy, as the 
Conservative opposition on the council were quick to criticise the running of the 
Town Centre for both practical and ideological reasons. Leading Tories Frank 
Marshall and Irwin Bellow questioned the competence and expertise of council 
officials in dealing with retail and commercial issues, arguing that civic prudence 
and ratepayers’ money had been placed in jeopardy. Bellow brought out more 
fundamental differences when he argued that ‘it should be no business of ours to 
indulge in capital projects which are both hazardous and speculative….above all, 
it does not supply a facility or give a service which cannot be equally well 
provided by other sources.’16 The Conservative proposal was to put the 
responsibility for letting the centre in the hands of a specialist agent.17 Councillor 
Merritt (Labour) responded by saying that it would cost much more to hire 
private letting agents than to rely on the council’s own staff, while council leader 
Alderman King (Labour) argued that ‘whoever provided the initial shopping 
accommodation will be involved in a loss, but we have a responsibility to ensure 
that that development takes place.’ Councillor Donohoe, Assistant Housing 
Chair, summed up the Labour position by pointing out that Seacroft was the size 
of towns like Dewsbury and Doncaster, and needed the appropriate facilities.18 
 
After the Conservative victory at the 1967 local elections they were able to hire a 
letting agent in February 1968 to try and fill the vacancies at the Centre, though 
this did not achieve the effect they had hoped. The Housing Department reported 
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in August 1968 that the agent, Hillier, Parker, May and Rowden, had not 
achieved any lettings yet. Non-food trades were very reluctant to move in, and a 
successful Sunday Market at the Centre had been forced to end when a complaint 
was received and an inspector informed the council that it had been illegal.19 
Taking stock of the situation, a report of officers admitted that there were too 
many units relative to the current population of Seacroft, but reasserted that the 
Centre ‘was not conceived merely as a commercial venture but was intended to 
provide a much needed facility for the Seacroft area generally of sufficient size to 
cater for the future major residential expansion of the area.’20 They advised 
against short-term measures that might damage the long-term viability of the 
Centre, but suggested tellingly that covering the Centre would be a major boost to 
its prospects, particularly as ‘the development at Crossgates which can be 
regarded as directly competitive with Seacroft is totally enclosed.’21 The agents 
argued that roofing over the Centre was not economically justified, but also gave 
their opinion that no large stores were likely to move into Seacroft until the 
surrounding housing estates were fully developed, and that in this case, and 
without a reorganisation of bus routes to better serve Seacroft, it was unlikely that 
the letting situation would improve in the short term. They advised giving long 
rent-free periods to certain shops and that the floor space was too large for the 
present turnover of the Centre, so other non-retail uses should be considered.22 
This was followed by acceptance of their failure and an offer to step down, 
though the Council officers had already suggested dispensing with their services. 
 
The viability and long term prospects of Seacroft Town Centre were to come 
under question on a number of occasions through the 1970s. It was announced 
that the Centre would make a loss of £121,000 in 1975, and a Conservative 
member of the Planning Committee, Councillor Malcolm Davies, argued that the 
Centre should be ‘demolished, sold or given away.’ 23 When Woolworth’s closed 
in 1977, Seacroft traders demanded changes including a new roof, adequate 
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heating and a lighting system to relieve the ‘gloom’.24 Seacroft Traders’ 
Association claimed that fewer than 10% of local residents shopped at the Centre, 
many preferring to get the bus to Crossgates instead. Members of the public who 
were canvassed by the Yorkshire Evening Post blamed icy draughts, noisy 
children and a lack of atmosphere,25 and STA Chairman Lawrence Burwell said 
that it was not a place where shoppers wanted to hang about, adding that 
‘something would have to be done soon about the heating, the roofing, the floors 
and the general décor so that the shopkeepers could compete equally with 
neighbouring centres offering better facilities.’26 Leeds had plans for upgrading 
the Centre, but the Director of Estates and Development said that they would take 
time coming about in the present financial climate.27 
 
Seacroft Town Centre thus limped its way through the 1970s, but without any 
sign that the malaise would be lifted. The concept of the Centre as an all-
encompassing facility that simultaneously offered both necessary social functions 
and private enterprises operating in a competitive capitalist world was to give the 
Council a difficult task in achieving a balance. Constructed all at once with a 
relatively strict division of retail, office, social and residential accommodation, 
the complex was not allowed to develop organically like older town or suburban 
centres, and the stigma that attached to the Centre due to vacant shops and 
deserted precincts was to prove impossible to shake off. This meant that, even 
though the residential districts of Seacroft had expanded throughout the 1970s, 
the Centre was in no position to benefit, and Crossgates, with an established 
suburban centre bolstered by a modern covered shopping mall, took the custom. 
With its range of modern facilities in an area that was badly in need of them, 
Seacroft Town Centre might seem like an unlikely failure, but its problems 
almost represent a miniature depiction of the Council’s difficulties in planning 
Leeds as a whole. Attempts to provide rational, lasting and socially effective 
projects were often to be frustrated by events and processes outside the control of 
local decision-makers.   
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Seacroft Town Centre was a flagship project for Leeds, driven by the sheer size 
of Seacroft as a ‘new town’ within the city, but the provision of ‘district centres’ 
was to be a major facet of Leeds’ planning in the post-war period. In the 1960s 
review of the City Development Plan, there were to be eleven district centres, 
nine of which were in existence, but judged to be in need of redevelopment and 
extension. Most of these were the heart of old villages, where ‘obsolete buildings 
and layout impair their efficient functioning’.28 Rather than the traditional spread 
of shops and services along existing roads, these centres were to be compact 
precincts where pedestrians and vehicles were segregated, car-parking provision 
was important, and public transport links integrated with the complexes.29 
Population trends moving towards the suburbs were held to have ‘outpaced 
economic shop distribution’ and suburban shopping centres would ‘cater for 
future growth in population, purchasing power and tastes.’30 Shopping was to be 
the main function of these centres, but social facilities were also to be included as 
they were judged to be ‘more successful’ when located near shops.  
 
Putting these plans into practice was to be a slightly different matter than in the 
case of the Seacroft Centre. As most of the proposed district centres were in 
existing areas there was not as urgent a need for new shops and facilities. 
However, the acquisition of land from multiple owners was more difficult, and 
the Council was to act as an ‘enabler’, allocating sites and issuing specifications, 
but relying on private capital to develop the centres. The district centre 
programme, unlike Seacroft, was under the supervision of the Planning 
Committee, but the issue of shopping and social facilities was to have a major 
impact on areas of public and private housing in Leeds. Given the long periods of 
time involved with designing plans, obtaining planning permission, acquiring 
land and embarking on the final construction process, a great deal of ‘planning 
blight’ was created. The complications were to be most evident at Moortown. 
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Leeds City Council announced in June 1965 that plans for shopping and 
neighbourhood centres in Headingley and Moortown had been prepared by the 
City Engineer, C.G.Thirlwall, and the City Architect, E.W.Stanley.31 The 
Moortown scheme was to serve 28,000 people in North Leeds, providing shops, a 
cinema, offices and a public library. Moortown householders reacted swiftly 
against the plans, realising that homes and businesses would be affected. Thirty-
three houses would be demolished, mostly in the higher-rated bracket and under 
fifty years old, eleven shops and a garage.32   The Moortown Property-Owners 
Association mustered a deputation to hand in a petition at Civic Hall opposing the 
development plans33, but there was little sign of the proposals coming to 
realisation in the short term and a period of uncertainty emerged. 
 
The saga of Moortown District Centre really gained momentum in the early 
1970s. A property developer had made plans to build a shopping centre on the 
Moortown site, but permission had been refused by the Ministry of Housing and 
Local Government in September 1970. The developer put in a revised plan in 
January 1972, but Moortown residents continued to fight the proposals, declaring 
that ‘they are proposing a city development in a suburban area. We are objecting 
to the scheme as a whole and not just a few points.’34 Residents were also backed 
by the local Conservative councillor for Talbot ward, Dr J.R.Sherwin, who 
considered that the scale of the development was too large for the area, the office 
accommodation greater than required for local needs, and the proposed library 
too small.35 Nonetheless, the revised scheme was approved by Leeds Plans 
Committee, despite 482 objections.36 
 
Opposition to the Moortown scheme was based around the nature of the proposed 
development, which was held to be out of character with the suburban 
atmosphere of the area, the fact that existing facilities were judged to be adequate 
for local needs, and the potential increase in traffic that would ensue. The 
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campaign was backed by the local Conservative councillors, the Leeds Civic 
Trust, a newly formed ‘Moortown Redevelopment Action Group’, prominent 
local residents, including a QC,37 and local Conservative MP Sir Keith Joseph.38 
Despite this kind of articulate and well-connected organisation, Deputy Planning 
Chairman Ken Woolmer (Labour) said that there was no chance of the scheme 
being abandoned.39 The proposals were running into different kinds of problems 
though. The developers, Commercial Union Properties, had tried to acquire 
properties on the site by negotiating full-market-value purchases, but by 
December 1973 were still eleven houses short of possessing all the necessary 
land. They claimed to need to buy the remaining houses simultaneously as they 
could not afford to waste time or further funds, but the Council were unwilling to 
compulsorily purchase the houses on their behalf.40 By July 1974 Commercial 
Union threatened to abandon current plans for Moortown unless the Council 
compulsorily purchased nine houses. Moortown Redevelopment Action Group 
urged councillors to reject these requests, withdraw planning permission, and 
remove the district centre proposal from the city’s development plan.41 
 
In November 1974 Commercial Union lost patience and placed a new application 
to build a supermarket on the land that they had managed to acquire on the 
Moortown site.42 These plans were rejected by the Planning Committee in 
January 1975, on the recommendation of the Divisional Planning Officer43, and in 
July 1975 the Housing Committee asked the Planning Committee to re-zone the 
Moortown Centre site for residential use.44 That was not to be the end of the 
matter. The Housing Committee, concerned about empty and dilapidated property 
and looking to combat the shortage of residential land, made an offer to buy 
houses from Commercial Union, but decided that the price asked was too high.45 
In the end Commercial Union decided to demolish four houses on the site and 
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replace them with a block of flats.46 This was effectively the abandonment of a 
curious adventure. Leeds Council had clearly intended the Moortown site as the 
area for a district centre, and it was an integral part of their city-wide plans. They 
consistently backed the attempt by private capital to develop the centre, even 
through planning and political problems. Yet after over ten years of planning 
blight and uncertainty, and without any formal reappraisal of policy towards 
district centres, the Council politicians and bureaucracy seemed to slowly give up 
on the idea, almost seizing on an opportunity to drop the plans. The strange thing 
was that it was to be financial-legal problems that were to precipitate the end of 
the proposal and, while the political opposition may have contributed to the 
Council’s loss of interest, the feelings of local people had seemed to matter little 
for the preceding ten years.  
 
The council continued to promote the idea of a North Leeds district centre, and 
was to be more successful with a site at Moor Allerton adjacent to the outer ring 
road. As a result of these aspirations the planning committee recommended the 
refusal of an application to build a supermarket, warehouse and offices in 
Alwoodley, judging that the development ‘would result in a provision of 
shopping facilities in excess of those needed by residents and the plans conflicted 
with the city council’s policy of locating such facilities in district and local 
centres.’47 The final plans involved little more than a Sainsbury’s supermarket 
with a DIY shop, gardening centre, pub and library tagged on, but seemed 
popular with local politicians and the public. Conservative Councillor Keith 
Sibbald declared that the new centre ‘was the best thing to happen in Moortown 
since the church was built 100 years ago’48, while the final plans received the 
support of over 500 letters and two petitions with over 500 names, as against only 
28 objections.49 
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Significantly, the Moor Allerton proposals were vigorously opposed by local 
businesses and the Leeds Chamber of Trade. They claimed that it would cause 
traffic chaos; only help people with cars and be detrimental to local traders;50 
that there were already enough shops in the North Leeds area;51 and that it 
conflicted with the West Yorkshire Structure Plan that stated a ‘successful 
superstore development will need to be integrated with other shops and 
facilities.’52 Shopkeeper John Penn said that he ‘thought that a Tory-controlled 
council would support private shopkeepers.’53 This has echoes with the approach 
of the local Conservatives towards private landlords and slum clearance, and 
provides further evidence of a shift in preference towards broader economic 
interests and away from smaller private ownership when there was a conflict and 
where public opinion was less conservative in tone. Given the rather limited 
scope of the ‘Moor Allerton District Centre’, there is also the feeling that the 
wider social aspects of the approach to district centres had slipped away to be 
replaced by more narrowly defined economic and cultural aims. 
 
In most cases the district centres did actually come to fruition, though problems 
between the plan, private capital and realisation of the project were to be 
ubiquitous. In Hunslet, one of the areas of Leeds most wracked by slum 
clearance, a shortage of shops and facilities was to be acutely felt, particularly by 
residents in the newly-built Hunslet Grange flats.54 In July 1971 proposals to 
build Hunslet District Centre were accepted by the Planning Committee, 
including a supermarket, a store, a ‘bazaar’ and nineteen shops in a covered 
arcade.55 It was announced the following year that construction was expected to 
begin in summer 1973, and Planning Chairman, Karl Cohen, said that they were 
anxious that the most up-to-date and convenient shopping facilities should be 
provided, insisting that the centre should take the form of covered precincts.56 
Unfortunately, by June 1974 a deputation from Hunslet Action Group was asking 
the Council ‘…what are we to make of it when nearly all our shops have been 
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taken and closed, and now, in June 1974, we are told that nothing can be started 
at all because the development company has withdrawn?’57 Conservative 
Councillor Redmond blamed the Labour government’s new development taxes 
for retarding the Hunslet plans, though the Labour Deputy Planning Chairman, 
Councillor Prichard, put it down to ‘a failure of private enterprise’.58 These 
ideological arguments were to prove relatively barren, particularly as the council 
did not have the resources to develop the centre itself, and was forced to depend 
on attracting another prospective developer to provide the facility. Morrisons’ 
were then invited to develop a slightly scaled-down district centre.59 Negotiating 
directly with the supermarket that was planning to occupy the site proved to be 
more successful, and a ‘booming’ Hunslet District Centre opened in August 
1976.60 
 
Some of the proposed district centres were planned to link into the new road 
network that was envisaged to cut through residential Leeds. An example of this 
was in Harehills, where some local residents objected to the siting of the 
projected district centre and the clearance of property this would involve. They 
argued that many residents were elderly and would not get mortgages for other 
houses or afford council rents, that improvements grants had been given in the 
mid-1960s that envisaged ‘lives’ of 50 years for some properties, and that the 
development should be moved further south to areas of poorer housing.61 The 
council responded that there were no alternative options in the area ‘because of 
the critical requirements which would be needed to ensure the efficient 
functioning and economic viability of the district centre.’62 Added to this was the 
fact that the North-East Expressway was intended to pass immediately to the east 
of the centre, and was to link up with car parks and public open space within the 
complex.63 The inspector agreed with the council’s policy ‘of establishing district 
centres with vehicular traffic-free shopping precincts and associated uses’64, 
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judged that alternative areas too far from the existing shops would not be viable, 
and claimed that the houses affected by the shopping centre would be adversely 
affected by the North-East Expressway anyway, so might as well be demolished. 
This demonstrates that there was full official backing for planning of this scope 
and ambition, but also that the planning machinery was willing to subject local 
residents to upheaval for schemes that existed only on paper. Ultimately the 
residents suffered just from the effects of planning blight, as neither the district 
centre nor the expressway ever came to fruition.  
 
Leeds’ district centre programme represented an excellent example of the city’s 
modernisation agenda, and also demonstrated many of the problems this agenda 
caused and struggled to deal with. The emphasis on rationally designed shopping 
environments with covered precincts, ample car-parking facilities and separation 
of vehicles and pedestrians was designed to cater to trends that promised more 
convenience and comfort for consumers and the public. This was also coupled 
uneasily with attempts to provide social facilities and for shopping to satisfy 
community need. This produced some odd situations. At Bramley District Centre, 
developers wanted to ‘retain the village atmosphere of Bramley Town Street’, but 
this was belied somewhat by their inclusion of a ‘hypermarket’, three-storey 
office blocks and a 300 capacity car park.65 In Moortown, the Council’s desire to 
provide a facility that would cover the needs of a large area of North Leeds was 
overwhelmingly rejected by the local residents, who found the existing range of 
shops perfectly adequate and feared the disruption and destruction that would be 
caused by a large redevelopment project.  
 
The type of district centre that was seen as necessary to provide the requisite 
commercial and social facilities, while being compatible with the aims of private 
capital, ended up creating more difficulties when it came to the planning process. 
Where land needed to be acquired before construction could take place there were 
problems negotiating land purchases and with opposition from local property-
owners, as at Moortown. In areas where land had been cleared, such as Hunslet, 
trouble was caused by the deprivation of facilities while the site was waiting to be 
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developed. Private developers both needed the project to be profitable, and the 
financial situation to be favourable, before they would embark upon a scheme. 
Hunslet was effectively to be a victim of the collapse of the ‘Barber boom’ in the 
early 1970s, making land development less desirable from a business point of 
view. When the situation had been favourable for private capital, competition was 
intensified that often led to conflict between business and planning ends, as in the 
issue between Crossgates and Seacroft. Political issues did also impinge on the 
progress of the schemes. By the mid-1970s, with shortages of housing and a 
dearth of land for residential development, the council were eager not to lose fit 
housing stock, and at Harehills Leeds Planning Committee ultimately ‘decided to 
refuse any application which reduces the amount of residential accommodation in 
the area and any plan which would increase commercial use without providing 
adequate on-site parking.’66 This effectively killed the prospect of a district centre 
in the area. 
 
As far as shopping was concerned, the winds of change had some quite drastic 
effects on Leeds’ residential environment, public and private, old and new. The 
very slow pace when it came to bringing schemes into fruition caused planning 
blight in many areas, while making life more difficult for residents of other areas 
who almost entirely lacked shopping and social facilities for quite lengthy 
periods. The specifications and type of development that planners and developers 
held to be necessary was not often the kind that residents found desirable, despite 
efforts to incorporate many of the latest functions and designs. The nature of 
district centres also lacked the kind of gradual change that many traditional 
shopping centres had adapted to, and was much less amenable to changes in the 
financial, social and economic environment. A balance between local politics, 
planning imperatives, big business and market forces was a very difficult one to 
achieve.    
 
Stourton provides an excellent example of ideas relating to ‘zoning’ and the 
desirability of segregating ‘incompatible’ land uses. Stourton was a village on the 
southern edge of the Leeds conurbation, but which came under the responsibility 
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of Rothwell Urban District Council until the 1974 local government 
reorganisation. It was situated in the midst of industrial development and quite 
close to the new M1. A report from Leeds’ Director of Planning described 
Stourton as ‘a mixture of unfit housing, relatively new housing, vacant houses, 
derelict industrial property, degraded land, manufacturing industry and heavily-
trafficked roads.’67 This unflattering description of the area prepared the ground 
for the report’s recommendations—the council was to acquire Stourton’s housing 
and clear it in preparation for forthcoming industrial development.  
 
Council officers had already informed residents that they saw no role for 
residential redevelopment in Stourton, and declared that the community was 
already declining due to the clearance of unfit housing, the growth of traffic and 
the spread of industry and dereliction.68 Most of the remaining dwellings were 
included in the Housing Clearance Programme, and when they were demolished 
there would be no replacement of shopping facilities, and the branch library 
would be withdrawn.69 The report declared emphatically that ‘there is little doubt 
that the appropriate use of all land in Stourton in the long term is for industry; it 
is located in an industrial area, major industrial concerns abut the area, and 
residential development has been shown to be undesirable.’70 After considering 
future options, the report advised the acquisition of all housing by the council 
through agreement and compulsory purchase, though no industrial development 
was to begin on the site until all houses had been demolished. Residents would be 
rehoused at the new Sussex Avenue estate in nearby Hunslet, or at Rothwell. 
 
Naturally, some Stourton residents were unhappy at the prospect of having their 
village wiped out, even if it was sold as something of a ‘mercy killing’. Stourton 
Residents’ Association claimed that thousands of pounds had been spent by 
Rothwell UDC as recently as 1974, improving houses to provide an extra thirty 
years of ‘life’.71 The Stourton Residents’ Association also alleged that the area 
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had deteriorated rapidly since its ‘takeover’ by Leeds City Council, and were 
backed by the local MP and the Rothwell ward councillor, who stated that they 
had spent a lot of time trying to persuade the planning committee to bring some 
residential development to the area.72 These arguments were complicated by the 
emergence of another local group, the Stourton-Idas Pre-Allocation Group. These 
were residents who responded to the carrot offered by the council of modern 
houses in nearby Sussex Avenue, and were campaigning to have the Housing 
Department extend the pre-allocation schemes to Stourton.73 They countered the 
arguments of the Stourton Residents’ Association by claiming that the houses in 
the Idas clearance area were damp due to water seepage into cellars, snails had 
infested some homes, and there were no longer any facilities for children to 
play.74 A reprieve for large sections of Stourton’s housing would jeopardise their 
chances of moving into the new houses at Hunslet. Thus there was some tension 
among the community, with some trying desperately to save the village and 
others seeking to make the most of an opportunity to benefit from the situation.  
 
The Idas Compulsory Purchase Order was upheld by the Department for the 
Environment, who agreed that the houses had structural defects and that the area 
was ‘likely to become progressively less suitable for residential purposes.’75 A 
judgement from an inquiry the following year did complicate matters when 
houses in Armitage Terrace were assessed as fit, even though thirty-one 
surrounding houses were to be knocked down. In this case the tenants were 
dismayed, claiming that they were damp and had been ruined through lack of 
repair. The council asserted that it would continue to pursue the acquisition of the 
houses through negotiation with the owner, proprietor of a garage that adjoined 
the row.76 The demise of Stourton had proved to be a relatively slow business, 
even after its death sentence had been proclaimed. The village did finally seem to 
be doomed when local people divided so sharply between those who wanted 
regeneration and others who were happy to make a fresh start. The latter position 
was undoubtedly a response in part to the decline of the area, which does seem to 
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have been influenced by a policy of neglect that stretched back before 1974. The 
feeling amongst planners and some residents clearly appears to have been that 
Stourton was an ‘old-fashioned’ environment, and not worth the effort of 
regeneration as a community when it was more favourably situated for industry.  
 
The Little London area was an example of another district where housing and 
industry were intermixed, though here, in the inner city, it was to be residential 
functions and road development that would take precedence. At an inquiry into a 
Compulsory Purchase Order at Camp Road, a factory owner objected to the idea 
of zoning areas on the basis of residences only, claiming that it ‘is that conception 
which has made much of the outskirts of Leeds a dreary waste of houses.’77 
Leeds’ representative countered by saying that the area was becoming an eyesore 
and that it was not desirable that new housing development should be 
interspersed with industry.78 In 1961 Leeds Chamber of Commerce also objected 
to the council’s plans in the area because they felt the amount of land available 
for industrial purposes in Leeds was insufficient.79 The council responded by 
stating that industry would ‘reduce the amenities of the new high density housing 
developments.’80 At another later inquiry in the same area the owner of a local 
print works objected that businesses in the area would find it extremely difficult 
to find suitable accommodation at a reasonable rent, as the council had not made 
adequate provision for the displacement of small businesses, preferring to 
develop industrial estates on the outskirts of Leeds and blocks of offices in the 
city centre. He claimed that this caused prohibitively high rents or difficulty in 
recruiting employees willing to travel.81 The council’s decisions were affected by 
their desire to see North Street become a one-way traffic artery out of the city 
centre, and the continued existence of shopping, industrial and warehouse 
facilities was not thought to be desirable.82 Ironically, the slowness of bringing 
road plans to fruition meant that many of North Street’s shops survived through 
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the 1970s, and when Housing Chairman Peter Sparling declared that the street 
was one of the worst eyesores in Leeds, he blamed West Yorkshire County 
Council’s delay in road proposals and said that areas on the east side of North 
Street would be cleared and offered for light industrial units.83  
 
Leeds’ policy was in line with the principles of the 1951 Development Plan, if 
not always the detail. Many of the areas that were to be zoned for industry 
contained older, ‘sub-standard’ back-to-back houses, which made it easier to 
justify their clearance. The benefits of segregation to an improved living 
environment was often held to be the reason behind zoning, but it was also 
judged as important in an industrial town to create room for expansion of existing 
industries and to provide space for larger units that could be more productive and 
efficient.84 These attitudes also led to a disregard for many of the older, smaller 
businesses such as those in the Camp Road area, albeit not necessarily 
consciously focused on them. There was the problem here that, as with other 
factors, economic conditions tended to change quickly and in a way that town 
planners could not control or even foresee at times. In the post-war ‘boom’ it was 
assumed that Leeds would remain an industrial city, and economic changes 
would be more likely to require more provision for services such as offices and 
retail rather than hastening the process of deindustrialisation which became 
apparent in the 1970s. When this decline occurred it affected many of the 
industrial areas that had been designated by the development plan, and like many 
of the residential areas that had been wracked by planning blight, these 
environments often assumed a rather dead and deserted feel.      
 
Traffic and roads were to prove both a major problem but also an opportunity for 
town planners and local authorities. The extensive increase in car ownership and 
usage in the post-war era meant that roads needed to be created and improved in 
order to relieve massive congestion, and Leeds featured as a case study in the 
influential Buchanan Report on traffic in urban areas, published in 1963.85 On the 
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other hand, mass car ownership and faster communications were central themes 
of modernity, and Leeds was keen to capitalise on this image by tagging itself 
‘Motorway City of the Seventies’. Whether new roads were seen as a difficulty to 
be surmounted or a chance to seize the future, attempts to deal with traffic would 
inevitably have a major impact on areas of housing. Roadbuilding schemes were 
an excellent example of the effects of planning blight and uncertainty on 
residential areas. They had a long period between the process of planning and 
construction, projected routes could be altered many times before they were 
finally commenced, and road schemes were very sensitive to financial trends, 
which led to frequent postponements and changes in format. Leeds’ plans for its 
road network were extensive. Along with the Inner Ring Road and the extension 
of the M1 and M621 into the heart of the city, there were proposals for a ‘North-
East Urban Motorway’, ‘North-East Expressway’, Harehills bypass and ‘Halton 
Expressway’ that would take traffic through the inner suburbs to the edge of the 
city. The classic embodiment of the confusion that road proposals caused was to 
be the saga of the Headingley bypass. 
 
A Headingley bypass had been mooted as early as 1937. Otley Road was 
traditionally one of the busiest traffic arteries in the city, taking vehicles through 
a busy residential and subsequently student-dominated suburb, and leading to 
developing commuter areas in the north of Leeds. In 1937 the bypass was 
intended to be restricted to avoiding the relatively short stretch of Otley Road 
between North Lane and St. Michael’s Church. This was judged to be necessary 
as it was felt that widening the road was essential, but its limited nature was also 
justified as anyone ‘interested in amenities’ should be ‘loth to destroy’ the 
character of the old village centre.86 This supplies some evidence that 
conservation of Victorian buildings was on the agenda before the 1960s. Plans for 
a bypass were accordingly included in the 1951 City Development Plan in the 
‘second period’, which was from six years after the plan approval up to 1971.87  
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The problems that the council faced with bypass plans in Headingley were that 
there was no route that would avoid a great degree of disruption to local housing, 
and that the plans were staunchly opposed by many educated and professional 
people who were only too willing to put legal and procedural channels to their 
full use.88 The ‘Headingley Fly-over By-pass Opposition Committee’ was 
horrified by the thought of a flyover passing through the suburb,89 even though 
the City Engineer insisted that the bypass would only take the form of a flyover 
for a short length, mostly resting on a landscaped embankment.90 Protestors 
claimed that it was not a ‘by-pass’ at all, but a road passing through the middle of 
the suburb.91 At the 1964 Public Local Inquiry on the bypass proposals the City 
Engineer’s arguments were questioned and criticised by an engineering lecturer, a 
chartered surveyor and a traffic engineer, the last of whom had been engaged by 
local residents.92 The objections were made on the grounds that proposals had not 
been adequately based on traffic movements and, as expected, that they would 
‘cause substantial devaluation and loss of amenity to properties flanking the 
road.’93 The arguments were made so strongly that Leeds’ solicitor suggested that 
the objectors were unfairly questioning the expertise of the City Engineer.94 
Nevertheless, Leeds’ 1964 plans were refused as they were judged to fall short of 
the standards of the Buchanan Report and impose ‘a more severe detriment to the 
amenities of Headingley than was necessary.’95 Suggestions made by inspectors, 
such as putting the road in a cutting, were regarded as adding massive extra costs 
by local planners.96 
 
The council declared that further plans would be drawn up, a fact that was 
bemoaned by a local estate agent and leading member of the Headingley 
Residents’ Association, Edgar Firth, who claimed that residents would be kept in 
suspense for years to come.97 The issue of the bypass continued to be a cause for 
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controversy throughout the 1970s. Detailed proposals were drawn up again in 
1973 for a dual carriageway bypass, this time to be sited in a cutting.98 Edgar 
Firth held his own ‘counter-exhibition’ against the plans.99 Headingley Residents’ 
Association were to receive support in their opposition from such organisations 
as the Leeds branch of the Society for Social Responsibility in Science100 and 
even transportation studies carried out by West Yorkshire Metropolitan Council 
recommended that the bypass be scrapped if other traffic flow measures were 
successful.101 The fact that the new West Yorkshire authority, created in 1974, 
had taken over control of trunk roads meant that an extra complication was added 
to the situation, and plans were constantly changed and postponed in the unstable 
economic environment. In June 1976 a public meeting of Headingley residents 
heard that bypass work would not start until 1980/81 at the earliest102, while 
Leeds Planning Committee approved a scaled down bypass scheme the following 
month described by the Director of Planning as ‘more modest in scale and impact 
on properties and environment.’103 Seven Residents’ Associations that were 
affected by the proposals formed a group called the A660 Joint Council, and 
delivered a petition urging greater consultation from West Yorkshire County 
Council.104 Local Conservative Councillor Alan Pedley was more direct when he 
claimed that ‘full, genuine consultation’ would mean that ‘if the feelings of local 
people were taken fully into account, the scheme would be dropped.’105 While not 
heeding this call, the WYCC could not ignore the increasingly poor financial 
situation, and after the scheme had been recategorised as low priority the HRA 
bemoaned the fact that empty buildings had been ‘left to rot’ due to planning 
blight, and urged that they be relet.106  
 
The Headingley bypass scheme demonstrates some of the contradictions and 
illogicality that often accompanied the planning process. It was judged by 
planners and political leaders as an utmost necessity and an inevitable part of 
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modern life, yet was constantly postponed and revised, and had still not come to 
fruition more than forty years after the initial proposals had been made. The 
bypass was also vehemently opposed by local residents who were supposed to be 
some of the main beneficiaries of the scheme, and it is noticeable in the 1970s 
how they reacted to many of the postponements of the scheme by urging its 
complete cancellation in the interests of clarifying the future of the area. Their 
opposition was undoubtedly aided by the presence of many figures who had the 
education, influence and social skills to ‘work the system’. The level of 
opposition and the middle-class roots of many figures involved in it did change 
attitudes of the local politicians. Conservative councillors in the 1970s were more 
in line with the opinions of the local population than their counterpart in 1963, 
Mrs Cardno, who told a protest meeting attended by 800 people that ‘this by-pass 
is for your good.’107 The struggle did at least contribute toward the postponements 
and revisions to the bypass plans, but it never succeeded in causing a 
cancellation. It was the gap between ambition and funding rather than 
consideration for popular feeling that was ultimately to prevent a commencement 
of the scheme.  
 
Headingley by-pass was to be the most long-running affair relating to roads, and 
the one which elicited most popular opposition, but other proposals left their 
impact. In January 1968 the Yorkshire Evening Post reported on residents in 
Hunslet who were told that their homes were in the path of the South-Eastern 
Urban Motorway and would be demolished. They complained that they were not 
told when this would happen, and that their rents would double after they were 
moved.108 This discontent seemed more to be based on the procedures adopted 
and lack of information provided by the council rather than any real opposition to 
the proposals. At the local inquiry of April 1968 into the South-Eastern Urban 
Motorway there were only two objectors.109 This particular proposal represented 
one of the most important road schemes, the extension of the M1 into the centre 
of Leeds, and as such was constructed in the 1970s. Other road schemes of lesser 
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prominence were to fare differently, though not without causing a stir in certain 
areas.  
 
A redeveloped system of major roads was an important part of Leeds’ 
development plan in the 1960s, and by the early 1970s a number of new roads 
were on the drawing board. The ones that caused most problems were the North-
East Urban Motorway and North-East Expressway, which were designed to take 
traffic round the east of the city centre and through the inner-city area of 
Harehills, and the Halton Expressway, which would effectively bypass York and 
Selby Roads. The North-East Urban Motorway was alleged to require the 
demolition of part of Quarry Hill Flats and the construction of an elevated section 
passing close to the historic Leeds Parish Church.110 The Leeds branch of the 
Conservationist Society also claimed that the new road would add to air pollution 
in the city and divert money from public transport.111 In Halton an ‘Anti-
Expressway Action Group’ had been formed to oppose the route of the road 
through the edge of the suburb, with some success. In October 1973 the Planning 
Committee decided that the current route would be ‘unreasonable and 
unacceptable’, mainly due to the amount of heavy traffic that would use the road. 
They recommended that a new route be substituted that passed further south.112 
The revised proposals still affected housing in Richmond Hill and Cross Green, 
and residents demanded confirmation that their houses would be demolished, 
claiming that there had been uncertainty ‘for 12 years.’113 There was just time for 
protest meetings to be held before the new West Yorkshire County Council 
announced the abandonment of the North-East Urban Motorway and the 
postponement of others, including the Halton Expressway.114 This was due to 
government spending cuts however, so apart from the concession provided to 
Halton residents through the alteration of the route of the expressway, concern for 
public opinion had been relatively unimportant. This was possibly testament to 
the vital importance that policy-makers gave in this era to ‘solving’ the problem 
of traffic.  
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Following the Buchanan Report of 1963, in 1965 Leeds became involved in a 
joint study with the Ministry of Transport and the MHLG ‘to consider the 
application of integrated parking, traffic management and public transport 
policies within the framework of land-use planning, and to consider the design 
and improvement of environmental areas from which extraneous traffic could be 
excluded as a result of these policies.’115 The findings, published in 1969, were 
based on some policies that had already been carried out in Leeds, notably on the 
new Whinmoor housing estate.116 New residential areas were to be planned on the 
basis of local centres and transport termini, from which a system of pedestrian 
ways would radiate, separated from access roads for servicing and parking.117 The 
density of housing would be governed by proximity to these transport termini, 
with ‘the massing of development around public transport termini or loading 
points to assist in creating conditions most suitable for the use of public transport 
to work journeys.’118 This was also held to be advantageous in providing variety 
‘in the grouping of buildings and the use of space and contour which can 
contribute a great deal to the pleasure of living in such estates.’119 In established 
residential areas it was thought that the separation of main routes from shopping 
areas would provide the opportunity to develop pedestrian precincts, though it 
was added ‘this may well have to be evolutionary in character with interim 
facilities for servicing.’120 Some thought was also given to approaches towards 
reorganising vehicle access, parking and landscaping in improvement areas, and 
an experiment to assess this was created with the two Ministries at Burley Lodge 
Road.121 
 
The most significant road project to be fulfilled was the Inner Ring Road. This 
had been included in the first Development Plan and earmarked for the ‘second 
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period’, between 1961 and 1971.122 The scheme was agreed by the Town 
Planning and Improvements Committee in 1961,123 approved by the Minister of 
Transport in 1963,124 and construction began in the following year. Despite the 
fact that the project involved the demolition of 340 houses and 170 other 
properties,125 opposition was minimal, possibly due to the fact that much was old, 
unfit and likely to be cleared anyway. One of the major construction feats of the 
Inner Ring Road was the creation of a ‘precinct’ bridging the road cutting and 
connecting the University of Leeds with the Leeds General Infirmary and the rest 
of the city centre. This was part of an arrangement between the council and the 
university authorities, and was part of the University of Leeds Development Plan 
formulated in 1960.126  
 
The university’s previous plan, devised in 1927, was nearing completion by the 
late 1950s, and the University Senate felt that the number of students was likely 
to rise dramatically by the late 1960s.127 As a result, the prestigious architects 
Chamberlain, Powell and Bon were invited to produce a plan that would cover 
this expansion. As far as the Inner Ring Road was concerned, they urged that ‘if 
the proposed traffic route is inviolable there only remains the possibility of 
reducing the divisive effect of a new road while retaining its necessary function 
as a traffic artery’.128 Consequently, they discussed the matter with Leeds’ City 
Engineer and recommended that the new road should be constructed below 
ground so that the university and city centre could be linked. They felt that the 
ease of communication and the use of the ground above the underpass would 
cancel out the extra expense incurred, considerations that impressed the 
university authorities enough for them to agree to pay most of the extra cost of 
the tunnel.129 The most important precondition for the development of the 
university was the acquisition of enough land to enable it to expand. 
Arrangements had already been made by the university to buy up houses in the 
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area, and the city’s first Development Plan zoned an area for university purposes, 
but Chamberlain, Powell and Bon declared that much would depend on the future 
planning of the area and ‘on the rehousing by the city authorities of the occupants 
 
Inner Ring Road construction, Woodhouse Lane, 1965. The houses in the middle distance were 
also soon to be bulldozed. (WYAS, Leeds, LC/ENG/376/11/no. 1) 
 
of the obsolete houses in the area adjacent to the present University precinct.’130 
This was important as they felt that more space was required than had currently 
been zoned for university use, and recommended that permission be sought for 
extensions of the zoning in the forthcoming review of the Development Plan.131 
In addition, they recognised that much of the area that was likely to be 
represented as unfit was inadequate even for the needs of the immediate term, and 
                                                          
130 University of Leeds, University of Leeds Development Plan (1960) p.29 
131 Ibid. 
222 
 
urged that the City Council be persuaded to use its powers under the Town and 
Country Planning Acts to secure a wider area.132 The council’s acquiescence in 
this was, therefore, a vital part in the University of Leeds’ future plans, even 
though the proposals were overambitious and not all of the land acquired was 
subsequently redeveloped. Civic development was a major part of Leeds City 
Council’s ambitions, and the loss of an established residential area was judged to 
be a small price to pay for progress in the educational and transportation 
attributes of the city. 
 
Open space and recreational facilities were judged to be very important by the 
planning profession in the post-war era, and even when faced by shortages of 
land they were always treated as essential parts of any residential development. 
This was to be one of the main reasons why so many planners were keen to utilise 
high rise housing, as it enabled the provision of more public space on the ground 
than the traditional two-storey terraces or semi-detached houses with gardens. 
The value of public open space on one particular redevelopment site was outlined 
by Leeds’ Assistant Chief Planner in 1970 as having a threefold use, ‘for visual 
amenity, for playing fields, and also as a spatial buffer between the new 
residential development to the west and the industrial area to the east.’133 The 
provision and use of this open space was often to prove controversial in practice. 
Many residents were disappointed that the incorporation of open space in 
redeveloped areas often led to depopulation and dispersal of people, especially 
when these areas were close to existing parks. Planning open space into 
developments also did not guarantee how that space was to be used. At times of 
financial shortage promised landscaping did not always take place and grassed 
areas often were not maintained regularly, which led to accumulation of litter and 
weeds. Some of the more unusual sources of trouble for housing managers were 
playgrounds. Many parents campaigned for the inclusion of play facilities in new 
estates, but other residents found them to be a nuisance, and in many different 
areas of the city there were to be boisterous campaigns for the resiting or removal 
of these playgrounds.   
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Statements such as the one above from the Assistant Chief Planner were 
relatively rare. Assertions of the need for open space, and associated terms such 
as ‘environmental improvement’ and ‘external amenity’, were common, but their 
merits seem to have been considered to be self-evident. Thus areas of open space 
were included as standard in every layout drawn up for new developments. This 
was not always accepted by the inhabitants of many clearance areas. In 
Woodhouse the community association argued that ‘grass verges are salutory 
(sic), but whole fields of grass as appear on the plans depriving the future 
Woodhouse of population potential are not necessary.’134 The Rev. Simpson, 
leading a deputation to the council, described why this was so when he pointed 
out that Woodhouse itself needed no more than a minimum of open space when it 
was bounded ‘by the greenery of Sugarwell Mount, Woodhouse Ridge, and 
Woodhouse Moor.’135 The orthodoxy also did not go completely unchallenged in 
the higher echelons of the council and, in his attempts to get green belt 
restrictions relaxed, Karl Cohen remarked ‘that the amount of open space 
allocated in the Development Plan is far more than any other town’s’.136 This was 
to be a vain pursuit of Cohen’s though. In a ‘Review of Land for Housing’ in 
1956 it had been commented that the council was proud of the fact that Leeds had 
a greater proportion of open space than most other cities.137 
 
One of the more concrete benefits of increasing the amount of open space was 
thought to be the opportunity to provide extra play areas for children. Areas of 
back-to-back housing did not even have rear alleys for children to play in, and by 
the 1960s motor cars were proliferating. After an inquiry into a compulsory 
purchase order in the Woodhouse area, one of the main reasons the inspector 
gave for condemning the houses was ‘the absence of any private space attached 
to the houses which compels children to play in the streets.’138  Play spaces, and 
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often playgrounds themselves, were usually included in plans for new housing or 
in the environmental improvement of older areas, and where this was not the case 
there were frequently calls from parents for a playground to be provided. Not all 
residents considered playgrounds to be a benefit though. At the new Holborn 
Gardens development in Woodhouse three small play areas had been provided for 
toddlers, ‘but tenants residing in the immediate vicinity of these play areas claim 
continuous noise and annoyance.’139 Demands were made for resiting the areas, 
and the matter went as far as discussions with local councillors and the 
Woodhouse Community Association.140 At the same time, identical problems 
were occurring at the Hunslet Hall Estate. A complaint about a play area led to a 
survey producing a hundred per cent vote for its removal and the council was to 
substitute a landscaped area for it.141 This was followed by complaints about play 
areas on the Cottingley estate, and more problems at Hunslet Hall. A play area at 
the junction of Bismark Street and Bismark Drive was removed, but a petition 
was signed by 40 tenants at the other end of Bismark Drive complaining about 
the lack of play facilities in the area.142 In another part of the area a climbing 
frame was provided in a courtyard area where children could be supervised, but 
within two days five complaints had been received about it.143 At times the 
problems seemed somewhat odd. At Whinmoor, residents were campaigning for 
the removal of climbing frames because older children were using them to peep 
into bedrooms. A spokesman for the housing department said the ‘the public 
demands facilities but doesn’t want them near the houses. Whatever we do is 
bound to be a little bit wrong.’144  
 
The council was understandably exasperated about these difficulties, and the 
issue could create real divisions, in particular at the Pepper Lane pre-allocation 
scheme in Hunslet, where the residents’ association was involved in the selection 
and siting of a play area that was subsequently removed, and had ‘incurred a 
certain amount of odium.’145 The housing department had hoped that the 
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residents’ association would consider establishing themselves as a form of co-
operative, but members had been put off by this episode and the abuse received, 
and seemed happier to leave controversial decisions to the council.146 In some 
ways these instances could be regarded as evidence of residents exerting some 
control over their environment, but it was a very negative form of influence that 
impacted adversely on other inhabitants. Such a seemingly small issue creating 
such rancour is representative of many of the tensions of this period. Provision of 
children’s facilities was one of the more enlightened examples of the council’s 
paternalism, but their intentions were frustrated and the problem became a much 
more political one than was anticipated. The practicalities of ‘collective 
consumption’ had again come under pressure from private concerns.  
 
 
Planning theory and practice after the Second World War put great emphasis on 
providing improved environments and facilities for residential areas, and also 
prioritised the segregation and reallocation of land uses that were judged to be 
harmful, inefficient or incompatible. These aims often created problems. One of 
the main difficulties was that the realisation of these ambitions required extensive 
redevelopment of areas of the city, with all the disruption this would cause. 
Coupled with this was the fact that the provision and development of roads, 
industry, shopping facilities and open space involved a range of groups and 
interests. While the local authority dominated the process of clearance and 
redevelopment in the field of housing, when it came to these other functions there 
was much more of an onus placed on business and commerce to provide finance 
and initiate construction, and greater co-ordination required between the 
development of shopping, roads and housing to ensure that the aims of the 
council’s development plans were achieved.   
 
This was another area in which wider political input was limited. Party politics 
generally left events to the planners, unless a particular issue provided a symbol 
for rare ideological point-scoring, as in the case of Seacroft Town Centre and its 
administration. Local councillors did become involved where a cause affected a 
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critical mass of their constituents, as at Moortown and Headingley, but this had at 
best a merely negative impact, and it is probably reasonable to say that where 
developments were postponed or cancelled this was largely due to financial or 
commercial reasons rather than as a political response. Political opposition also 
tended to be less clear-cut. It was more focused when the lack of a service was 
experienced, as at Seacroft and Hunslet before their district centres were built, 
and also in the immediate environs of road proposals. In fields such as open space 
and playground facilities attempts by planners to meet the demands of some 
residents elicited quite a vehement response from others. At Stourton, the 
attempts of one group of residents to save what they saw as their community was 
answered by another group who wished to seize the opportunity to improve their 
conditions by relocating elsewhere. Even without a top-down planning structure 
some of these conflicts of interest and opinion would have been difficult to 
reconcile. As it was, the fact that the development plan framework and the 
professional and ideological environment that the planners were operating in 
tended to be so free from political input, meant that issues could be aggravated at 
local level when it came to the implementation of planning decisions. As with the 
issues that directly affected housing provision, the response was ultimately for the 
local authority to pull back from a lot of its attempts to regulate the built and 
social environment. Once again, the state regrouped and narrowed its focus and, 
as a consequence, collective political action was left frustrated and lacking a firm 
institutional basis when confronted by forces that it was either unwilling or 
unable to control.   
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Conclusion 
 
 
Pottery Vale, Leek Street Flats, 1983. (Leeds Library and Information Service, www.leodis.net) 
In 1983 Leeds City Council bowed to the inevitable and demolished Leek Street 
Flats. Given that the ill-fated estate had survived twenty-five years fewer even 
than Quarry Hill Flats, it would be tempting to see it as emblematic of Leeds’ 
post-war housing policy and as evidence of failure in the city’s attempts to 
modernise itself. Such a view, however, would come too close to the ideological 
approach to urban history. Judging the transformation of Leeds’ residential 
environment in terms of the propagation and reputation of slogans, clichés, 
schemes and designs would be to miss out on many of the underlying forces that 
both drove and constrained the whole process of change.  
 
This thesis has looked at an essential period in the history of Leeds’ post-war 
built environment and its main aims have been to assess the impact on urban 
policy of concepts of modernisation, to examine how urban change within Leeds 
affected the relationships between the state and the citizenry, and to consider the 
main constraints faced by various actors in urban politics, both in political 
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institutions and at an informal level. It has also aimed to link Leeds’ experience 
with broader trends that led something of a crisis in state provision and 
governance by the 1970s. In doing this, the thesis has engaged with a number of 
arguments on these particular issues. There have been those such as 
Shapely1,Ravetz2, and Dennis3 who have argued wholeheartedly against post-war 
housing policy and planning from the opinion that it represented an elite 
consensus that was harmful to pre-existing urban communities and also 
intervened in a counter-productive way that was unable to either achieve its aims 
or recognise its limits. While this thesis acknowledges many of the shortcomings 
of planning processes, the problem with these kind of views is that they offer an 
excessively ideological approach and make little effort to reflect on the political 
roots of the state’s role or the effects of wider socio-economic factors on urban 
change.      
 
More nuanced critiques of the role of the state and planning, with much greater 
consideration of the broader political and socio-economic context, have been 
given by Glendinning and Muthesius4, Gibson and Langstaff5, Castells6, and 
Dunleavy7. These analyses tend to approach urban politics and planning from a 
less ideas-focused and ideological point of view, looking beyond much of the 
style and rhetoric to uncover the role of planning and urban policy as part of 
broader functions in politics and society. Where they might fall short is in 
minimising the role of agency to some extent, and not looking more closely at the 
actual role that many ideological arguments played in the urban political struggle. 
This thesis has aimed to extend the political focus adopted by many of these 
works by examining the conceptions of the city of Leeds that were held by 
political actors at all levels and addressing the issue of how different views of the 
city’s image and role affected attitudes to modernisation and urban change. 
 
                                                          
1 Shapely, The Politics of Housing: Power, Consumers and Urban Culture 
2 Ravetz, Remaking Cities; Ravetz, The Housing Poor  
3 Dennis, People and Planning; Dennis, Public Participation and Planner’s Blight 
4 Glendinning and Muthesius, Tower Block 
5 Gibson and Langstaff, An Introduction to Urban Renewal 
6 Castells, City, Class and Power 
7 Dunleavy, Urban Political Analysis 
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Many of the above works are contemporary or quite dated, but two valuable 
sources of analysis that are recent and feature Leeds as a case study have been 
provided by Kefford8 and Ellis9. Both have provided excellent insights into Leeds 
post-war urban politics. In addition, Kefford has developed the critique of the 
post-war local state by concentrating on its role as a promoter of economic 
growth and as a catalyst to private consumption, while Ellis has given a detailed 
description of the fortunes of community groups during this period, tracing their 
rise and fall and studying their limitations and legacy. Kefford’s argument that 
local authorities were intensively involved in promoting the transformation of 
their built environment in response to concerns over economic competition and 
the promotion of an image of modernity is a compelling one, and is well 
buttressed by his descriptions of the protestations of some of the people who felt 
that they were likely to suffer as a result. Ellis provides an excellent analysis of 
how many of those who were discontented with urban policy acted collectively, 
but ultimately how they were intrinsically too weak and insufficiently focused 
organisationally vis-à-vis the council, central government and broader economic 
factors to provide a political solution to many of the democratic problems 
associated with urban planning in this period. Both deal comprehensively with 
certain facets of urban politics—the state-driven restructuring of urban space in 
favour of private consumption and the impact of community action groups, 
respectively—which provide some thematic overlap with this work. This thesis, 
however, looks at residential spaces in Leeds with a view to broader planning and 
political strategies and visions, paying greater attention to policy and decision-
making within the council itself and putting the behaviour of political actors at all 
levels in the fullest possible context. While sharing many of the misgivings of 
Kefford and Ellis as to the nature of urban policy, this thesis pays more attention 
to understanding the roots of planning behaviour and political decision-making. 
In addition, it has aimed to add to our knowledge of planning and politics in 
Leeds and urban change at a national level by examining the concept of 
modernisation as an example of conflicting views of the future of the city and as 
                                                          
8 Kefford, ‘Constructing the Affluent Citizen’ 
9 Ellis, ‘Pavement Politics’ 
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a study of what the changing face of urban politics and planning in this period 
tells us about the nature of the state and its relationship with the populace.   
 
Urban environments in the post-war era were heavily affected by the context of 
rapid socio-economic change and the various adjustments that needed to be made 
to the infrastructure of everyday life. These adjustments were quite far-reaching 
and more intensive than previous interventions. This was largely due to a mass 
politics that insisted on higher levels and standards of state provision, and to a 
changing economy which required a greater degree of state involvement to 
improve transport, commercial and industrial infrastructure, stimulate greater 
consumer spending, and ensure a more healthy, educated and mobile workforce. 
As Castells described, this context required the creation of a system of ‘collective 
consumption’, and this increase in collectivism was a noted feature of urban 
change in the 1950s and 1960s. The problems that were to affect urban policy in 
the 1970s were rooted in the incomplete nature of this collectivism and the 
inability of state involvement to find an effective and adequately broad political 
basis for its schemes. 
 
As we have seen in Leeds, residential environments were only partly under the 
influence of ‘collective consumption’. The drastic decline in privately rented 
housing was accompanied by a significant increase in owner-occupation as well 
as public housing, and while planners were legally obliged to regulate land use, 
most land remained in private hands. The non-housing aspects of residential 
Leeds were also significantly affected by private economic interests in such areas 
as construction, property development, industry and retail, and there was a clear 
outlook on the part of politicians, administrators and planners that the city 
required a strong economy, was competing with other places, and thus had to 
satisfy the needs of business and the ‘model’ consumer. This put private interests 
in a strong bargaining position, and it was often difficult to extend processes of 
collective consumption against particular private actors even when collective 
action might improve the broader urban economy. 
 
This tension between collective and individual interest was also evident in 
political responses to urban change. Within urban politics the interests of the 
231 
 
collective were effectively represented through the council, which consisted of 
both elected and unelected actors. Given problems of accountability, low 
electoral turnout, professional status and procedural bureaucracy, the legitimacy 
of the council to speak for the public as a collective was always shaky and was to 
become more problematic the more the local authority intervened in urban life. 
Technocratic methods of local governance tended to maintain a certain distance 
from the population as a whole, and the connections between formal local politics 
and the opinions and interests of the public were often tenuous. This led to 
increasing suspicion and incomprehension between state and citizenry. The scale 
and pace of change provoked a broadening array of opposition, from those such 
as homeowners who were threatened by slum clearance or road proposals through 
to people who feared upheaval and uncertainty or wanted more control over their 
living conditions. Arguments for the necessity of adapting to the future were 
countered by those who preferred the familiarity of the past, and the desirability 
of continuing to modernise Leeds was a major dividing point. While this 
opposition to technocracy and modernisation undermined the credibility of local 
authority policy during the 1970s, it remained rather unfocused and was never 
able to provide an effective political alternative. Thus its legacy was quite 
negative and, at the very least, helped to provide an excuse for the rolling back of 
modernisation.  
 
When the increasing political problems of ‘collective consumption’ were 
compounded by greater financial restraints, the state at national and local levels 
began to pull back from many of its newly acquired responsibilities. In the 
immediate term this led to more strife between the council and opposition groups, 
but as the local authority did less it also reduced expectations and provoked a 
more individual response from the public and from private interests. Sales of 
public land and council housing could satisfy the interests of some people, while 
even council tenants and those on the housing waiting list became more willing to 
pursue their private ambitions both within and outside of the council procedural 
machinery. The scaling back of ‘collective consumption’ may well have pleased 
many people who benefitted materially or those who felt threatened by state 
intervention, but it effectively acted as a substitute for political action and 
reduced mass influence on the state. Many of the contradictions involved in a 
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situation of incomplete ‘collective consumption’ were effectively resolved by a 
depoliticization of issues relating to the urban environment and a more narrow 
and parsimonious focus by the state on those judged most in need. This mirrored 
many of the wider aspects of socio-economic life in the 1970s and 1980s.        
     
 
Arguments and debates both for and against modernisation and urban change did 
have an influence on urban policy within Leeds during this period. They 
represented attempts to mobilise and manipulate public and elite opinion, and 
also reflected the often sincere motivations and emotions of politicians, 
bureaucrats, campaigners and ‘ordinary’ members of the public. Significantly, 
these ideas and opinions both constituted the discourse of ‘real’ conflicts of 
interest and determinants of change, as well as cloaking much of the context of 
urban policy. Focusing on architecture and the physical shape of the city could 
bring forward concerns about the control and shape of the built environment, but 
also ignore many of the issues that were to affect the face of residential Leeds. 
Both sides of the ‘modernisation’ argument made their favoured types of building 
the embodiment of wider qualities and attributes. In response to the claims of 
planners and architects that modern housing and its broader environment could 
bring about a healthier, more content population and harmonious social 
relationships, ‘traditionalists’ made the Leeds back-to-back a veritable ideal 
home, ‘compact, low-cost, easily run accommodation for which the demand is 
great’10 and perfect for a transient population as well as the ultimate symbol of a 
settled community.11  
 
As a result, it is important to see the attempts both to modernise and to preserve 
Leeds as part of broader political and social processes, and as a response within 
Leeds and by Leeds’ political and bureaucratic institutions to adjust to wider 
environmental factors. These factors provided the potential and the impetus to 
rebuild and improve vast areas of Leeds in line with modern ideas and standards. 
At other times they retarded efforts at modernisation and triggered political 
                                                          
10 Leeds Civic Trust, Outlook, (May 1976, Special Housing Issue) p.4  
11 Community Housing Working Party, Gradual Renewal in Leeds (March 1976) p.7 
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discord. At the forefront of these factors were such things as the general financial 
situation, something that was largely outside the control of local political actors; 
rapid socio-economic change, which prompted the city to restructure in order to 
compete in the broader economic environment; and local politics, both in the 
sense of ‘traditional’ party rivalries and the less obvious conflicts between 
different territorial and social groups within the city. These features of urban 
policy give a more thorough perspective to the often superficial assessments of 
success and failure when it comes to the fortunes of a city.           
 
There were elements of a ‘modernisation project’ in the immediate post-war 
period in the ideas and aspirations reflected in the City Development Plan and in 
the general concepts of Leeds’ planners, but in the immediate term change was 
quite incremental. Approaches to slum clearance showed continuity with the pre-
war era, and had the essentially sanitary aim of getting rid of unfit housing that 
was believed to cause ill-health, while new building was also similar to that of 
before 1939, with cottage-type dwellings on out-of-town estates. The initial spur 
to modernist development was pragmatic, as high-rise dwellings were thought to 
be more economical when it came to land-use and also eventually provided a 
quick method of construction. For the design professions they had the added 
advantage of incorporating modern ideas about rational internal and external 
layout, with the bonus for politicians and potential residents that they contained 
most of the ‘mod-cons’ that were found in newly-built private housing in this 
period. Thus for a period of approximately ten years there was a general 
consensus within the council on the benefits of modern housing estates and tower 
blocks, though the first cracks in this agreement came as early as 1965, with the 
reservations of Karl Cohen and the Housing Director in discussions about the 
Development Plan review. 
 
Ironically, the incorporation of housing in what resembled a coherent 
modernisation process came after most of Leeds’ high-rise flats had been built. 
By the late 1960s residential areas were an integral part of general schemes to 
provide new transportation links, shopping and industrial facilities that would 
radically upgrade Leeds. The Conservative administration of 1967 to 1972 used 
this process as evidence for a determined effort to sell Leeds and change its 
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image and appearance from that of an old-fashioned, Victorian city. In housing 
this took the form of going beyond looking for shortfalls in the fitness of housing 
to trying to anticipate the standards that would become commonplace in future 
and combating ‘obsolescence’. Integral to this change of emphasis was a 
profound awareness of socio-economic change, and explicit references to the 
growing ‘North-South divide’ were made to highlight the perceived need to make 
Leeds a more desirable place in which to live, as well as in which to invest. 
Elsewhere in the country the major Conservative victories in the 1967 and 1968 
local elections led to a reduction in slum clearance and public housing output, 
often regarded as ‘socialist’, and a focus in attention on improvement.12 Leeds’ 
modernisation push was a decisive reason why the local Conservative group 
pursued a divergent route to its counterparts. 
 
High-rise housing and system-building became emblematic of modernisation, but 
their significance has been exaggerated. High-rise was a relatively short-lived 
phenomenon, and the pro-redevelopment ‘Strategy D’ proposal came at a time 
when Leeds’ last public high-rise blocks were being completed. Dunleavy, 
despite his misgivings about the multi-storey construction programmes, noted 
that ‘it was not possible to see high-rise policy as an issue involved in electoral 
politics.’13 Though there was enthusiasm from a range of people about the 
novelty of multi-storey flats and prefabricated dwellings in their early days, they 
were really symbolic of the modernisation project in the fact that they were 
treated as an unavoidable necessity in the circumstances of land and materials 
shortages and the need for speed of construction. They were abandoned when 
they became financially counter-productive and when waiting lists were falling, 
and they only became associated with the end of the modernisation process in 
hindsight. In emphasising the pragmatic side of systems-building, Glendinning 
and Muthesius have pointed out that ‘in the pre-fabricated schemes of the mid-
sixties, architectural theories of mass-production were unrealised in the face of 
municipal demands for limitless minor variations.’14 Politically, using 
prefabrication was less of a ‘brave new world’ and more of a means to an end. 
                                                          
12 Glendinning and Muthesius, Tower Block p.313 
13 Dunleavy, The Politics of Mass Housing in Britain, p.335 
14 Glendinning and Muthesius, Tower Block,  p.216 
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By the mid-1970s it had become clear that the modernisation ‘project’ had lost 
most of its momentum, if not ground to a halt entirely. Financial cutbacks had 
curtailed the slum clearance and housebuilding programmes, and this meant that 
much greater attention had to be given to focus efforts on the areas that most 
needed action. This applied just as much in the field of housing improvement, 
where intensive administrative processes took up a great deal of time and 
resources, and where unfamiliar and blurred consultation and participation 
procedures made political consensus even more difficult. Issues involving poor 
construction methods and disrepair in much post-war public housing also took up 
resources at a time of relative shortage, and played a major part in undermining 
the public legitimacy of modernisation, based as it was on the principle of higher 
standards. Merrett sums up the era by stating that ‘we can see that what most 
commentators presented as a welcome switch from redevelopment to 
rehabilitation, from axe to scalpel, was in fact a retreat from slum clearance 
accompanied by a huge cut-back in new local authority building, with only a 
temporary surge in the scale of rehabilitation in the private and municipal sectors. 
The “switch” in fact constituted a remarkable withdrawal of construction 
resources from housing renewal.’15 Against this kind of backdrop it was 
unsurprising that housing policy caused political difficulties in the 1970s. 
 
 
One of the important themes of this thesis is the nature of the state and the ‘local 
state’ and their relationship with the built and social environment, particularly in 
the sense of providing the background or framework for politics at the local level. 
As previously discussed16, there is a tendency for some commentators to focus on 
urban policy as the unrestrained application of ideas by a professional elite, 
without really giving much thought to the institutional machinery or socio-
economic constraints that decision-makers operated in. The constitutional 
arrangements between central and local government had a major impact, in the 
sense that legislation and finance forced constant ‘corrections’ at the local level, 
                                                          
15 Merrett, State Housing in Britain, p.262 
16 See pages 21-24 and 227-228.  
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but local authorities also possessed a substantial degree of leeway in the 
implementation of policy. Finance was probably a more significant constraint 
than legislation, despite being less prescriptive in theory. When the supply of 
money and subsidy from central government was plentiful, the options for 
councils were much broader, and it was easier to satisfy the needs and demands 
of the population. In the periods of relative dearth, the job of the local authority 
was more difficult. Spending helped to encourage expectation, and in the absence 
of funds there was inevitably a sense of frustration among sections of the 
population who felt neglected. The whole ‘project’ of participation and 
consultation was to be marred by the fact that it so often involved the attempt of 
the local administration to manage expectation and get the population to share the 
responsibility for difficult decisions.  
 
This gap between the policy-makers and the population was a major feature of 
urban planning in this era, and one of the more complex areas was in terms of the 
technical and design aspect of urban renewal. The application of ‘expertise’ 
inevitably created a division in that ‘ordinary’ people often lacked the skills and 
knowledge of issues relating to urban planning, architecture and public finance. 
This situation essentially created an environment of paternalism, where 
architects, planners and bureaucrats made and executed policy according to their 
own ideas and conceptions. Where this involved the uncomplicated application of 
professional standards the process was top-down but more benign than the 
alternative, which was that these kind of standards and procedures were 
compromised by external constraints such as financial cuts and political 
directives. When this occurred the status of officers and professionals was often 
used to justify policy that was ill-conceived or short-sighted, but where the 
decision-makers were jealous of their own positions and unwilling to share 
responsibility with wider sections of the political community and the public. One 
particular example of this was with the system-building programme, as at Hunslet 
Grange, which offered something of a technological ‘short-cut’ that eased 
problems with the progress of construction but caused massive difficulties later 
on. 
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The feature that was probably of the widest political significance related to ideas 
of ‘collective consumption’. As Castells has outlined,17 this concept describes the 
growth of public services that were provided or regulated by the state in the 
interests of ‘reproducing’ capitalism, and basically covered functions that it was 
difficult or impossible to operate at a profit, but that were essential to keep the 
economy or society functioning efficiently. Such services as health and education 
were the foremost examples, but planning was also an activity that aimed to 
sustain the socio-economic system, producing a rational urban order. Housing 
policy, including as it did widespread public interventions such as slum clearance 
and council house construction, also involved procedures that could be described 
as ‘collective consumption’. The significance of ‘collective consumption’ 
activities for local authorities was that they brought large groups of people into a 
position of reliance on the local state for the provision of various social needs. 
This also created a politicisation of these issues as demands were made or 
policies resisted relating to functions that had become the responsibility of the 
council. 
 
By the time of the late 1960s it might be said that the political, financial and 
technical resources of the council were struggling to cope with the expectations 
of the population and the legal and political responsibilities it had come to 
assume. The response was that, on the one hand, there was an attempt to 
rationalise the institutional and administrative processes of the council to produce 
greater efficiency, while on the other there was more of a willingness to involve 
sections of the public in the decision-making and execution of policy, in order to 
make them aware of the constraints and to tie them into the implementation of 
policy. These two responses were both followed by the local authority, but never 
really hand-in-hand or in any systematic way. In some sense they were quite 
incompatible. Striving for greater efficiency was held to require greater 
centralisation and an even closer reliance on technical and bureaucratic expertise, 
qualities that were not conducive to the encouragement of greater participation 
from the population. Participation inevitably involved a slower decision-making 
process which sought opinion and involved trying to reconcile a range of 
                                                          
17 Castells, City, Class and Power 
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positions, many of which were ‘irrational’ from a technical or bureaucratic point 
of view. 
 
As the impact of the financial problems of the 1970s became clear, the 
contradictions thrown up by adopting an incoherent strategy of centralisation and 
consultation came to a head. The attempts to involve the public and community 
groups in policy-making were frequently thwarted by an inability to reconcile the 
often complex preferences these exercises threw up with the options that the 
council felt able to offer and the bureaucratic difficulties in translating them into 
practice. From the point of view of community groups, participation offered 
frustratingly limited decision-making opportunities, and they resented the way 
that the council tried to ‘coach’ them into adopting its preferred option or simply 
provided them with a fait accompli.18 On the council’s side, they found local 
associations to be insufficiently realistic, but also that they were unable to tie 
most areas into routine consultation procedures, many people only taking an 
interest when major proposals were ready to be carried out. Where participation 
did prove successful, as in pre-allocation schemes, it was very resource-intensive 
and the authority was unable to stretch it over the whole city. In certain areas and 
campaigns it was also questionable just how representative some of the local 
groups were, and councillors were often jealous of their claims to be the voice of 
the local community.  
 
The mid-1970s were an inauspicious period in which to try and establish public 
involvement in planning, as the more stringent financial regime meant that often 
community groups were being incorporated into managing shortages and cuts in 
funding and provision. Where the issue was one of trying to draw residents into 
the process of managing declining and money-starved services, there was little 
public interest. Many of the Housing Consultative Committees created in the 
1970s by Leeds’ Housing Department were very poorly attended, even in areas 
where popular discontent was quite high. Thus there was no effective institutional 
basis that could incorporate public participation while maintaining an ‘efficient’ 
                                                          
18 Planning to Deceive- A Critique of Leeds Council’s ‘Participation Planning Exercise’ 
(Chapeltown News Pamphlet, 25/07/1975) provides a particularly radical exposition of this point 
of view. See also Ellis, ‘Pavement Politics’, which gives many examples of this type of situation. 
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management of residential areas in a context of depleted finances. The result of 
these failing strategies was that the state, both locally and centrally, began pulling 
back from the provision of ‘collective consumption’ in an attempt to reduce the 
responsibilities that it had acquired, as well as from sheer financial and 
administrative necessity as far as local authorities were concerned. This saw 
attention concentrated on the areas and groups that were judged to be in ‘most 
need’. This was a judgement that was still effectively under the control of the 
‘technocratic’ side of the council, but which was coming under question from 
groups that saw themselves as the most deserving recipients or, in the case of 
some slum clearance areas, were questioning the need for drastic intervention. In 
the field of housing management there was also a trend towards individual 
remedies, as tenants sought to use the system to acquire or refuse certain 
dwellings or districts, and as tensions developed over the use and abuse of public 
areas such as children’s playgrounds, vandalised garages and untidy green space. 
 
The earlier years of the modernisation process were closely connected to the 
growth of ‘collective consumption’. The virtual expropriation of many private 
landlords, the fruitless opposition of middle-class homeowners to the acquisition 
of land for public housing in their areas, proposals for roads through residential 
suburbs, and the local authority carrying out a shopping centre project at Seacroft 
all demonstrated that state intervention in the name of modernisation could often 
go against particular private property interests. Yet, in areas such as housing and 
planning, collective consumption was still limited in scope. This was evident in 
the policy of the Conservative administration that took control of the council 
from 1967 to 1972.  
 
Enthusiastic about intervening to improve the efficiency and image of the city, 
the decisions of the council at this time to sell off council housing and public land 
nevertheless served to curtail the breadth and depth of modernisation, and reduce 
legitimacy for it in the wider community. By the early 1970s the council was 
finding it difficult to get private developers to provide planned shopping centres 
in Hunslet and Moortown, building rates for private housing were sluggish, and at 
Colton the decision to build predominantly public housing on the planned estate 
was reversed. In many ways, therefore, there was a shift towards the reduction of 
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collective expectations in favour of an intensification of individual 
‘responsibility’, as the council gave up attempting to regulate urban processes and 
settled for a focus on problem areas where intervention was felt to be most 
necessary. Leeds’ own programmes of council house and land sales provide an 
example of where more emphasis was to be given to the market and property 
interests. These types of non-intervention helped to make Leeds more 
‘governable’, but they also seriously reduced the political space and made the 
satisfaction of popular demands a lot more difficult.   
 
‘Collective consumption’ was to play a major part in public involvement in local 
politics, both in providing grievances for people to react against, or in bringing 
them together to campaign about issues which affected them collectively. 
Examples of this included slum clearance and the struggle to get repairs carried 
out at Hunslet Grange Flats. Even where opposition was essentially conservative 
in resisting change, the response was political and involved some sort of common 
cause. Nevertheless, the political impact was limited by the nature of the 
organisations involved and their essentially circumscribed aims. One of the few 
cases of campaign groups uniting was the Community Housing Working Party, 
where a number of organisations opposed to slum clearance combined with the 
Leeds Civic Trust and some progressive sociologists and architects. Effectively, 
the arrangement involved common publicity and involvement in consultation 
with the council. It was moderately successful in raising the issue of gradual 
renewal and bringing grievances to the attention of the council, but by eschewing 
conventional politics and not broadening their arguments across urban issues as a 
whole, their impact was relatively small. The one area where campaigning on 
urban matters sought deliberately to provoke a wider radicalisation was in 
Chapeltown, but the level of mobilisation needed for that kind of politicisation 
was difficult to sustain, and later in the 1970s community activity in the area 
focused more on issues of racial identity and anti-discrimination.   
 
It was understandable in many ways that campaign groups would seek to resist 
incorporation into ‘ordinary’ party politics, either from a distrust of the council 
and a desire not to be compromised or used by parties, or from the belief that they 
needed to be ‘respectable’ and above sectional or ideological interest. The 
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problem was that these outlooks helped to keep campaign groups in the place that 
the bureaucracy or political parties wanted to see them, and prevented them from 
mounting any real challenges to the established interests and institutions. 
Ultimately the shortcomings and frustrations of community organisations 
paralleled or even provoked the switch towards individualised approaches to 
pursuing self-interest on urban matters, from such things as rejecting offers of 
certain types of housing and particular areas; seeking a transfer to another house 
or estate; actually buying council houses; through to efforts to erect fences to 
individually ‘colonise’ communal areas or to defend privacy against ‘nuisances’ 
like children’s play areas. This was a trend that was often assisted by the political 
and bureaucratic wings of the council. Shapely’s description of a rise in 
‘consumerism’ in urban politics was correct in the sense that the council had to 
take increasing account of the effects of accumulated individual decisions and 
behaviour19, but he failed to remark on the fact that this type of ‘consumerism’ 
seriously weakened the position of community groups and collective political 
action, as David Ellis astutely observed.20 Leeds’ experience of broadening public 
involvement in urban policy was similar to the participation process in 
Birmingham commented on by Paris and Blackaby. They pointed out that it ‘did 
very little to change the overriding influences on the council’s urban renewal 
policy. Nor did it raise residents’ consciousness to a level that would lead them to 
challenge these influences.’21 
 
Urban policy in residential Leeds involved both a radical transformation of the 
built environment along with relative neglect, where change was retarded or 
disregarded due to a range of financial, social and political factors. The concept 
of modernisation is an important one in helping to understand the process of 
change, but should not be assessed purely on its own terms, or allowed to 
disguise the deeper context of urban politics. Modernisation itself can be used to 
describe a series of modernist technical responses to urban problems, as well as 
an ideologically-led approach that aspired to improve the image of the city and 
act as a political guide for its transformation in a more competitive environment. 
                                                          
19 Shapely, The Politics of Housing, pp.13-17 
20 Ellis, ‘Pavement Politics’, p.57 
21 Paris and Blackaby, Not Much Improvement, p.155 
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The irony of modernisation rhetoric in Leeds was that the more concerted 
political efforts at modernisation came at a time when the ideological, technical 
and national political dominance of modernist urban intervention was coming to 
an end.  
 
In the post-war era housing was one of the leading political concerns, and there 
was a great deal of political and popular consensus that more dwellings needed to 
be provided, and that the poorest quality housing needed to be eradicated. Leeds 
was no exception to this, though it had its own problems, such as the high 
proportion of back-to-back houses, and often approached these in its own way. In 
other respects Leeds was under the same imperatives as other cities, and did not 
hesitate to adopt multi-storey building, centralisation of large contracts with 
‘reliable’ builders, and the use of prefabricated building systems. These were all 
responses to the issues thrown up by political demands and processes of urban 
change. Rightly or wrongly, these particular modernist strategies and techniques 
were justified as necessary and unavoidable by the council, and it has to be 
acknowledged that this was largely accepted at the time by the elected local 
politicians, the media and the Leeds public. While the institutional processes 
were heavily paternalist and there was evidence of some inchoate discontent, 
there was little sign of organised opposition to urban policy until the start of the 
1970s.   
 
This stirring of opinion was in many ways a response to a crisis that had already 
erupted. By the end of the 1960s high-rise building had become discredited and 
prohibitively expensive, significant figures within Leeds’ politico-bureaucratic 
elite such as Karl Cohen and Housing Director Syd Benson were questioning the 
wisdom of high slum clearance rates and the popularity of much modern housing, 
and financial restrictions were eroding the basis of the ambitious programmes of 
construction and redevelopment that had marked much of the previous two 
decades. The response of the council, and in particular the Conservative political 
administration of the time, might appear strange in hindsight, but was influenced 
by the flavour of the time. Much of the intervention in Leeds’ urban environment 
was motivated by the feeling that it was a long overdue opportunity to tackle 
some ingrained problems with obsolete housing, aging infrastructure, significant 
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traffic congestion and out-of-date industry. Leeds’ policy-makers were conscious 
of the socio-economic trends of the era, which in their eyes made competing with 
other cities, particularly in the South and Midlands, a vital task. Apart from the 
actual physical improvements this was held to require, an even more important 
objective was to boost the image of Leeds in order to impress potential investors 
and keep hold of aspirational and skilled Leodensians. The architects of the 
strategy of the ‘Motorway City of the Seventies’ saw the continued existence of 
its aging back-to-backs as something of an embarrassment and an affront to 
modern standards. 
 
This renewed physical and ideological transformation of the city was to involve 
the centralisation of policy and executive functions within the council and the 
increased application of managerial expertise. The new emphasis on consultation 
and participation was actually intended to reinforce this corporate shift by 
providing information on grass-roots opinions and issues, and by incorporating 
local organisations into the managerial outlook, as Cockburn described in 
Lambeth.22 In Leeds these hopes were to be sorely disappointed. In a period of 
increasing financial cut-backs, it was to be very difficult to continue to implement 
urban policy that required expensive, drastic changes to social life at the same 
time as trying to hold down costs and to gain the willing support of wide sections 
of the local population. Community and campaign groups were unsurprisingly 
disappointed at the expectation that their participation should be closely guided 
by the council bureaucracy, and that many options seemed to be ‘off the table’. 
The impact of these groups was to be boosted by the active support of a 
revitalised local Liberal Party, who both gave them a voice in the council 
chamber and tried to encourage discontent for electoral gain, and the involvement 
of academics and professionals who had reacted quite violently against the 
previous modernist intellectual consensus of the past-war period. In many ways 
the flowering of community opposition was a symptom of pre-existing problems, 
and the single-issue, often very localised nature of groups helped to reduce their 
impact and the ability to resolve and recognise some very deep-lying causes.  
 
                                                          
22 Cynthia Cockburn, The Local State (London, Pluto Press, 1977) 
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In this volatile and unfavourable atmosphere the ambitious modernisation plans 
of Leeds’ council were to be frustrated. Managerialism was reduced in many 
cases to the encouragement of lower expectations and the achievement of at least 
a minimum of their most urgent objectives. Planning policy became more long-
term and vaguely aspirational in nature as its political and financial basis got 
more unsettled. This did little to improve its relevance to the public, and 
legitimacy possibly dropped even further as planning objectives were to be 
constantly disappointed. In the circumstances of the era some of the local 
Conservative policies were to prove counter-productive. The encouragement of 
council house sales, the sale of council-owned land and the reduction of public 
housebuilding in the suburbs all helped to cause division between sections of the 
public in a context where council house construction was decreasing and where 
the increased stock of private landholding did not lead to a corresponding rise in 
the rate of private building. Despite the significant improvements to Leeds’ 
residential environment—including thousands of modern houses, the renovation 
of the vast majority of the remaining older dwellings, and the provision of new 
social facilities to enhance housing areas—the political roots of urban policy had 
proved inadequate. In a situation where public money was increasingly scarce, 
where there were much higher standards and expectations, but where people still 
found control over their environment to be frustratingly elusive, discontent had 
increased significantly. The inability to find collective solutions to the problems 
of residential Leeds was leading to a situation where people turned to increased 
individual approaches to housing issues, leading to more competition and further 
division within the local population. A new Leeds had been created by the end of 
the 1970s but, for all the initiatives of the community groups of the previous 
fifteen years, it was a city that seemed to be decreasingly influenced by the 
collective vision of its inhabitants.                                          
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